ESCALATION HARAKIRI

Since its inception, the state of Israel has developed a strategic principle on which it has essentially based itself: the only way to survive in a stolen land, surrounded by the people from whom it had been taken, is to impose oneself through terror.

The Jewish state has always been inspired by this principle, but during the wars against neighboring Arab countries it has become a real military strategy - and therefore also a political one. The operational application of this strategy of terror, formulated as a real war doctrine, has been the annihilation of the enemy, through the application of disproportionate violence whenever it manifested hostile intentions. Obviously, such a strategic doctrine could not help but intertwine - in a mutual nourishment - with the religious and pseudo-racial supremacism of Zionism. Considering the Arabs as "human animals" (as the moderate defense minister Gallant still defined them a year ago) made it possible to erase any moral qualms.

What those who imagined and formalized this particular idea of ​​war without limits did not foresee is that even though it envisaged the cancellation of every ethical and moral limit (in addition to those provided for by international law, of course), it instead contained within itself an insurmountable one, which would lead sooner or later to self-destruction.

The indispensable prerequisite for this doctrine to be eternally valid was in fact that the enemies of the Jewish state were always - militarily - in a condition of inferiority. Only in this way could it work. Instilling in the enemy the certainty that any attempt to change the balance of power would be crushed required that the enemy internalize the certainty of this violent reaction.

Israeli strategic deterrence, in fact, was not simply based on military superiority (which, after all, depended largely on external support from the United States), but on the extent to which this was exercised. Israel's deterrence, in short, has always been out of proportion, multiplied tenfold. If you give me a little push, I'll shoot you; if you shoot me, I will blow up your house with your whole family inside.

This worked for about seventy years.

But, at a certain point, two or three things happened.

First of all, the Palestinian Resistance - historically secular - veered towards an ever greater religious influence: jihad, the idea of ​​martyrdom, provided not only an even stronger motivation, but also the ability to accept a greater cost, even extreme, and welcome it as a gift.

On the other hand, not only the very long denial of every right for the Palestinian population, but also the disproportionate violence with which it has always been treated, at a certain point overflowed, exceeding the threshold of human endurance.

And, finally, the appearance on the scene of the Iranian political actor (and the action of building the Axis of Resistance, especially by General Soleimani) changed the terms of the equation.

On October 7, 2003, Operation Al Aqsa Flood demonstrated that the Palestinians, despite Israel’s overwhelming military power, no longer fear openly challenging it (which of course means that deterrence has lost its power; and to restore it, the response must be immensely disproportionate). With the two True Promise operations, Iran has not simply challenged Israel’s military power, but has demonstrated that it is now largely a paper tiger, and that its supremacy is in fact a thing of the past.

The combination of these factors has determined the situation in which Israel finds itself today, and determines its future development.

The attempt to restore deterrence against the Palestinian resistance, which has resulted in the most violent, vast and intense war against an entire population in the modern era, has clearly failed. Just as the attempt to impose it on Iran has failed. For the first time in its history, the Jewish state finds itself in a situation where, in order to prevail over its enemies, it needs not only the support, but also the direct involvement of the US. But, above all, having this strategic approach based on exaggeration, it finds itself with very limited room for maneuver.

Naturally, in fact, starting from a very high level of violence means that any need for escalation quickly reaches unsustainable levels. Immediately after the mass terrorist attacks in Lebanon, for example, I wrote that in order to possibly raise the level of pressure, they would have to kill Nasrallah. Which is what Israel actually did, just a few days later. But, as is evident, if this level turns out - as it actually is - to be insufficient to achieve the results hoped for (i.e. to restore deterrence, or to drag the enemy into a conflict with the United States), there are not many moves left to raise it further - while the Iranian enemy, which is acting with extreme lucidity, still has numerous possibilities for escalation, before the maximum threshold.

In practical terms, this means that Israel finds itself in the situation of having few cards to play, and then it will have no other options at its disposal. Whatever the next moves (assassinate Khamanei? attack Iranian nuclear sites? launch tactical nuclear weapons?), the possibilities for escalation are now limited.

And when you reach the limit of your possibilities, and you have not achieved what you wanted, you have lost.

At that point, it does not matter what happens immediately, because from that moment on not only do you no longer have any deterrent power, but you are effectively subject to the power of your enemies. In practice, you have committed suicide with your own hands.