The Middle Eastern situation increasingly resembles a pressure cooker, but no one has any interest in actually exploding. As often happens, when a conflict has to deal with the impossibility of victory on the field, and with the inability of the political leadership to deal with this reality, the greatest risk comes precisely from the lack of a clear perspective, and therefore from the fact that the war – left to itself – ends up taking on a life of its own, sliding towards catastrophe without anyone actually wanting it.
As much as I believe that the actual risks of resorting to nuclear weapons are always overestimated (which, after all, is part of the deterrent strategy that characterizes them), we must recognize that we are here facing a very particular situation. On the one hand, in fact, we have a state – Israel – engaged in a conflict that it is not in a position to win militarily, that it cannot sustain for long socially and economically, and that it cannot politically afford to lose. On the other hand, we have the most extremist and fanatical government in the history of this country, which both for personal interests and ambitions (Netanyahu) and for messianic delirium (Ben Gvir, Smotrich), is willing to do anything.
In the background, the shadow of the semi-secret and infamous Samson Directive [1] hovers – a sort of even more delirious extension of the now well-known Hannibal Directive. According to this crazy clause, if the Jewish state perceived that its very existence was threatened, and there was no realistic possibility of eliminating the threat, the entire nuclear arsenal of the country (estimated at around 300 warheads) would be launched against enemy and friendly countries, with the precise intent of triggering a global nuclear conflict – may Samson and all the Philistines die, precisely – according to a supremacist and racist logic, according to which a world without Jews (in reality without Zionists, since approximately only half of the Jews live in Israel) does not deserve to exist.
We are obviously talking about an extreme condition, and presumably still quite far from the current situation, but nevertheless present and – not only theoretically – possible.
It may seem paradoxical, but the best guarantee that the conflict will not slide atrociously towards an even blacker abyss lies in the probable explosion of the contradictions present in Israeli society, which first on October 7, and then with the war, are clamorously bringing to light.
The most visible is naturally the one that is revealed in the street demonstrations (the last one, on September 8, seems to have brought about 750,000 people to the streets, between Tel Aviv and other cities; a very considerable figure, if you consider that there are about 9 million Israeli Jews). With respect to which, however, especially in the West, there is the risk that a series of misunderstandings have arisen. Partly because the media make a communication that is not very informative, partly because those who read/listen have a fleeting and superficial approach, in any case lacking the basic information necessary to understand what is happening.
The street demonstrations, in fact, began before October 7, but the impression is that there is no solution of continuity with the subsequent ones, which however is not the case.
Before the war, the demonstrations represented the protest of the more liberal part of the population, mainly urban, worried about some legislative measures of the government, considered dangerous for democracy. Those that took place later, and which are mainly focused on the issue of the liberation of Israeli prisoners held by the Resistance, are animated mainly by settlers, since a large part of these civilian prisoners came from the illegal colonial settlements near Gaza. In this case, therefore, it is partly the same electoral base as the government majority. The bulk of the far right voters, in fact, are made up of settlers, especially those settled in the West Bank [2].
We have, therefore, two different lines of fracture: one, which we could define as physiological, of an exquisitely political nature (to simplify: right vs. left), and another, of a specific and contingent nature, which is transversal, and crosses above all the governmental field. The latter is particularly significant not only because, in fact, it extends right into the government, but also because the settlers' movement is - in fact - a very important one in Israeli society. Not only, obviously, for historical reasons (the tradition of the kibbutz), but above all because it is significantly numerous (about 800,000 settlers), and substantially organized as a militia (all the settlers are armed). Fundamentally, the settlers have more than one open question with the government. There is, as has been said, the question of the prisoners [3], but there is also the question of the 100,000 settlers who have had to abandon the settlements along the border with Lebanon. Who are itching to return and, therefore, are pushing for an open war with Hezbollah.
Last but not least, the Israeli government has been forced to issue a measure that goes, once again, against a not insignificant part of its electoral base. For the first time in the history of the country, in fact, the haredim, or ultra-Orthodox dedicated to the study of the sacred scriptures, will no longer be exempt from compulsory military service – something that is already leading to demonstrations, clashes with the police and mass draft evasion.
All of these, however, are critical and divisive issues, which however act predominantly within society and, at least for now, remain contained within the scope of a natural political dialectic, even if increasingly harsh.
Much more significant, however, is the fracture that has emerged – and which tends to deepen – between the government on the one hand, and the armed forces on the other.
As often happens, in fact, the military (and also the men of the security apparatus) have much clearer ideas than politicians, in order of what can be done and what cannot. And if at first the climate of revenge, following October 7, prevailed - together with the desire for revenge, to cleanse one's face from the shame of the defeat of that day - as the conflict went on, the awareness emerged of the limits of a political strategy that imposed unachievable objectives [4]. And this is, at the moment, the unsolvable contradiction, the one that can stop the disaster. Obviously we are not talking about a coup, or even just a military pronouncement - unthinkable in Israeli society - but rather the fact that, at a certain point, the IDF leaders will have to say a clear and decisive "no". It only remains to understand what is the threshold beyond which it will no longer be possible to say "yes".
The issue is not at all simple, also because the IDF – in addition to having a duty of loyalty to its government – is partly complicit, having initially supported its impossible plan. From this point of view, the figure of Yoav Gallant, current defense minister, is extremely representative. Gallant, in fact, who is also a general, therefore a career soldier, immediately after the start of Operation Al Aqsa Flood was among the most determined supporters of a violently aggressive campaign on Gaza, almost explicitly dreaming of the extermination of the Palestinians (defined as “human animals”). And it is the same Gallant who today, and in fact for some time now, finds himself constantly in conflict with Netanyahu precisely on the prospects of the conflict. In his dual role as political leader and high-ranking official, he carries on his shoulders the planning, implementation and management of a military campaign that has been nothing short of a failure, the only concrete outcome of which is the start of a genocide – a gift, moreover, to his political adversaries within the government.
Operation Iron Swords, in fact, immediately appeared to be characterized more by an irrational desire for revenge, than by rational military planning, aimed at achieving achievable objectives. At best, the strategy underlying the Israeli operation was based on a frightening underestimation and ignorance of the enemy. Moreover, almost a year after the start of the fighting, the results achieved by what claimed to be one of the best armies in the world are, from a military perspective, practically nil. In an area of just 360 square kilometers (Rome has 1,285...), and using a stratospheric quantity of bombs (80,000 tons...), the IDF was unable to inflict a defeat, even a partially strategic one, on the Resistance forces. The fighters of the various Palestinian formations made up for their losses by enlisting new militants; the tunnel network is almost entirely intact, and above all unknown; most of the October 7 prisoners, apart from those exchanged, were either killed by Israeli bombs or are still in the hands of the Resistance; in fact, last August – the eleventh – was one of the bloodiest for the IDF.
Probably the biggest mistake made by the Israelis was to approach the conflict in an American way, as if it were a matter of defeating a (less powerful) army and not a series of guerrilla formations. The idea of defeating the Palestinian Resistance through a campaign of terrorist bombings (Serbia or Libya style) was in fact absolutely senseless. But not only that. By unleashing all their military potential from the first phase of the conflict, with the exclusion of the nuclear option, the Israeli armed forces precluded themselves from gradually putting pressure on the enemy, possibly exercising an escalation in the intensity of the fighting. Once faced with an impasse, it became necessary to find something that – if only through a prolongation of the conflict [5] – would allow to avoid the political collapse of the government.
Having therefore burned the possibility of escalating by increasing the intensity of the war, the Israeli commanders had no other choice but to do so by increasing the extension of the war. In this sense, moving the focus of the action from Gaza to the West Bank responds exactly to this need, which is eminently media and political. But, once again, Israel is making a strategic mistake.
First of all, because the armed formations of the Resistance in the West Bank are fresher, while the IDF is worn out by eleven months of war. And the duration of the conflict wears down the Israeli forces much more than the Palestinian ones. But, even more importantly, this choice – I repeat, absolutely political, not military – contradicts a fundamental principle. The escalation of fighting in the West Bank, in fact, does not correspond to a withdrawal from Gaza, or at least to a stabilization in the Strip. What the IDF is doing, therefore, is dispersing its forces on multiple fronts. Instead of concentrating them in an attempt to resolve one. It almost seems, conceptually, a replica of the Ukrainian operation on Kursk.
From this point of view, what we know about Israeli military projects seems to fit perfectly into the wake of these strategic errors.
Fundamentally, in fact, the Netanyahu government has a plan for Gaza, and a broader one, which concerns neighboring countries.
As for the Strip, the objective they are currently pursuing is to narrow the circle. The entire border between the Palestinian territory and Israel will be strengthened, especially by widening a security zone (within Gaza territory), while the IDF will establish its stable control over two strategic axes: the Philadelphia corridor, on the border with Egypt, and the Netzarim corridor, in the north.
The first of the two corridors, which includes the Rafah crossing, is a strip of land about 14 kilometers long and 100 meters wide, and runs from the northwestern tip on the Mediterranean to the southeastern tip of the Kerem Shalom crossing. Where it touches the sea, the village of Al Qarya as Suwaydiya has been razed and has become an Israeli military base. The decision to occupy this border strip would in fact violate the Oslo Accords, according to which control would be held by Egypt – which, moreover, does not look favorably on an Israeli military presence on its borders. And, obviously, it meets with the total opposition of the Resistance.
The aim would be to cut the umbilical cord of the Strip, which would find itself completely surrounded by territory under Israeli control.
The Netzarim, on the other hand, is located about two-thirds of the Strip, immediately south of Gaza City, and is an axis that separates the territory longitudinally, and goes from the border of Israel to the sea, breaking the territorial continuity. This corridor should also become, in the intentions, a military zone. It is not yet entirely clear whether the intention is to completely clear the area to the north - therefore the city of Gaza and the suburbs - to annex this part of the territory (in which case the Netzarim corridor would become the northern border of the Strip). In any case, colonial settlements would be built in this area and, as in the West Bank, the militarization of the territory and the road network connecting the settlements would become a tool for fragmenting the territory.
Regarding this plan, it is useful to remember that Israel had already taken military control of the Strip in the past, as well as having settled settlers there. Until, in 2005, he withdrew his troops and the nine thousand settlers who lived in 25 settlements. And this was certainly not done out of sudden generosity, but because the occupation had proven counterproductive. 19 years later, with the Resistance much stronger, to think that things are different is at least naive. Moreover, Israeli troops deployed along the Netzarim are already being hit practically every day by Palestinian fighters. But, at best, the implementation of this plan would entail a significant increase in the permanent military deployment; no longer just to defend the perimeter of the Strip, but two important axes inside the hostile territory, and the colonial settlements.
In essence, the Israeli plan for Gaza seems to reflect more the government's political ambitions (and the settlers' greed for territory), than healthy military realism.
As for the new theater of war opened by the IDF - or rather, in which it has decided to raise the level of conflict - apart from what has already been said, it should be noted that the idea (or rather the illusion) seems to be that of repeating the Gaza model [6], made however extremely more complicated by the fact that the colonial policy of the last fifty years and more has been based on the leopardization of the Palestinian territory, fragmenting it into countless portions of territory divided by settlements and off-limits road networks.
Even if the ambitions, not even hidden, are those of annexing these territories to the Jewish state, this would first require the ability to defeat the armed Resistance, something that at present seems unlikely. The control of the territory, by the Resistance Brigades, appears so firm and evident as to unequivocally testify that the IDF finds itself facing a people's war.
Finally, as regards the Lebanese front, the situation does not seem at all more favorable. The exchange of fire with the Hezbollah army has been going on, on and off, for almost a year, with losses on both sides. But, more importantly, while the IDF preferred to focus mainly on targeted killings and the bombing of Lebanese villages, Nasrallah’s fighters have concentrated on the systematic destruction of the Israeli defense network along the border: surveillance installations, air defense and anti-missile systems, barracks. In fact, strong in its sense of superiority, the Israeli army has built this network by placing it mainly on the dominant heights, while Hezbollah has set up its own in tunnels and caves in the mountains. Moreover, there is an unequivocal fact that gives an exact picture of the situation: while the Israelis have been talking for months about the desire to push Hezbollah back beyond the Litani River (i.e. 10/20 km behind the border line), it was the Lebanese who forced Israel to evacuate its population from the bordering areas.
Obviously, the dream of the entire Israeli leadership would be to find a way to get rid of this thorn in their side, but – especially after the beating they suffered in 2006, when the Lebanese Islamic Resistance was much weaker – they know well that it is an almost prohibitive undertaking. For this reason, ideally, they are trying to drag the United States into a conflict of this kind, which should eliminate the entire Axis of Resistance, including Iran.
But, despite everything one might think, the US is not at all willing to cross a certain threshold in its support for Israel, and this is because – despite the power of the American Jewish lobby – they must still make their strategic interests prevail, if these diverge from those of Tel Aviv.
In particular, it is quite evident that the Pentagon, unlike the IDF, is well aware of the need for concentration of forces [7], and it is therefore very difficult for them to be distracted by something so demanding.
Moreover, there is no lack of clear indications in this direction. In the last few days alone, the messages have multiplied [8]; most recently, Kamala Harris, in her TV debate with Trump (in which the competition was about who was more pro-Israel) clearly said “I will give Israel the security and the tools it needs to defend itself from Iran”. That is, we will help you defend yourselves (which is significantly a little less than “we will defend you”…). Moreover, as was predictable, this US defensive commitment is already being scaled down: according to Israeli radio, two American aircraft carriers in the Middle East have received the order to leave the region [9].
But above all, a fact as evident as it is underestimated, there is a historical element, which testifies to how the relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv, although very solid, is at the same time very ambiguous and conflictual, almost like snake relatives. Isn’t it strange that the United States, which has about 800 military bases scattered in every corner of the world, does not have even one in Israel?
It is however evident that in Tel Aviv, USA or not, they are thinking about how to deal with the problem. According to what was published on the website of Al-Akhbar, a Lebanese newspaper [10], an Israeli plan for an invasion of Lebanon, for which the IDF is training, has been leaked. Some Western envoys, quoted by the Lebanese newspaper, are said to have said that, given the situation, "Israel will be forced to carry out a major military operation to achieve these objectives, something whose indicators are growing day by day, and no one in the world can prevent Israel from waging this war" [11]. The strategic plan would be to isolate Hezbollah from Iran, cutting its supply lines, so as to be able to get the better of it; the operational plan to achieve this objective would include a ground operation to invade southern Lebanon and south-western Syria, "advancing eastwards towards the heart of Lebanon to cut the route between the Bekaa and the south" [12]. The plan would also include attacking the Syrian armed forces, and to use – for this purpose – the Syrian opposition forces. In short, the SDF (Kurds, Islamists, Al Qaeda…).
This is, with all evidence (and if it is substantially real) a move that is nothing short of reckless. Even if the United States were willing to give the green light (putting the men of the U.S. Army in Syria at very high risk), and to guarantee an air-missile defense, it is clear that the IDF should be the one to take root on the ground.
From a certain point of view, the idea of first penetrating Syria, and then striking southern Lebanon from the east, may apparently make sense, given that the situation is quite precarious for Damascus, and its armed forces are not in very good health. But it should still be taken into account that in the Bekaa there are military units of Hezbollah, probably also units of the Iraqi militias, and certainly the Iranian IRGC. Not to mention Russian forces, who recently set up observation posts on the Golan.
An attack on southern Lebanon, via Syria, would not be a walk in the park, even for an army in top form, and with fresh and rested men. While the IDF is severely tested by almost a year of war (Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid says the IDF has lost 12 battalions since October), it must still disperse its forces between Gaza, the West Bank and the Lebanese border, and then face experienced and motivated military formations, well rested and operating on their own territory. And all this, would also require a considerable amount of men and equipment [13], because obviously a maneuver that seeks to take Hezbollah's deployment on the eastern flank, and to cut its supply lines with Iran, cannot ignore the fact that, in turn, it would leave itself open to a counteroffensive, and would have to maintain control of Syrian territory to prevent the flow of aid.
And all this, without taking into account what the Axis of Resistance would do.
It is hard to imagine that Hezbollah would not rain down missiles on Israeli military sites and rear areas. It is hard to imagine that the Yemeni Ansarullah would not do the same. That the hundred thousand-odd men of Baghdad's militias would stand by and watch. That Iran would let its closest allies be directly threatened without intervening. And, last but not least, that Russia could stand by and watch.
In short, if an invasion of Lebanon carried out by attacking directly from Israel would be a gamble, an operation of such a large scale, in the given conditions, seems more like madness, or a wet dream.
And here we return to the central question. How will the clash between Israeli military and political leaders be resolved? When and how (and above all if) will it explode?
To begin with, we must keep in mind that the Israeli generals are Zionists, and therefore Israel's survival is more important to them than disagreements with the government. From their point of view, therefore, the question is not whether the government's indications are possible and/or correct, or not; the question is what the alternatives are. That is, whether a possible refusal to implement a decision taken by the government is more or less dangerous for Israel than implementing it anyway. In concrete terms – for example – whether it is more destabilizing to attack Lebanon and Syria, with all that that entails, and with the concrete risk of suffering a severe defeat, or to provoke an institutional crisis that splits the country in a profound way. And this, of course, is something that is not easy to answer, because much depends on the overall circumstances at the time the choice is made.
Notes
1 – The Samson Directive was first revealed by the famous journalist Seymour Hersh in his 1991 book “The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy”. See Wikipedia
2- One reason, not the most important but not the last, why the IDF has tightened its interventions in the West Bank, is precisely that of keeping Smotrich and Ben Gvir's voters happy, showing that it supports their expansionist aims.
3 – In this case, we are in the presence of a further contradiction, this time internal to the settler movement; if, in fact, on the one hand they call for a negotiation with the Resistance for an exchange of prisoners, even at the cost of a truce, on the other they are for the complete expulsion/elimination of the Palestinians, and for the annexation of their territories to the state of Israel.
4 – According to a study by the Israeli think tank BeSa Center for Strategic Studies, in the aftermath of October 7, the political-military leaders adopted a maximalist concept of security, which replaced the idea of total defeat of the enemy with that of deterrence, but exposed Israel’s total dependence on American weapons, and its inability to guarantee security on multiple fronts. See “The Long War Phenomenon: Is a New Security Concept Required After October 7?”, Col. (res.) Gur Laish, Besacenter.org
5 – In this case too, as has already been seen in Ukraine – but in fact already in Afghanistan – when a Western army finds itself in a situation where it is impossible to prevail, it switches to a strategy of postponement: prolonging the war not to achieve victory, but to delay defeat.
6 – Netanyahu: “We will build a fence on our eastern border (with Jordan) and make sure there are no infiltrations”. Israel Katz (Foreign Minister): Israel “must address the threat exactly as it addresses the terrorist infrastructure in Gaza, including the temporary evacuation of Palestinian civilians and any other necessary measures”.
7 – As part of a more general reorientation of US strategies, which aim to focus on China and therefore on the Indo-Pacific quadrant, it is clear that the Department of Defense is planning (also for economic reasons) a significant change in the global presence of the US armed forces, which goes well beyond the already outlined disengagement from the Ukrainian conflict. In the coming years, we will certainly witness a redefinition of the American global strategic projection, currently characterized by a wide dispersion, which will also pass through a reduction-optimization of the network of military bases. The withdrawal agreed with the Iraqi government, for example, to be concluded by 2026, and which will most likely be followed by that from Syria (countries in which the US presence is under constant attack), will involve a redeployment of troops in the area, concentrating in the safest and/or most strategically relevant countries (UAE, Qatar, Djibouti). It is likely that a phenomenon of the same type will be seen in Europe and Turkey.
8 – Haaretz, reporting statements by a Western official, wrote that “the US administration has warned Israel against launching a large-scale escalation or an all-out war with Lebanon”. In a statement released by the Pentagon, it is said: “we are closely monitoring the situation in the Middle East and are ready to support Israel, while ensuring the protection of US forces and assets in the region.” Again, support Israel, but we must ensure our interests in the region.
9 – Official Pentagon news confirms the order to return the USS Theodore Roosevelt (and its crew). Unofficial sources also confirm that the American administration is trying to negotiate with Ansarullah, so that it can withdraw its ships from the Red Sea, given the failure of the Prosperity Guardian mission.
10 – “Leaks on the alleged Israeli war: a ground attack in and from Syria… and the separation of the Bekaa from the south”, Ibrahim Al-Amin, Al-Akhbar
11 -Ibidem
12 -Ibidem
13 – Already in July, the army highlighted the shortage of tanks at its disposal due to the high number of vehicles damaged and disabled in the conflict. See “IDF delays tentative pilot program for female tank troops by another year”, Emanuel Fabian, Times of Israel