While during the first two years of the Ukrainian war, the track record of warmongering was almost equally divided between the USA and the UK, in more recent times this has been claimed by Macron. The reasons are varied, and range from the great difficulty in which France finds itself today to the illusion of being able to take advantage of the German crisis to assume European leadership, to the political dwarfism of its president. But the underlying reason is that the European leaderships, almost unanimously, have essentially resigned themselves to carrying out the task left by the United States: taking on the burden of the conflict in the East, supporting Kiev even beyond the last Ukrainian, if necessary.
Here too, the reasons why Europeans have convinced themselves that they cannot escape this task are multiple, and I have written about them other times. What matters is understanding how they think they will do it, when they think they will do it, and obviously whether they really think they can do it.
Judging by how interventionist declarations are intensifying, it would seem that the deadline is not that far away; probably, in the European secretariats they imagine starting an operational phase at least after the American elections - also to have a clearer picture of the White House's orientations and its release times. At the same time, the evolution on the battlefield does not seem very compatible with these optimistic forecasts: the arrival of the good weather has already relaunched the Russian initiative along the entire front line, and the structural deficiencies of the Ukrainian army are to the comb. Events, therefore, could accelerate.
As for how, it would seem quite clear that the idea is to boil the Russian bear like the proverbial frog. One step at a time, counting on the fact that Moscow, wanting to avoid an escalation, will eventually let things happen without a strong response. All in all, it is believed, Russia had set several red lines, but then allowed them to be crossed without reacting. Therefore, raising the temperature little by little can be a good strategy.
Furthermore, public discourse (the narrative with which public opinions are prepared) is a mix of nonsense and half-truths, but reading them carefully the design becomes clear.
Macron puffs out his chest and makes aggressive statements, but then between the Ukrainian requests and the European availability the scheme emerges: start by training the Ukrainians in Ukraine (150,000 men...) so that they are closer (and ready) to the front [1]. After all, NATO countries have been training them for years, only the location changes... One imagines that such a debut would be more acceptable for European citizens, and that after all Moscow would not react beyond "harsh protests". Then we'll see from there on out.
Obviously, the weak point is the actual possibility of creating the design according to your own scheme.
First of all, the premise is that Russia behaves exactly as expected in Brussels – which, however, is by no means a given. As always, prey to their autism, European leaders do not listen, and even if they do they do not understand. Here, in fact, we are beyond Medvedev's entire statements; when a diplomat like Lavrov says clearly that if the Europeans want war they are ready, it is not to be taken lightly. Moreover, when Monti in his turn says that "to make Europe" we need to shed blood, he is just more sincere and pragmatic than Macron.
The problem, of course, is that a scheme of small steps simply risks resulting in a series of useless steps. The critical issues of the Ukrainian army are basically three: lack of ammunition for artillery, lack of personnel, lack of anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems.
The first, the Europeans are unable to remedy. Even if the relative Russian industrial production did not grow (as is happening) and remained at current levels, it would take Europeans years and years to match it.
For the second, the difficulties in solving it would be at least the same. Sending even 20-30,000 men would have no decisive impact. First of all, we would be talking about men without any real combat experience, much less a war of attrition like the one underway. The support logistics would be very complicated, since the rear would have to be located in Poland and/or Romania, a thousand kilometers from the front. And anyway, even such a figure would be equivalent to 5-6,000 men in combat. Irrelevant. We would need to send at least 2-300,000 men, practically the entire force of European NATO, to have any impact.
The Europeans could transfer almost all their anti-missile/anti-aircraft defense systems, leaving their respective countries almost undefended, but this too would have a limited impact in time: the Russians would exploit the large quantities of at their disposal to saturate the defenses and destroy the batteries one after the other.
The only thing that could introduce an element of discontinuity would be the intervention of the air force. European fighter-bombers taking off from airfields outside Ukraine, hitting Russian rear areas. But this would inevitably bring the war to European soil, since at that point it is clear that the Russians would hit the departure air bases with their ballistic and hypersonic missiles. The same thing would happen if anti-missile batteries were used from neighboring countries. Furthermore, if this level of intervention were to create problems for the Russian armed forces, it is practically certain that at that point Moscow would resort to tactical nuclear weapons. Because for Russia the risk of defeat in this war would be equivalent to an existential threat. And here Macron comes back into play, who boldly promises the coverage of the French nuclear umbrella, the force de frappe. Unfortunately, the comparison with the Russian Federation is merciless, and the quantity of French nuclear weapons (as well as the carriers to deliver them to the target) is ridiculously smaller: France can at most offer the shelter of a cocktail umbrella, and Moscow would do Paris a milkshake.
The European strategy of boiling the Russian bear little by little, therefore - even if it is as stupid as a frog - cannot work. Graduality simply risks making people pay a very high price (in terms of casualties, injuries, destroyed weapon systems, etc.), without obtaining any noteworthy results. An acceleration, on the other hand, by quickly bringing a significant force into combat, is practically equivalent to plunging Europe into an extended conflict, and without equally managing to change the terms of the equation.
Without direct intervention from the United States, European countries alone are absolutely unable to significantly engage Russia [2]. But direct engagement is exactly what they shun in Washington, and they are well aware that once you put boots on the ground, you can never go back, and the logic of war drags you deeper and deeper. Something they learned well from Vietnam, and have never forgotten.
The match, therefore, still presents itself as a gamble. It's like having far fewer chips than your opponent, and yet going all-in with not even a pair of deuces in your hand.
In all of this, of course, we have absolutely not taken into consideration the fact that there is no identity of views - beyond the facade - between the various European capitals. In all likelihood, there are countries – not only Hungary, or Slovakia, but also Germany and Italy… – which secretly hope for an immediate collapse of the Ukrainian army, so as to make any hypothesis of deploying their own forces useless. troops.
Although the scenario briefly described is a very realistic scenario, it is clear that there are those who believe that the Europeans would have an excellent chance in a confrontation with Russia. That this is believed to be possible among the political leadership, although dangerously disheartening, is also plausible; much worse is when it is supported by senior NATO military ranks, whose opinion cannot help but influence political choices. And quite a few generals, French, German and other countries, seem convinced that they can win the game (or perhaps they simply dream of a moment of glory, after a life behind a desk or playing war games) [3].
Certainly, what happens on the European chessboard also depends on what happens elsewhere, because this is a global game, in which everything is interconnected. The problem is that European leaders not only have no decision-making power, not even marginally, with respect to this dimension, but they are also completely lacking in the overall vision. The real one, of course, not the one reported on the news.
The next few months, therefore, will be fraught with consequences for Europeans, but also - to a large extent - played like pawns, whose moves are largely externally directed, but whose effects will largely be at our sole expense. And it is clear that the United States' interest is to push the Europeans, but not NATO, to take on the risks and burdens of the conflict, which Washington would like to prolong indefinitely [4].
The inadequacy of leadership is a further risk factor, in addition to the objective ones. In this context, from what we see, these leaderships tend to close themselves in like a hedgehog; aware of their own weakness, both towards the enemy against whom they are hurled, and towards their own citizens who have no desire to die for Kiev (nor even for Washington), and are increasingly proceeding towards the militarization of public space, towards the restriction of spaces of democracy, towards the authoritarian twist. They move war on the dissent of its citizens in order to be able to wage war on Russia tomorrow.
And if the European peoples lose this war, they will end up dragged into the other one, in which defeat could coincide with the extinction of European civilization as we have known it.
Notes
1 – According to the New York Times, due to troop shortages, the Kiev government has asked the United States and NATO to “contribute to the training of 150,000 new recruits” inside Ukraine, so that they can be sent to the front more quickly. Obviously, we are faced with a gigantic nonsense. These training camps should however be located as far as possible from the front line, to minimize the risk of them being hit (large concentrations of troops are obviously an attractive target), and would require adequate protection for attacks from the air; The risks and logistical efforts would greatly outweigh the minimal benefit of having conscripts in training a little closer to the battle line. This is blatantly a ploy to bring NATO military personnel onto the ground.
2 – An investigation by the British The Daily Mail established that in the event of an open conflict between NATO and Russia, NATO forces will not be sufficient. Although the strength of the Atlantic Alliance appears superior in numerical terms, this superiority is essentially due to the armed forces of the United States, without which it deteriorates significantly. Furthermore, the investigation does not take into account, if not marginally, factors such as industrial production, experience and combat capacity, etc.
3 – According to the commander of the Alliance's combined armed forces in Europe, General Christopher Cavoli (USA), the Russian armed forces “do not have the skills and capabilities to operate at the scale necessary to exploit any breakthrough for strategic advantage”.
4 – In this regard, an authoritative US magazine such as Foreign Affairs has explicitly indicated this direction, and certainly not by chance. According to FA, obviously very close to the Secretariat of State, "European countries must do more [...] They must seriously consider the deployment of troops in Ukraine to provide logistical support and training, to protect the borders and critical infrastructures of the Ukraine or even to defend Ukrainian cities. They must make it clear to Russia that Europe is willing to protect Ukraine's territorial sovereignty.” After ruling out that this could lead to World War III, the authors mischievously suggest that “a strictly non-combat mission would be an easier sell in most European capitals.” However, he immediately underlined that "Europe must consider a direct combat mission that helps protect Ukrainian territory". Indeed, “since European forces would be acting outside the framework and territory of NATO, any losses would not trigger an Article 5 response and would not implicate the United States.”
And to reassure European leaders - to whom the message is clearly addressed - they add: "At a certain point, European leaders must ignore Putin's threats, since they are just propaganda."