HOW IT COULD GO

What does the considerable buildup of US forces in the Middle East (and in the European “rear areas”) tell us? While it’s true that, given the US president’s psychological instability, every option is being pursued to the last possible degree, a certain “overload” seems to indicate two things: on the one hand, the concern to deploy a superior strike force to ensure the hardest and most effective blows possible, and on the other, the need to establish layered defensive capabilities, sufficient to minimize the damage from Iranian counterattacks.

Regarding this issue, especially regarding the “attack yes”/”attack no” aspect, several factors are “uncertain.” The USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier squadron is still in the Atlantic and doesn’t appear to be forcing its course to approach the operational area. A joint naval exercise between Iran, Russia, and China has just taken place in the Strait of Hormuz off Oman, and as long as Russian and Chinese ships are in the area, a strike is unlikely to be launched (though there’s no certainty as to whether these ships will withdraw, or even when). Next week, Congress will vote on a War Powers Resolution, introduced by Representatives Tomas Massie and Ro Khanna, which aims to prevent Trump from attacking Iran without prior congressional approval. Trump continues to say that military action could occur if Iran rejects a deal, but Tehran has so far done nothing of the sort and is clearly aiming to delay the process.

If, therefore, the military option were to be triggered, it is unlikely to happen before next week—to allow for the arrival of the USS Ford and the departure of the Russian and Chinese ships—although it’s likely the president will prefer to rush things so as not to be blocked by the resolution. The motion is likely to fail, but Trump certainly doesn’t want his hands tied, so paradoxically, this could push him to move forward to avoid a vote.

The US deployment appears designed for a long-term combat capability, but the United States can hardly afford a conflict lasting more than two or three weeks, and above all, it must ensure it achieves a clear military result within that timeframe, allowing the deployment to be withdrawn without fear of a subsequent Iranian retaliation against US bases in the region. On the other hand, Iran is likely aiming to preserve a growing and sustained counterattack capability, and will therefore make limited use of its response capacity in the initial phase of the fighting, focusing primarily on exhausting Israeli and US attack and defense capabilities, before subsequently intensifying its attacks. Obviously, this depends greatly on both the availability of drones and missiles and the capabilities of Iran’s defense system. Essentially, therefore, we could witness a massive and intense attack, attempting to neutralize Iranian anti-aircraft defenses and missile launch sites, which will then gradually taper off—due to the consumption of ammunition, aircraft, and crews. At the same time, Iran will initially mount a predominantly defensive response, seeking to minimize damage, before gradually increasing its intensity. This would mean that US and Israeli forces will have a window of opportunity of seven to ten days, during which they will be more engaged in defense than offense, followed by a few days in which their actions tend to balance out in intensity. After that, the main issue will become the defense of US and Israeli land and naval assets. Presumably, Tehran will seek to secure a counterattack capability capable of overcoming enemy defenses by exhausting them, as it did in June.