A new Eurasian war doctrine?

“The experienced general wears out the enemy by keeping him under constant pressure. He makes him run everywhere by luring him with illusory advantages”.
Sun Tzu

The evolution of war doctrines is determined on the one hand by technology (new weapons, new offensive or defensive tools impose different approaches to combat – think of unmanned aircraft), but on the other hand it is the experience of combat itself that forges the new military thought. In fact, all the great military thinkers, whether Western or Eastern, have always drawn their reflections from a previous experience (direct or otherwise) of war.
Historically, the evolution of strategic thought has then condensed in the elaboration of more specific doctrines, also built on the basis of the nature and scope of the interests of the countries in which they were developed. If we look at the decades following the end of WWII, we can observe how strategic thought had its development – ​​as is logical – essentially in the United States and the USSR. In both cases, it was obviously sucked into the narrow scope of the confrontation between these two powers. Throughout the Cold War, Western and Soviet strategic thinking was characterized by the presence of nuclear weapons (technological innovation) and the evolution of what had been developed during the previous world conflict (combat experience).

The years following the Second World War, in fact, saw both Washington and Moscow develop a mirror model, whose main characteristics were: creation of large integrated blocks of political-military alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact), development of an atomic arsenal, both potentially offensive and deterrent, construction of a model of armed forces based on mobility and the massive presence of armor. The characteristic of this historical phase was therefore a military doctrine that was not particularly different, in the two opposing camps, and substantially characterized by symmetry – armies of very similar power, structure and doctrine, that confront each other.
Moreover, geopolitical reasons have at the same time meant that all of this remained in a merely theoretical context, since neither of the two ever really sought conflict. In short, during the years of the Cold War, the military instrument always remained in its sheath, without ever being truly unsheathed. Even if, obviously, it was used as an instrument of pressure.

From the point of view of the use of conventional, non-nuclear forces, the most complete theorization of the strategic approach inherited from WWII is probably the US doctrine called Airland Battle [1], destined to profoundly and long-lastingly mark Western military thought. It is important to note that this doctrine, elaborated during the seventies of the last century, finds its definitive formalization in the eighties, that is, only a decade before the collapse of the USSR.
In any case, what unites Western strategic thought and Soviet Cold War thought is, as already said, on the one hand symmetry, but on the other being completely theoretical; there has never been, in fact, an opportunity to verify it in combat.
Parallel to all this, another strategic thought was being developed in the East, in turn forged in the concrete experience of war, whose fundamental characteristic was asymmetry, and whose most important theorists were Mao Zedong and Vo Nguyen Giap.

This asymmetric strategic thinking was also, obviously, closely connected to a political-ideological vision of war, which went beyond the classic Clausewitzian assumption, and which would make it the basis on which the national liberation movements would build their action during the twentieth century.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall, and then of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, the fundamental condition of symmetric warfare obviously disappeared, that is, the presence of two contenders who were overall comparable (in terms of military, industrial and demographic power), and therefore the era of asymmetric warfare began. The only remaining power – the United States – identified itself as hegemon, and partially converted its strategic doctrine in this direction.
The fundamental concept of this approach is that there are no adversaries of equal level, and therefore: a) it is possible to use the broad technological and military supremacy to crush any adversary, and b) it is possible to engage more easily in rapid and decisive conflicts.

It is the doctrine of Rapid Domination (better known as Shock and Awe) [2], whose best-known applications are the wars against Iraq (Operation Desert Storm, 1991) and against Serbia (Allied Force, 1999).
In its essence, the substantial change compared to previous symmetric strategic doctrines is the transition from the competition to obtain supremacy on the battlefield, to the assumption that this is the default condition. What changes, therefore, is more the duration of the combat than the combat mode, and therefore the quantity of men and means necessary to obtain victory.
In the unipolar world, characterized by US hegemony, the military instrument becomes in effect a sort of global police, to be used to repress riots in the various peripheral areas [3], and whose action also serves as a deterrent towards other potential rebels to the new world order.
As mentioned, this new strategic approach, based on the undisputed assumption of complete supremacy, has mainly influenced the quantitative aspect: NATO armies have gradually reduced personnel, abandoning the model of compulsory conscription in favor of a professional one, and have oriented themselves towards more sophisticated and technologically advanced weapons systems, but produced in smaller quantities - and above all little suited to intense and prolonged use.
At the same time, in the United States a line of thought based on the reduction of costs in the exercise of imperial power has progressively asserted itself. As a consequence of this, the direct involvement of NATO's allied armies in international military operations has constantly grown.

This development of the Atlantic Alliance, from an instrument of defense (from the USSR) and control (of the USA over Europe), to an offensive instrument with global projection, has obviously been made possible not only by the substantial subservience of the European political leaders, but also - and not secondarily - by the aforementioned professionalization of the armies, which has made the problem of war casualties less psychologically impactful. At the same time, this has produced a profound change in the armies of the Alliance. The direct involvement of the armed forces of the various countries in non-defensive combat operations, and outside the geographical borders of the alliance itself, has in fact led to a growing standardization and ever greater integration – so much so as to determine a situation in which the various professional armies, despite being formally dependent on their respective governments, perceive themselves as a whole, a sort of collective super-army, in which not only is the military command always in US hands, but in which strategies and tactics are established at the Pentagon, and (even more importantly) adherence to this subordinate model becomes a conditio sine qua non for career advancement.
This entire evolutionary process, both of strategic thinking and of its tactical articulations (as well as the consequent organizational and logistical implications), has substantially characterized the last three decades, but has exclusively affected the Western field.

What happened in the meantime outside of this, has often remained outside the optical horizon of the West, which has continued to lull itself in the idea of ​​its own superiority (moral and cultural, as well as material), in the illusion that it was, among other things, an immutable fact. As a consequence of this, the US-NATO bloc has not taken significant steps to adapt - strategically, tactically and materially - to the changes that were instead occurring in the global geopolitical framework.
From this point of view, the most striking is undoubtedly China's extraordinary economic growth; growth that, as is obvious, has enabled Beijing not only to exercise a growing multi-continental commercial influence, but has also provided it with the basis for increasing its political role, making it a rapidly growing world power. A condition that has effectively placed the PRC as the main competitor of the USA, and therefore - according to the US hegemonic logic - representing the main challenge to Washington's global hegemony. Unlike the American leadership, which has not equipped itself for the challenge, the Chinese one has instead perfectly understood that the new level of power required a substantial adjustment of the armed forces, and has taken important steps in this direction.

But obviously - as Westerners are bitterly discovering - there is not only China. To begin with, there is Russia, which is right there, on the eastern borders of NATO. Which for thirty years has cultivated the illusion that, one step at a time, it could push these borders ever closer to Moscow, and without consequences. Indeed, it has lulled itself so much into the idea of ​​Russia as a medium regional power (in short, a couple of steps below the Atlantic Alliance), that it believed it possible to openly challenge it, drag it into a conflict (conducted by proxy) that would have exhausted it and, in the best of cases, would have produced a collapse of the current leadership.
The Ukrainian adventure is dramatically revealing how mistaken and naive the calculations of the West were.
But, in this respect, perhaps the most decisive error - among the many committed by the hegemonic complex - was to consider its technological advantage as unattainable. Only to then discover (see communications from the Minister of Defense Crosetto to Parliament), that it simply no longer exists. Indeed (even if there is not yet a Crosetto who has the guts to say this) in terms of warfare the West is well on its way to being overtaken. And not only by Russia and China. Just think of North Korea's capabilities in the nuclear and artillery sectors, or Iran's capabilities in drones and missiles (Iran has hypersonic missiles of its own production, the US is still experimenting with them - and not very happily, by the way).

Moreover, regardless of geopolitical alignments, US and European industrial war production, in qualitative terms, today appears to be surpassed by that of other countries, such as South Korea, India, Turkey...
If this is the general picture, the context in which the current players in the global confrontation are placed, let's now see what are the elements that are determining a significant change in military strategies, under the dual aspect indicated at the beginning: technological evolution and combat experience.
As for the first aspect, there is no doubt that the element that is having the most significant impact on the battlefield are drones, in all their possible declinations. And, as a first important consequence, the margins of action (and the ways of using them) of what have traditionally been the strong points of the US-NATO model: armored formations and attack aviation have been drastically reduced.
As a result, anti-missile / anti-aircraft systems and – more generally – EW (electronic warfare) systems are becoming much more important than they were previously.

The strategic importance of drones – from large observation and attack UAVs to small FPVs – derives from the excellent cost/benefit ratio and, therefore, from the ability to produce them in large quantities. From this point of view, the West is decidedly behind. Hypersonic missiles are also an element capable of marking the difference, both for their precision and for the extremely high difficulty of intercepting/shooting them down. Their use, however, has still been limited, therefore not sufficient to determine great changes. The fact that it is mainly non-Western armies that have them (and master the related technology) has not so far produced an attempt to make strategic use of them.

But what is the current experience of war producing? Certainly – and it could not be otherwise – not a new strategic doctrine; formulated, articulated, put down in black and white. Maybe not yet; or maybe it simply will not happen.
In modern times, apart from the aforementioned theorists of guerrilla warfare, there are not many strategic theories of non-Western origin. The Gerasimov doctrine [4] comes to mind, which is however erroneously attributed to the current Russian Chief of Staff and – it seems – is instead the fruit of his predecessor, General Makarov, or the famous War without Limits, a volume written in the 90s by two high-ranking Chinese officers [5]; in both cases, these are theoretical works on what is now commonly defined as hybrid warfare, but which – especially with regard to Chinese material – is not entirely accurate to define as a doctrine. Certainly, however, while China has substantially no direct experience of a large-scale conflict since the Korean War, the same cannot be said of Russia, which instead has fought various wars and guerrilla warfare in the last twenty years (Chechnya, Georgia, Syria, Ukraine).

If we look at the two major ongoing conflicts – Ukraine, precisely, and Palestine – we can make a series of very interesting observations, from which we can dare to derive a common interpretation and, in some way, perhaps even prefigure the (still shapeless) emergence of a Eurasian military doctrine for the next ten, fifteen years. We certainly know that in both cases we are faced with a clear and distinct alignment (USA and NATO on one side, Russia and Iran on the other), and that both can be indisputably framed in the great geostrategic game, with which the US empire seeks to maintain hegemony and contain the development of rivals capable of challenging its rules-based order.

The conflict in Ukraine, despite its peculiarities, is characterized by a series of elements (which have been reflected upon at length, even on these pages).
– First of all, it is a war that fits fully into the framework of the global confrontation that opposes the USA (with its retinue of colonies and clients) to the Eurasian bloc led by Russia and China.
– It is a symmetrical conflict, because the countries that are facing each other are not two countries (Russia and Ukraine) that are profoundly different in terms of potential – military, industrial, demographic – but fifty-one: Russia against the 31 NATO countries plus another 19 variously linked to the American empire.
– It is an existential war, not only because in it both contenders on the ground are putting their survival as a unitary state-national entity at stake, but because there is no possible ground for mediation between the complex of opposing interests.
– It is a conflict in which (at least for the moment) neither of the two real adversaries (USA-NATO and Russia) intends to escalate to the point of direct confrontation, which would imply an exponential increase in the risk of nuclear conflict.
– Of the two parties, Russia is the one that has proven to be more flexible, more capable of learning (politically and militarily) from the development of the conflict, progressively adapting its tactical approach.
– The Western camp, after initially toying with the idea of ​​being able to inflict a defeat on the field on Russia, then moved on to the strategic objective of simply prolonging the conflict to the point of exhaustion, and finally (as usual, one might say) Washington drew the conclusions of a cost/benefit assessment, deciding on a progressive disengagement.
– For its part, Russia, while maintaining its minimal strategic objectives (demilitarization of Ukraine and its neutrality), is successfully pursuing an approach based on the attrition of the enemy – in a broad sense – such as not only to lead to its capitulation, but to determine the progressive annihilation of the Ukrainian war capacity.
– Significant, in fact, is the absolutely asymmetrical balance of losses. Although there are no official figures, neither on one side nor the other, the most reliable estimates speak of around 70,000 Russian casualties, while the Ukrainian ones are now approaching 700,000.
– Last but not least, the Ukrainian regime (and in particular the secret services) are increasingly resorting to forms of real terrorism, to try to balance the failures on the battlefield [6].

Overall, therefore, Moscow is applying (with full effectiveness, and with better adaptation of means to ends) what NATO thought it could apply to Russia.
Fundamentally, this outcome is due to the overestimation of themselves (by the USA-NATO) and the underestimation of the adversary. And, not least, to the fact that Russia had long understood that the West had taken a path that led to war, and had prepared itself in time for this eventuality - while preferring to avoid it.
As regards the conflict in Palestine, it is necessary to make a brief excursus of the previous conflict. In fact, everything begins, at least in 1948, with the foundation of the state of Israel, and the Nakba (the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian Arabs by Zionist militias).
The first Arab-Israeli war coincides with the foundation of the Jewish state: on May 15, 1948, the armies of Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq and Lebanon invade its territory, but just two months later – thanks to Israeli military supremacy – a truce is reached, which will allow Israel to annex the Eastern Galilee, the Negev and a strip of territory up to Jerusalem. The second war is that of 1956, linked to the crisis of the Suez Canal (nationalization carried out by Nasser), at the end of which – from October 29 to November 9 – Israel will obtain the port of Eilat, on the Gulf of Aqaba.

In 1967, the third conflict, the famous Six-Day War. Israeli forces occupied Gaza and Sinai to the detriment of Egypt, the West Bank and the Arab part of Jerusalem to the detriment of Jordan, the Golan Heights to the detriment of Syria.
The fourth and final war was that of 1973, called the Yom Kippur War (from the Jewish holiday during which the Syrian-Egyptian attack took place). And this too was extremely rapid (from 6 to 22 October).
The Yom Kippur War, therefore, effectively put an end to the military confrontation between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries, which – both due to defeats on the field and Western pressure – essentially abandoned the idea of ​​erasing Israel from the Middle East and recovering the lost territories, preferring a de facto accommodation, with the start of a long phase of commercial relations with the Jewish state.

From this moment on, the only political-military opposition to the Israeli occupation will come from the Palestinian movements, united in the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization). The three subsequent Israeli-Lebanese wars, in fact, do not fall within the framework of the confrontation between Arab countries and the Jewish state, but are in fact part of the conflict between this and the Palestinian Resistance. The PLO, in fact, had in fact taken root in the nearby country of the cedars, where there were also numerous Palestinian refugees, and from here it conducted its guerrilla actions in Palestine. In March 1978, following some incidents on the border, Tel Aviv invaded southern Lebanon, occupying it to a depth of about 20 kilometers, up to the Litani River. A few days later, the Security Council asked Israel to withdraw, and established the UNIFIL mission [7]; Tel Aviv would withdraw its troops only after a few months, but not before creating a Christian-Maronite militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), to which it would entrust control of the territory.

In June 1982, the second invasion of Lebanon, again following border clashes. The IDF, aided by the SLA and other Christian militias, this time pushed over 40 km into the country, reaching Beirut, where the PLO command was located. The UNIFIL soldiers, who were supposed to stop the invasion, in fact did not intervene, and were outflanked by Israeli troops. Operation Peace for Galilee culminated in the siege of the Lebanese capital (from 14 June to 21 August), which caused thousands of victims. It was precisely following this second invasion – which among other things caused the transfer of the PLO to Tunis – that the Hezbollah party was born within the Lebanese Shiite community.
Although the siege of Beirut was lifted [8], the IDF continued to occupy southern Lebanon for 18 years, until 2000.

In 2006, the third invasion of Lebanon, this time following a Hezbollah incursion into the occupied territories. This too was short-lived: on August 14, a month after the start of the invasion – during which the IDF had barely managed to penetrate a couple of km – Israel was in obvious difficulty, and thanks to international intervention its withdrawal to the so-called blue line was agreed.
The 2006 conflict represents the turning point in the confrontation between Israel and the Resistance, because for the first time the IDF has to register a defeat on the field, albeit limited – and above all camouflaged by the intervention of the UN.

Apart from this series of military conflicts, which mainly concern the Arab countries, the resistance of the Palestinian population to the occupation will initially manifest itself with the first and second Intifada. In both cases we cannot speak of guerrilla warfare, but of civil resistance, as the struggle was conducted mainly by popular committees, and was expressed in strikes, boycotts and above all stone throwing against the occupation forces. Both the first and the second were long-lasting phenomena (1987-1993 and 2000-2005), and were important both for relaunching the Palestinian cause internationally and for bringing out a substantial radicalization of the Resistance (Hamas, founded in 1987, began to carry out armed attacks against the occupier in 2001).

Between the end of the second Intifada (2005) and the Al Aqsa Flood operation (2023), the main events in the Palestinian camp were the split between Fatah and Hamas (2006-2007), with the consequent partition between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the progression of the PNA under US control and active collaboration with Israel. This has in fact shifted the center of gravity of the confrontation to Gaza, assigning Hamas the leadership of the Resistance. And it is in fact on Gaza that Israeli repression will be directed. In particular, first with Operation Cast Lead (December 27, 2008 – January 18, 2009), during which Israel used US-made phosphorus bombs (internationally banned) and inert metal DIME [9] projectiles against civilians, and subsequently with Operation Pillar of Cloud (also known as Operation Pillar of Defense, November 14, 2012 – November 21, 2012). In both cases, thousands of civilian victims were recorded, and the practice of human shields by the IDF.

Even the conflict in Palestine, despite its peculiarities, is characterized by a series of elements (which, here too, have been written about several times).
– As long as the conflict mainly concerned Israel and the Arab countries, we have witnessed symmetrical and rapid conflicts, in which Tel Aviv has exploited its technological supremacy and its best military leadership.
– When the conflict became asymmetric (Lebanon-Hezbollah), the IDF began to show its difficulties in engaging in an unconventional conflict.
– Although always convinced that national security had to be guaranteed even with a disproportionate capacity for reaction (like a mad dog, in the words of Moshe Dayan), from that moment on the Israeli leadership fully embraced the doctrine of shock and awe, bringing it to its highest levels.
– The need for US support has gradually grown over time; from an initial phase in which the political level prevailed, to a second in which the supply of weapons and ammunition was relevant, to one in which, beyond these, direct intervention by the US (and its allies) is necessary to guarantee a minimum level of defense.
– This is an existential war, not only because both contenders on the ground are putting their survival at stake, but because there is no possible ground for mediation between the complex of opposing interests (for Israel, any Palestinian state is unacceptable).
– Of the two sides, the Axis of Resistance has proven to be more flexible, more capable of learning (politically and militarily) from the development of the conflict, adapting its tactical approach.
– Israel, after initially toying with the idea of ​​being able to inflict a defeat on the field on the Palestinian Resistance, then moved on to the strategic objective of simply prolonging the conflict, even at the cost of expanding it by increasing the risk of defeat.
– For its part, the Axis of Resistance is successfully pursuing an approach based on wearing down the enemy – in the broad sense – such as not only to lead to the worsening of its contradictions, but to determine the progressive reduction of Israel’s war capacity.
– The balance of losses is significant, in fact. Despite the extermination of the civilian population, the Resistance’s fighting force in Gaza is believed to be substantially intact (or replenished), while the IDF’s losses are very significant: no less than 10,000 casualties in eight months, with approximately 1,000 new wounded or with psychological trauma per month [10].
– Last but not least, Israel always resorts to forms of terrorism, to try to balance the lack of success on the battlefield.

It is clear that, beyond the all too obvious differences, there are numerous common elements, and among these some decidedly significant.
In both cases, we have one of the parties in conflict (Ukraine, Israel) for which Western support (political, diplomatic, economic, military) is literally fundamental. Both, if this were to fail, would collapse in a short time.
In both cases, the parties supported by the West are unable to defeat the enemy, and are subjected to attrition, of the armed forces first and foremost, but also economic and psychological, which deeply stresses the respective societies, and which – what matters most – undermines the ability to continue the conflict over long periods.
In both cases, both Russia and the Axis of Resistance are modulating their war action based on the principle of maximum attrition of the enemy, an approach that implies inflicting constant losses over time, rather than trying to inflict many and heavy ones in a short time.

Even if, obviously, we are far from a comprehensive theorization, and even more so from a possible systematization of the theory, what is emerging is in fact a strategic orientation that unites very different fronts (in every respect), and which is equally certainly in the vein of Chinese strategic thought.
In contrast to Western strategic thought, which is totally focused on offensive capacity, and therefore on achieving a decisive result in the shortest possible time, what is emerging - and which perhaps we can dare to define as a future Eurasian war doctrine - is focused on the depth of the result, on its incisiveness and duration. Brutally put, rather than trying to bring the enemy to its knees, it tries to break its legs.

Equally significant is the fact that this strategic orientation, not by chance in the wake of that already seen by Mao or Giap, arises from a political vision of war, in which the strictly warlike aspect is deeply intertwined with the political one. And, despite the obvious cultural implications, which are located upstream of all this, it can be defined as extremely Clausewitzian.
In the next one or two decades, we will probably have the opportunity to witness the confrontation between these two opposing strategic approaches, destined to battle it out on the field.
And, perhaps, someone, somewhere, will also take the trouble to try to derive the aforementioned doctrine from all this.

Notes

1 – Airland Battle was officially born on March 25, 1981, with the doctrinal publication 525-5 “The Airland Battle and Corps ’86” which redesigned the functions of the U.S. Army standard division (1986 model) in function of the European scenario. In 1986 the new doctrine was fully explained and adopted with the publication of the manual FM 100-5 “Operations”.

2 – Shock and Awe, is a military methodology based on the use of overwhelming power and spectacular displays of force to paralyze the enemy’s perception of the battlefield and destroy their will to fight. Rapid Dominance is defined as the attempt to “hit hard on the enemy’s will, perception and understanding to attack or respond to our strategic policy”. This new post-Cold War doctrine will be presented in a report at the National Defense University of the United States in 1996 (See “Shock and awe. Achieving Rapid Dominance”, Harlan K. Ullman, James P. Wade, National Defense University of the United States).

3 – It is absolutely no coincidence that at the same time as the emergence of this police approach to the use of armed forces, the self-perception of the United States as the highest and only true world authority will also emerge, and as such morally legitimized to guarantee order everywhere.

4 – It would be a military strategy that combines the military, technological, informational, diplomatic, economic, cultural (and other tactical) spheres to achieve strategic objectives. In short, that then began to be defined as hybrid warfare. The attribution (later retracted) was due to an article by an American military analyst, Mark Galeotti, who also later acknowledged that he had poorly translated the original Russian document, interpreting as an offensive strategy what, in fact, was instead defensive.

5 – See “Guerra senza limiti”, Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui, Libreria Editrice Goriziana

6 – Aside from the murders of Russian exponents both in Moscow and in Donbass, or the attack on the Crimean bridge, even more serious are those that were somehow foiled, from attempts to use dirty nuclear bombs, to the attempt to assassinate Putin and Defense Minister Belousov, during the parade in St. Petersburg for Navy Day. The operation was discovered, Belousov contacted the Pentagon to warn of the consequences, and Lloyd Austin – who was extremely surprised – took the information seriously, and then told Kiev to cancel everything.

7 – UNIFIL’s initial mandate was to “confirm Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon” and restore peace and security. The mission is still active today, and its objectives have changed as the situation on the ground has changed.

8 – In September 1982, as the IDF was withdrawing, the Maronite Christian militias of the SLA and the Lebanese Phalange massacred thousands of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camp on the outskirts of Beirut. The massacre was justified as revenge for an attack carried out a few days earlier on the Phalange headquarters, in which the Lebanese president, the Christian Bashir Gemayel, was killed. The IDF did not take part directly in the massacre, but aided and armed the Christian militias, even surrounding the camp to prevent the Palestinians from escaping.

9 – These are projectiles made of an external carbon fiber structure, filled with tungsten powder instead of traditional metal shrapnel. The tungsten particles allow for a high-temperature explosion to develop in a very small radius of action, in order to produce damage in a smaller space.

10 – 10,000 losses in eight months, which means about 2,500/3,000 dead and the rest wounded, is a very heavy toll for Israel, especially in light of the lack of military results. The Yom Kippur War (1973) cost about 2,700 deaths, the first Lebanon War (1982-1985) more than 1,200, but they were against regular armies. The second Intifada, the bloodiest, in five years (2000-2005) cost about 1,000 deaths.