ON THE OUTLOOK FOR SYRIA
The evolution of the Syrian situation is inevitably destined to introduce new elements, not necessarily foreseen – and which, probably, can help to understand some positions currently taken by the parties involved.
There are essentially two fundamental issues. The first is the partition underway in the country, in at least three macro cantonal areas: the western one, under the control of the HTS, the eastern one, under the control of the Kurdish forces, and the southern one, under Israeli control. This cantonization of Syria obviously plays into the hands of both the US and Israel, because it not only undermines the unity of the Arab country, but strengthens the political and military presence of both in the region. But it cuts Turkey out of the game, which finds itself with the stabilization of a Syrian Kurdistan on its borders, and what’s more as a US protectorate.
As is clear from the first steps, Al-Julani clearly responds much more to Anglo-American interests (his real sponsors) than to Turkish ones; the pacifying signals towards Israel on the one hand (despite the massive bombing campaign underway, which shows no signs of ending), and the openness to collaboration, even governmental, with the SDF, clearly indicate the alignment of the Islamist power with American designs.
Moreover, and for more than one reason, Washington intends to exercise its influence on the new Syrian government, but its reference ally remains (at least for the moment) the Kurds. The issues to be resolved, in this context, are obviously the margins of autonomy that the SDF will be able to carve out for themselves, also considering that they will obtain ministers in the national government (another thing destined to irritate Ankara quite a bit...), and - in parallel - how the issue of the disarmament of the militias (demanded by Al-Julani) will be resolved. Given the prevalence of US interests, it is likely that both issues will be resolved within the framework of some regional autonomy, in which the Kurdish militias become the territorial armed forces. Furthermore, the persistence of the Kurdish-American control over Syrian oil resources represents a powerful lever towards the power of Damascus; a possible willingness to divert a part of the profits towards the central government of the new Syria, puts the Kurds in a position to negotiate from a position of strength the terms of the political inclusion of the territories east of the Euphrates.
Another fundamental issue is the structural weakness of the HTS. A weakness that derives first of all from being an umbrella coalition, which brings together dozens of different groups – many of which are not even composed of Syrians – whose commonality of purpose is quite relative, and in any case risks weakening as things go on. For many of these groups, a prospect of Syrian national reconstruction is at best indifferent, having as its horizon that of a single great Islamic caliphate, coinciding with the umma (the community of believers, everywhere in the world). A further element of potential fracture, within the Islamist coalition, is that part of the groups ideologically refer to Wahhabism (typical of Al Qaeda and Daesh, from which many militants come), while another part places itself - albeit on more radicalized positions - within the ideological framework of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. In the absence of strong motivations that support a unitary effort, and in the presence of possible tensions, these differences are likely to accentuate, to the point of divergence. It is no coincidence that ISIS has resumed a certain activity, from the Syrian desert where it had taken refuge, seizing in the current situation a potential opportunity for relaunch. Just as, for similar but opposite reasons, the United States has resumed hitting ISIS groups, fearing that they could exert a disintegrating attraction on the forces of the pro-tempore ally Al-Julani.
But, for the group of Islamist formations that have settled in Damascus, there are further elements of weakness, which are not at all secondary. The first of which is, obviously, the difficulty for these forces – essentially composed of guerrillas – to assume state and administrative tasks. Even if we are talking about a country devastated by years of war and Western sanctions, in which the population has progressively lost the normal relationship with the state, the very need for reconstruction requires an administrative machine capable of making state structures function. In turn, this requires personnel accustomed to managing issues that are very different from those to which the HTS militants are accustomed. Bearing in mind that, for example, in the province of Idlib – where they have stayed for years – the administrative functions have been de facto contracted out to the Turks, starting from the most basic aspects (Turkish currency, telephony Turkish, etc.). To do this, therefore, Al-Julani will necessarily have to resort to a part (at least) of the old Syrian state apparatus; which, in turn, requires that a substantial pacification be achieved, and that its personnel be protected from retaliation and revenge.
A further element of weakness, the systematic destruction of Syrian military infrastructure, carried out by Israel, lays the foundation for the essential need to be guaranteed, in this respect, by someone who has the tools to do so. Namely the USA.
The combination of these objective conditions, evidently, does not favor an easy stabilization of the situation, and therefore leaves the way open for various possible evolutions of the same.
The mere presence of forces that represent different, and sometimes conflicting, interests, even though they can all be placed in the same part of the global alignment (USA, Israel, Turkey) can lead to contrasting developments. If, for example, from Ankara's point of view the ideal solution would be to maintain Syrian territorial integrity, and in this context the significant reduction of Kurdish political-military power, this is not among the US priorities, and certainly not in the Israeli interest, which would prefer a fragmentation of the Arab state. In the presence of a growing Israeli hold on south-west Syria, the never-dormant (and recently reaffirmed) Ottoman ambitions on northern Syria could emerge with greater force. In this context, tensions between Turkish interests and ambitions and those of Kurdish-Americans could rekindle friction, even armed, taking into account among other things the difficulty - in this context - of placing the forces under Turkish control (Syrian National Army) within the new Syrian political framework.
For its part, the territorial fragmentation of Syria offers Israel the opportunity to gradually proceed with further colonial expansion towards the east. In particular, two of the points currently occupied by the IDF are of great strategic importance for the Israelis: Mount Hermon and the Al-Wahda Dam. The first, from its height of 2,800 meters, allows a panoramic view from Syria to the Mediterranean, and therefore the control of a vast potentially hostile area; the probable construction of a radar system here, would give the Israeli air defense system a considerable asset. The second, on which the supply of fresh water for Syria (30%) and Jordan (40%) depends, would put a crucial key to regional geopolitical control in Tel Aviv’s hands.
Given the set of subjective interests and objective conditions, it is reasonable to assume that an effective stabilization of the situation is not exactly around the corner, and that in the best of cases these elements are destined to maintain their disintegrating potential at least in the medium term.
Clearly, since Turkey is the regional player with the most to lose – and is, in fact, losing – it is likely to be the main agent of destabilization. This could obviously happen both through its SNA proxies and – in a broader sense – through the political-diplomatic role that Ankara could play. Which has long been used to maneuvering unscrupulously between several tables.
It will be interesting, from this perspective, to see how the issue of the Russian bases in Latakia and Tartus evolves, in which Turkey’s mediation role is important. From what we see, Moscow is calmly preparing for both hypotheses (maintenance or dismantling), and does not seem particularly worried about the possibility of having to abandon them. The transfer to Libya, possibly partial, seems the most likely hypothesis, even if they are maintained. It is also significant that, while the irrelevant European countries bark, threatening not to remove the sanctions if the Russians are not kicked out, there is no position taken by Washington. Moreover, not only has Erdogan long maintained a line of balance between Russia and NATO (albeit in a wavering and ambiguous way), but Al-Julani himself has taken a position that is not prejudicially hostile – which he instead reserves for Iran and Hezbollah. There is, in this, both the reflection of the years of the civil war, when the Shiite forces defeated the Islamists on the field, and a sectarian question, and – obviously – the different consideration for a power that is far more than regional like the Russian Federation.
The Turkish role, moreover, could play in favor of Russia in the future too. Ankara could in fact play a supporting role with Moscow to obtain favorable conditions with the USA, in particular with regard to the Syrian context; something that it has already done, more generally. At the same time, the situation of the new government, if it maintains the line of moving in the perspective of national reconstruction, could sooner or later come into conflict with Israeli interests (and actions).
These elements, among other things, also explain why both Iran and Hezbollah maintain a pragmatic, not prejudicially hostile, attitude. Although the current situation is obviously unfavorable, and has undoubtedly weakened their position, both Tehran and Beirut think in terms of a long-term perspective, and are in any case interested in not widening the front of enemy countries. Just as they sought appeasement with Saudi Arabia (ideological hotbed and strongbox of extremist and anti-Shiite Wahhabism, as well as historically the leader of the Arab countries hostile to the Axis of Resistance), obviously not from a position of weakness, so evidently they are looking today at Damascus: what is not possible today, could become possible tomorrow.
Clearly it is not possible to extrapolate the Syrian situation from the broader regional context. So a lot depends on how this plays out in the coming months.
Israel, for example, which has been in the midst of over 14 months of war – the longest ever fought, and it’s not over yet – is paying the direct and indirect economic toll, and even though (for now) the Lebanese conflict is over, the one in Gaza is far from being resolved, the one in the West Bank is set to become increasingly explosive, and now the occupation of a vast area in southern Syria requires maintaining an extraordinary level of reservist mobilization, which is likely to continue for at least another year. While the overthrow of Assad’s regime was a fortunate advantage, the consequences will not necessarily be advantageous – in fact, they will at the very least require the war effort to be extended further. So a lot depends on how Netanyahu tries to get out of the corner. Which – of course – means first and foremost whether and how he can convince Trump to follow him into an open conflict with Tehran; a conflict that will necessarily have to be brief and decisive, because Israel is simply not capable of sustaining a regional war lasting many months. And the issue is obviously not just a military problem in the strict sense.
In turn, the choices that will be made in Iran, in the weeks and months to come, will be equally decisive. Even well beyond the problems posed by the interruption of the logistics channel with Lebanon, in fact, there are a series of issues that are anything but simple, and all intertwined with each other.
There is the question of the relationship between the more possibilist wing of the establishment, the one headed by President Pezeshkian, and the more radical one headed by the IRGC and the supreme leader Khamanei. In turn linked both to that of the succession to Khamanei himself, and to that of nuclear power.
The nature of relations with the West, under the Trump presidency, which certainly aim to avoid conflict, but at the same time cannot go so far as to make Tehran bend to the wishes of Washington, Tel Aviv and Brussels. There is the question of the decision on whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons. There is the question of the need to restore deterrence against Israel (True Promise 3?), which is also part of the possibility of being recognized as a regional power. There is the now imminent signing of the strategic partnership agreement with the Russian Federation – the terms of which could in themselves reverse the balance of power with Israel. In short, we could well say – quoting Chairman Mao – that “there is great disorder under heaven, therefore the situation is excellent”. It remains only to understand for whom.