After the truce
As usual, in the unsaid, in the omissions, there is more relevance than in the overt assertions, which are always peppered with various opportunistic reasons.
And for example, in the current phase of the (almost centenary) Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there are quite a few.
From Netanyahu, his ministers and the IDF generals, from 7 October until today, it has been a continuous profusion of fiery declarations. We will destroy, we will annihilate, we will kill. But then there is the gap between the statements and the reality. Reality is a genocidal campaign of systematic destruction of the entire Gaza Strip - on the meaning of which even the New York Times questions (“Gaza Civilians, Under Israeli Barrage, Are Being Killed at Historic Pace”); reality is 20,000 dead, two-thirds of them women and children; reality is the violent aggression against the occupied territories in the West Bank (which cannot be blamed for the 7 October attack), which already has over 200 Palestinians killed. The reality, as many in Israel and among its sponsors now admit, is that the fighting strength of the Palestinian Resistance is substantially intact, while the political one is immensely strengthened.
The reality is what is happening - on the ground and in the rear - on the various fronts.
Meanwhile, the truce. It is clear that Netanyahu had to accept it, for a variety of reasons: US pressure, the pressure of domestic and international public opinion, but also the objective difficulties encountered since the start of the ground operation in Gaza. And in the space of a few days, it went from the declared intention to assassinate Hamas members wherever they were in the world, to the promise not to touch those living in Qatar ("Israel will not assassinate Hamas leaders in Qatar, Netanyahu tells Doha").
And then the direct correlation between the Gaza front and the Lebanese, and Syrian-Iraqi front. Despite the fact that the truce was declaredly limited to the Strip (and in fact the IDF continues to rage in the West Bank), both Hezbollah's attacks in the north and those of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and Syria against US bases have in fact ceased. And of course this greatly reassures Tel Aviv (which is terrified of Hezbollah) and Washington.
At this point, it is quite predictable that the truce, barring special events, will be extended in steps, at least until the civilian prisoners in the hands of the Resistance are exhausted. There should still be more or less 40 to 60 of them (considering that according to Hamas about 50 died in the bombardments), which means the possibility of maintaining the truce for another 7 to 10 days. For the Resistance it will in any case be an acquired political success, in addition to the advantage of no longer having to provide for the needs and surveillance of so many people. [N.B. All of the liberated Palestinians come from the West Bank, because Israel exercises authority and control there; their liberation, therefore, greatly strengthens the Resistance's political credit there, to the detriment of the PNA]. As for Israel, which will eventually have freed 400/600 Palestinians, silenced the families of the prisoners, and in the meantime has made ample payback by capturing some 3000 Palestinian prisoners in the West Bank...
And after the truce?
It is clear that resuming with the massive bombardment will be politically very complicated for Netanyahu. But resuming the ground campaign will be militarily complicated. So far, the IDF has lost hundreds of armoured personnel carriers and hundreds of soldiers, with a result (net of propaganda) that is absolutely insignificant. Nor can things be expected to change any time soon, quite the contrary. Even if one only looks at the tactical methods (and results), it is evident that the army is moving decidedly badly, inside Gaza, registering very high losses, and without achieving any real military objective.
Moreover ('unspoken'), the Resistance is holding dozens of Israeli soldiers; and men of military age. The Hannibal directive would be to leave them prisoners, or even kill them if possible. But after negotiating to free women and children, it becomes very complicated not to negotiate for those too. Only, the price will be very high. And at that point, the dilemma will be fatal: if Tel Aviv refuses the exchange, it condemns its men to a long imprisonment (at best); if it tries to free them, assuming it finds them, it will condemn them to death; if it accepts the exchange (surely thousands of Palestinians), the political defeat will be total. Lose-lose. However he decides, he loses.
And if he resumes the attack on Gaza, from the air and/or by land ("unspoken"), the other fronts will be rekindled: Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen... Israel cannot withstand a war of attrition on so many fronts, neither militarily nor economically; and therefore not politically. America strongly fears the widening of the conflict, and in any case would like to close this game as soon as possible; to its credit, there is already the defeat in Ukraine, which it is trying to manage in a time and manner that does not affect the presidential campaign, but the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is much more lacerating, especially for the Democrats. On Ukraine, basically there is a clash within the political world, between Republicans and Democrats, but on Palestine, the clash is almost all within the Democratic world, with strong pro-Palestinian chunks of the electorate and much of the Jewish lobby, the friendly ones, against.
In the end, the Resistance will emerge victorious in any case, even if the IDF really succeeds (which is impossible) in destroying its organisations in Gaza and the West Bank.
As for Israel, much depends on what will happen within the war cabinet in the coming days and weeks. If anger, racial hatred, the desire for revenge, and the messianic illusion of Greater Israel will once again prevail, they will all drown in blood - Israelis and Palestinians - and an abyss will open up. If prudence and reasonableness prevail, the chasm opened with the truce will widen, the tones will soften, and Israel will have to come to terms with itself, and above all (like the US with Ukraine) it will have to look for a way to make defeat less painful and less dangerous.
Either way, in the medium term this could mean the political death of the Zionist project.