ON THE RAZOR'S EDGE 2/2

If there is one fundamental thing that must be made clear immediately, regarding the current phase of the conflict in the Middle East, it is that – exactly as with the conflict in Ukraine – we are facing a radical conflict, in which the spatial dimension (territories) is absolutely secondary, while the temporal dimension (duration) is prevalent, and above all that it is a conflict in which the objectives of the parties are absolutely irreconcilable. This means that there is no intermediate possibility between victory and defeat, there is no room whatsoever for mediation and negotiations that aim to establish some kind of lasting peace, and that even tactical options, such as temporary ceasefires, are extremely difficult.

In both cases, a point of no return has been passed; and it was passed not during the two wars, where there is also a continuous escalation, but at the very moment in which they began.

Just as the launch of the Special Military Operation, on February 24, 2022, marked (perhaps even without full awareness on both sides) the transition to a phase of irreversible conflict, the same was true for Operation Al Aqsa Flood, on October 7, 2023.

Specifically, what is happening in the Middle Eastern theater - which beyond the specific motivations is still a full part of the ongoing global confrontation - presents itself as a clash between actors with absolutely irreconcilable positions. What is at stake, in fact, is a complete redesign of the regional geopolitical framework (which, as seen in the first part, has widespread repercussions, even well beyond the countries directly involved) and which, regardless of the immediate outcome of the conflict, presents only two possible options: either the destruction of the Axis of Resistance, including Iran, with all that this would entail (expulsion of Russia from the Middle East, definitive cancellation of projects related to the New Silk Road, growing Western threats in Central Asia and Africa), or vice versa expulsion of any regional influence by the American-Western side.

This does not necessarily imply, in the second case, the cancellation of the state of Israel as an outcome of the war. As was said at the beginning, the territorial dimension is secondary, what matters will be the balance of power.

Continuing to examine the more general issues, always from the perspective of the war, the different nature of the actors in the field must be kept in mind. Israel, even in this respect, presents itself as a classic Western colonial power: the conduct of the war, starting from strategic decisions, is linked to a vertical chain of command, which has at its apex the political government of the country. A government in which, unlike in past decades, ex-military personnel are decidedly underrepresented (in practice, only Gallant, who in fact is constantly in the minority, and on the verge of dismissal), and is therefore lacking the capacity for overall strategic understanding, but which - also by virtue of the presence of a swarm of extremist ministers - tends to overflow its role, not limiting itself to indicating the general objectives (e.g. significantly reducing the combat capacity of the Resistance in the Gaza Strip) but also establishing how they should be achieved. For the Israeli government, in fact, war is not only a way to achieve political objectives with other means, but is itself a political instrument, used as such.

In any case, the hierarchical structure of the Israeli armed forces is typically Western, with a centralization of strategic and operational choices, and often also tactics, which leaves little room for initiative on the ground, resulting in a certain rigidity in the execution of operations.

Of course, this model worked well as long as it was confronted with the Arab armies, which in turn borrowed the model, but were infinitely weaker. For better or for worse, it managed to express a relative capacity for containment [1], even compared to guerrilla formations, but today it finds itself in serious difficulty, having to face formations that are much stronger than the previous ones, with good if not excellent offensive capacity, and which instead make the most of an extremely flexible and decentralized command structure.

Another characteristic of the Israeli military modus operandi is that it is focused on destruction rather than strategic combat. Even in this typically Western way, it is influenced by a profoundly quantitative approach: so many deaths, so many buildings destroyed, so many tons of bombs dropped... However, it is an operational method that is good when it is able to destroy, or at least annihilate the adversary in a short time, but is completely ineffective when applied in a context of asymmetric warfare. This is even more true for a country like Israel, which has a limited availability of men and means – and, specifically, depends almost entirely on US supplies, which (already consumed in Ukraine) are not inexhaustible.

A third Israeli characteristic is determined by geography. Although the aforementioned criterion of the relative importance of the spatial dimension is valid, this refers above all to any territorial conquests (or losses); in other respects, geography strongly conditions the strategic plan. And Israel is a small country, with its population and critical infrastructure concentrated in limited areas, therefore totally lacking in strategic depth. Furthermore, it is geographically trapped: to the west by the sea, to the north, to the east and to the south by Arab countries. It therefore does not have a neighboring country that, if necessary, can offer it the depth that it does not have. And it is also to make up for this condition that, since always, the Israeli strategic doctrine has concentrated on the development of a highly destructive offensive capacity, concentrated in time, so as to ensure a rapid defeat of the enemy.

In other words, Israel is not structurally equipped for an asymmetric war of attrition, in which the winner is the one who resists the longest, not the one who inflicts the most losses on the enemy.

If this is, essentially, the general picture on the Israeli side, it is legitimate to ask why they launched a military campaign – the one in the Gaza Strip – that clearly could not be rapid, regardless of its intensity. Obviously, after October 7, with the deterrent capacity having been shattered (as well as the credibility of the security services and the IDF), there could not have been a military response, but it remains truly incomprehensible that it was launched without a clear strategy and reasonable operational plans. Without prejudice to the political responsibilities in these choices, one cannot fail to note how the application on the ground was as ferocious as it was crude. The approximation with which the campaign was – and is – conducted is evident not only from the duration-results ratio (a year of war and the Resistance is still fully operational), but from the very fact that the IDF continues to move across the territory like a caged animal, continually moving from one sector to another, proclaiming the annihilation of enemy brigades [2], only to be forced to retrace its steps over and over again.

We have, however, dealt with what has happened so far in the Gaza Strip several times, and we will not return to it. Instead, we will try to examine what is happening now on the battlefields – of which, to date, there are at least three: beyond Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon. Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Iran are currently the object of a low-intensity and long-distance war, not yet fought on the field.

As for Gaza, the first thing that stands out to an observer is that, despite a year of fighting – and an incredible quantity of bombs dropped on an extremely small territory – the intensity of the fighting has not diminished at all; on the contrary, one could almost say that it has increased. In fact, despite a slight decrease in the number of firefights, one can certainly note an increasing tactical capacity of the Palestinian combat units, as well as operational coordination between different formations.

In fact, the number of ambushes set for Israeli forces has increased, some of which are very complex (with explosive traps set up in advance, different teams with different tasks, and prolonged over time, with clashes that continue until the arrival of the IDF reinforcement and recovery units, which are in turn attacked), and carried out by fighters from various organizations (Al Qassam Brigades, Al Quds Brigades, Mujahedeen Brigades, etc.). All signs not only of an intact operational capacity [3], but also of an efficient joint command.

And, of course, the network of underground tunnels remains largely intact and unknown (as does the location of dozens and dozens of prisoners). The underlying problem is that the IDF moves in the Strip seemingly aimlessly, without a coherent operational plan. “We occupy territories and then we leave,” said Michael Milstein, an Israeli analyst of Palestinian affairs; “this kind of doctrine means you find yourself in a war without end” [4].

To achieve the best possible result, and therefore excluding the possibility of actually permanently degrading the Palestinian Resistance’s fighting capacity, rather than implementing a devastating campaign of massive bombings (which, from a military perspective, by reducing cities to rubble, benefit the guerrillas more than the Israeli army), it should have proceeded differently. That is, it should have divided the Strip into quadrants, proceeding to systematically clear them one after the other, identifying and blowing up the tunnel entrances when it was not possible to penetrate them, and then proceeding with the next quadrant once there was no longer any active presence of the guerrillas. But this would have required a great deal of time – perhaps more than the past year so far – a great many men (to maintain the garrison of each quadrant) and – naturally – a great many losses. A price that, understandably, the IDF was not able to bear, and which however led the Israeli forces to apply a completely ineffective operational plan.

What the IDF is doing, therefore, is moving the concentration of forces from one place to another, without ever getting to the bottom of the situation. The only two points where Israeli forces have permanently established themselves are in fact the Philadelphia corridor, immediately south of Rafah, which runs along the border with Egypt, and the Netzarim corridor, an axis that cuts the Strip from east to west, just south of the metropolitan area of ​​Gaza City.

The intent would be to block smuggling between Egypt and the Strip, and divide the latter in two. Objectives that in any case presuppose a long-term presence of the IDF on Palestinian territory; but which, in both cases, do not take into account the network of tunnels that cross the territory, even at great depth, and which could allow the north-south mobility of the fighting formations.

Moreover, the IDF forces stationed along the Netzarim are attacked daily by the Resistance, with mortars, missiles and RPGs.

Currently, and for the third time since the beginning of operations, the Israeli army is significantly investing the area of ​​the Jabalia camp, in the center of Gaza City, where fierce fighting has been going on for about twenty days [5]. According to some rumors, this would be part of a plan - the so-called generals' plan, drawn up by some former high-ranking officers, led by Major General Giora Eiland - which would provide for the complete emptying of the strip north of the Netzarim, even at the cost of starving the civilian population, and then proceed to cleanse it of fighters.

Even if it might seem like a late application of the aforementioned tactic of dividing it into quadrants, in this case it is an area too large to be used profitably. Officially, the IDF denies applying the plan, but the impression is that it is essentially using it with a view to a very different plan: the annexation of this large strip of territory and the creation of a large security zone.

This plan, which obviously worries the Palestinians greatly – who are currently being forcibly deported out of the area en masse, with hundreds of adult men being arrested – requires some steps in order to be realized, which are highly unlikely to occur.

The first, obviously, is to be able to completely empty the area of ​​civilians (it is estimated that around 400,000 remain), and to overcome the local Resistance units. As already mentioned, this is the third time that the IDF has tried this, and given how things are going it is unlikely to end with an outcome different from the previous ones. Another condition, which is very difficult to achieve, is that such a hypothesis is accepted, when – inevitably – the terms of the ceasefire are negotiated.

Because – and it is incredible how easily one forgets what it means – the key word is resistance.

In the aforementioned New York Times article, the authors write that Hamas is “incapable of operating as a conventional army” [6]. But the Al Qassam Brigades (the military wing of the movement) have not become incapable of doing so – perhaps as a result of the action of the IDF, as Kingsley and Boxerman seem to suggest – they simply never thought so. Like virtually every national liberation movement of the twentieth century, they have never had the goal of militarily defeating the occupier (except occasionally, tactically), but to resist it longer, longer than the latter in turn is able to resist.

It is therefore clear that the resistance of the Palestinian people (which has lasted 76 years…) will continue until Israel is forced to give in. And this is what happened to the state most similar to Israel that history remembers, apartheid South Africa (not by chance close allies).

Back then, no one would have bet that a handful of blacks would defeat the Pretoria regime. Nelson Mandela, founder and leader of Umkhonto we Sizwe (military wing of the African National Congress) was considered a terrorist, and remained in prison for 27 years. Then he became the first non-white South African president, and won the Nobel Peace Prize…

So, just as in terms of historical perspective, in terms of contingent perspective it is inevitable that we will arrive at a negotiation to put an end to this virulent phase of the conflict; because Israeli society is not able to resist longer than Palestinian society. And since, precisely, the negotiation will arrive when Israel gives in, there will be no way to ignore this.

From an operational point of view, however, it is clear that even the minimum objectives of the IDF operation in the Strip are difficult to achieve, and in any case of little use.

Control of the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphia corridor, on the border with Egypt, will not serve to block smuggling in the medium to long term. Control of the Netzarim corridor will not serve to separate the north from the south, and consequently to keep the Resistance forces divided. And, in both cases, it will offer the latter targets constantly available. As for the hypothesis of transforming Gaza City and its surroundings into a large buffer zone, even if it were feasible, it would only serve to shift the problem a little further.

As has been said, Israel is a small country, and there is practically not a single meter of territory that cannot be reached by the weapons of the Axis of Resistance.

From a strategic point of view, therefore, Gaza is destined to remain a thorn in the side – in the literal sense – for the Jewish state. It is worth remembering, once again, that Israel occupied the Strip for a long time, even maintaining colonial settlements there, but in the end had to opt for the choice of abandoning that territory, dismantling the settlements and relocating the inhabitants, because the occupation was too expensive.

In a certain sense, it represents an effective synecdoche of the broader problem of Israel with all the occupied territories: there are too many, too inhabited, too resistant, for a small country.

Which, moreover, also applies to the West Bank – which is the portion of territory on which Israeli colonial appetites are most concentrated, and in particular of the settlers who constitute a large part of the electoral base of the far right.

The situation on the West Bank front is certainly the least explosive, from the Israeli point of view, even if since October 7th things have gotten much worse for the IDF. Although the Resistance forces are much smaller in number of fighters than in Gaza, so much so that territorial brigades are often formed by bringing together militants from various organizations, over the past year a qualitative leap in combat capabilities has become evident. As a result, every time Israeli forces make an incursion into one of the Palestinian population centers, they inevitably have to face firefights and IED ambushes. In this portion of the occupied territories, moreover, the IDF can count on an additional advantage of no small importance; in fact, the government of the Palestinian National Authority [7], and in particular its security forces, actively collaborate with the Israeli forces, passing on information about the Resistance, collaborating in the realization of ambushes by special forces against fighters, arresting them and even defusing the devices prepared to hit the IDF forces.

From a strategic point of view, the very particular administrative configuration of the territory, leopard-like, presents advantages and disadvantages for both sides. In practice, the entire occupied West Bank presents itself with a series of Palestinian inhabited centers, and Israeli colonial settlements, scattered across the territory, but with the additional particular characteristic that there is an entire road network connecting the settlements that is totally off-limits to Palestinians. This particular configuration effectively creates a series of enclaves of one side and the other, randomly arranged across the territory. The original Israeli idea, which determined this singular urban development, was to allow the colonial settlements to cover the largest possible area, and at the same time serve to fragment the Palestinian territory, preventing any continuity.

This territorial fragmentation, if on the one hand it severely limits the mobility of Palestinian forces (essentially each forced into its own territory, without the possibility of intervening to help other centers under attack, and more generally without being able to operate any concentration of forces, even temporary), and allows the IDF more effective operational control, is however potentially dangerous also for the settlers, many of whose settlements are within reach of Palestinian attacks (something this, moreover, has already begun to happen).

It should be noted that the proximity of the border with Jordan makes it easier to smuggle weapons – as can be seen from the video-photographic documentation, while in Gaza the typical weapon of the fighters is the AK-47, in the West Bank modern weapons of Western manufacture abound.

More generally, the forces of the Resistance (also due to the aforementioned conditions) are not currently able to operate in such a way as to create problems for the IDF, and can at most act on the defensive, striking the enemy when it carries out incursions into the various Palestinian population centers. The Israeli army is however forced to constantly maintain forces on the territory, which therefore cannot be engaged on the hottest fronts.

Finally, as regards the third front, the Lebanese one, it is quite evident – ​​in many respects – that here we are in another dimension of scale. Even if Hezbollah is a non-state organization (let us remember that it is first and foremost a political party, represented in the Lebanese parliament and government), its strength and its combat capacity make it a significant military actor, certainly greater than the regular Lebanese army (and not only that: probably stronger than the Syrian army, for example). And therefore, if we ignore this different, so to speak, legal nature, what is being fought along the blue line [8] is to all intents and purposes a symmetrical war. This obviously does not mean to argue that the IDF and Hezbollah are comparable (suffice it to say that the latter does not have its own air force...), but that they both belong to the category of armies. Equally obviously, there is another significant difference between the two, both in terms of the chain of command and the operational methods.

Furthermore, the fighters of the Lebanese Islamic Resistance can boast two further assets: they have accumulated a long combat experience, during a decade of civil war in Syria, and they have a highly territorialized structure (that is, the combat units are mainly made up of men from the place where the unit itself is stationed).

All these characteristics, although obviously not allowing them to compete with the IDF on the same level [9], however, give the opportunity to obtain sufficient tactical superiority on the ground. As we have seen for example after the whole series of targeted assassinations, with which many political and military leaders were eliminated (including high commanders and the leader Nasrallah himself), this has not affected the operational capacity even for a day. The hierarchical structure of the military organization is in fact much more horizontal and decentralized, as opposed to the vertical one typical of state armies.

Finally, it should be emphasized that Hezbollah is fighting a defensive battle on the ground (and this is always an advantage), that the orography of the terrain along the demarcation line does not favor large-scale movements of armored vehicles, and that over the past 24 years it has built a dense network of tunnels and underground bunkers along this line, which allows it to shelter men and vehicles during air attacks.

Let us now look at the strategic objectives (declared and undeclared) of Operation Northern Arrow, launched by the IDF on October 1, in order to evaluate the effectiveness or otherwise of the military action on the ground. Regardless of the propaganda, it is clear that the Israeli military leaders knew very well that a ground campaign against Hezbollah would be bloody, and very probably also fruitless. But this idea was not entirely shared by the government, which perhaps counted on a greater destructive capacity of the armed forces. In any case, it is presumable that both politicians and the military were counting on a sort of Gaza effect, that is, the annihilation of the enemy through a massive and devastating bombing campaign. The minimum declared objective of the operation was in any case to ensure the return of the approximately 100,000 settlers evacuated from the northern settlements of Israel. Corollary of this – or rather, its necessary precondition – to render Hezbollah harmless and/or push it back to the Litani River (about 20 km north of the blue line). Third objective, finally, unsaid but substantial, to arrive at a reversal of the Lebanese political balance, such as to undermine Hezbollah's dominant role in the country of the cedars, realigning it with Western interests.

This strategic objective – the only one actually still in the field – is pursued through a pincer maneuver, with Israeli military pressure on the ground, and political-diplomatic pressure from Western countries. Hence both the insistence on a rapid election of the Lebanese President [10], and the pressure to arrive at a withdrawal of UNIFIL, which they would like to replace with a new multinational mission, no longer UN-branded, and led by Western forces.

Such a maneuver clearly has a much greater scope than the safeguarding of Israeli colonial settlements; the underlying objective, in fact, is to deprive Iran of its main – and strongest – ally, to reduce its role in the region and, in perspective, make it weaker in the event of a military move to overthrow its regime.

If we look at Israeli military action, we can distinguish three different levels. The first, and most significant, is that of the massive bombings on cities and villages in southern Lebanon, as well as on Beirut. These, in their indiscriminateness, do not have the aim (except to a very small extent) of affecting Hezbollah's fighting capacity, nor even of undermining its popular support. The aim is precisely to exert very strong pressure on the part of society – and of the political class – that is hostile or in any case not supportive, in order to determine a deep rift and, thanks to European and American support, achieve a reversal of the political and power balances within the Lebanese state. In this sense, it can be said that the ferocious bombing campaign is the only truly Clausewitzian move in all of Israel's military action.

The second level, substantially completed, is that of the attempt to disarticulate Hezbollah's political and military structure, killing as many of its leaders as possible through targeted attacks and, as we saw a few weeks ago, through forms of mass terrorism (exploding pagers and walkie-talkies). Although experience should have taught us something (Israel has been practicing assassinations for decades, first against the Palestinian Resistance and then against Hezbollah, without it ever having actually served any purpose), it is clear that once again the Israelis have placed too much emphasis on the effectiveness of this type of practice, which has in fact once again proven to be militarily useless. By the way (personal opinion) the mass explosion operation should have been done on the same day, and not in two successive steps, 24 to 48 hours after the ground attack, so as to maximize its psychological and disorientation impact.

Third level, obviously, that of boots on the ground. Which, equally obviously, is the most complicated, because this is the terrain on which Hezbollah can exploit its advantages to the fullest, and because it is also the one without which Israel cannot achieve any results. In four weeks of fighting, the Israeli advance continues to be measured in the order of a few hundred meters; the areas where the IDF has managed to penetrate the most are those to the northeast, where the village of Kfarkilla was taken (about 4-500 meters of penetration to the west) and, to the south, that of Mouroun al ras (about 1 km of penetration to the northwest). Along the remaining parts of the contact line, Israeli forces have advanced on average 100-200 meters. In the face of these fairly limited results, and certainly very far from the objective of pushing Hezbollah back to the Litani, the losses suffered are significant; According to data provided by the Resistance (the IDF strictly censors this information), the death toll would amount to over 70 dead and more than 600 wounded, including officers and soldiers [11], 28 Merkava tanks, 4 military bulldozers, an armored vehicle and a troop transport.

Although the Israelis claim that Hezbollah “has withdrawn from the border,” they not only fail to take into account the negligible penetration carried out so far by the IDF, but above all the fact that the Islamic Resistance operates from fortified positions about five kilometers from the border; mindful of the 2006 war, it has nevertheless equipped itself with sufficient strategic depth to contain the Israeli advance, even if it had managed to cross the front lines. And in the meantime, Radwan’s elite forces are engaging the Israeli forces, blocking or severely slowing down their ability to push into Lebanese territory. An approach that underlines Hezbollah’s tactics, based on attrition and deterrence.

“For Hezbollah, a prolonged clash serves both as a defensive measure and as a strategy to influence Lebanon’s political and security future, potentially tilting the resolution of the conflict in its favor” [12].

It should be noted that during the second Lebanese war in 2006, which lasted 34 days, the Israeli advance was mainly smashed against the village of Beit Jebeil, which is located not far from the current IDF forward point in the area of ​​Mouroun al ras. In Beit Jebeil, Hezbollah fighters resisted a siege for two weeks, while now the Israelis have only just approached the village, after four weeks.

Aside from the limited territorial advances, the Islamic Resistance’s ability to strike areas south of the blue line with missiles and drones has not been affected in the least; on the contrary, it has intensified and extended, reaching as far as Tel Aviv [13].

Currently, Israeli forces are primarily focusing on demolishing all homes and mosques within the controlled area (with the exception of the Christian village of Rmeich).

One would have expected that, at the very least, the IDF would continue to try to push forward, both in the direction of Beit Jebeil and further north towards Taybeh, as well as along the coast to the west, regardless of the losses, otherwise it is not clear what the point of the losses sustained so far was. However, contrary to this, it appears that Israeli forces have already decided to back down. After the 146th Division was withdrawn, the 98th Division is now also withdrawing from southern Lebanon, leaving only two divisions active inside the country (the 91st and the 36th). The IDF’s 146th Ha-Mapatz Reserve Division ceased operations last week, after being pushed back in the western sector. The 98th Ha-Esh Paratrooper Division is now withdrawing from the eastern sector, after suffering heavy losses in Kfar Kila, Odaisseh, Markaba and Houla.

This reversal of course has been accompanied and supported by the Israeli media, which has expressed growing doubts about the course of the war, and has given space to critical voices within the army and intelligence.

Amos Harel, in Haaretz [14], has highlighted the gap between the army’s position and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s intention to intensify operations. Analysts such as Ronen Bergman of Yedioth Ahronoth acknowledge that the intelligence and military have greatly overestimated Hezbollah’s vulnerability, and military correspondent Ron Ben-Yishai has highlighted Hezbollah’s solid recovery. For Alon Ben-David of Maariv, not only has the daily rocket fire from Lebanon not decreased, but the conflict has begun to push Israel towards negotiations.

Apparently, then, Israel is moving towards de-escalation, at least on the Lebanese front. But, considering the absolute paucity of the results obtained, it seems it is difficult to understand how he could justify it, in the eyes of his own public opinion.

Netanyahu makes no secret of wanting to fire Defense Minister Gallant, who is disliked by the ultra-religious far right both because he is considered too moderate and because he is the architect of the introduction of compulsory military service for the Haredim (Orthodox scholars, who have been exempt from the draft until now), but clearly this move will not serve to make him the sole scapegoat. Moreover, Gallant is the Biden administration's trusted man in the Tel Aviv government, and his removal will not please Washington.

But the real problem is that, no matter how much they boast of amazing successes, even by firing off sensational fake news, government propagandists can no longer hide the reality of the facts on the ground. Despite the decapitation of its political and military leaders, Hezbollah is stronger than ever; there is no question of militarily pushing it back beyond the Litani; there is even less question of making the evacuated settlers return home; even the objective of separating the Gaza conflict from the Lebanese one is impossible.

So what could Israel’s next moves be? It is interesting to note that Gallant himself, in an open letter addressed to the government (and which sounds at once like a further provocation to get himself kicked out, and like a sort of political testament), advances his ideas on the immediate future; ideas that are however a short and easy compendium of good intentions, but without any real indication of how to implement them. Gallant writes that, as far as Gaza is concerned, efforts should aim to “establish a reality without a military threat, prevent the growth of terrorist capabilities, return all hostages and promote an alternative to the Hamas government”; on Lebanon, he says that it is necessary to “create a security reality that allows residents of the north to return to their homes as soon as possible”; and regarding the West Bank, he added: “Prevent a violent outbreak by countering terrorism”.

All things, in fact, that even Smotrich probably wouldn’t have anything to object to, but that – as a former general, and as the current defense minister – he should have at least accompanied with strategic and operational indications on how to implement them.

More generally, it seems that Israel is moving towards a phase of slowing down its military action (see also the attack on Iran, decidedly low-key), which could however only be a (also) political tactic, in view of the American presidential elections. Whether Trump or Harris wins, it is likely that Netanyahu will restart his Merkavas the following day. Indeed, it is precisely during the interregnum phase, between November 6 and January 20 (the date of the new president’s inauguration) that he could accelerate, precisely to influence the attitude of the new US administration.

And, although it is taken for granted that he would prefer Trump, this may not be true at all. It is no coincidence that the powerful American Jewish lobby is firmly aligned with Harris. And it certainly didn’t escape the notice of a seasoned politician like Netanyahu that the vice president-elect, J.D. Vance (the true political mind of a possible Republican administration), recently declared on TV that “Israel has the right to defend itself, but America’s interest will sometimes be distinct. Sometimes we will have overlapping interests, and sometimes we will have distinct interests, and our interest, I think, is very much in not going to war with Iran.”

After all, a week of less intense military activity could be very welcome, at the White House, and in any case it wouldn’t be a big problem. But Israel has to decide what to do, and it has to decide now. One thing is quite clear, and that is that the US is not willing to be dragged into a war with Iran. Harris or Trump, this point is not susceptible to change - also because the decisions on this matter are not taken in the Oval Office at the last minute, but derive directly from the imperial strategic orientations, which certainly do not change with every presidential election, nor as a consequence of these; if anything, presidents are chosen based on medium-long term strategies.

Furthermore, the recent Russian warning, with which Moscow made it clear that, in the event of an Iran-Israel conflict, if NATO intervened in favor of Tel Aviv, the Russian Federation would take the field with Tehran.

The options, therefore, are narrowing. Either focus on a de-escalation strategy, with all the consequent risks for the stability of the government and its majority, perhaps trying to restrict military action to the Gaza Strip alone, or find a way to relaunch the war in some other way.

The first option is obviously very risky for Netanyahu; he would find himself facing the anger of his far-right allies Smotrich and Ben Gvir, he would have to deal with the settlers who are furious because they cannot return to their homes and businesses, and above all he would have to suffer another defeat by Hezbollah. All things that would not only undermine his personal position and that of his government, but that would reflect negatively on the stability of Israel itself. Therefore, the second option would seem to be a forced choice, as well as in the nature of the current government.

But, having to discard the idea of ​​a conflict with Iran, the range of possibilities narrows dramatically. In fact, perhaps only one. Which, once again, is quite a gamble. The IDF could in fact try to reverse the impasse on the Lebanese border, through a flanking maneuver. Israeli forces could enter Syria from the Golan Heights – where they would encounter little resistance from the Syrian army – and then converge to the west and enter Lebanon from Syria (a border that is certainly not fortified, and undoubtedly even less guarded), obtaining the double advantage of bypassing Hezbollah's defensive lines, and cutting off its supply lines. Furthermore, it could exploit its ties with the Kurdish-jihadist militias to activate them, creating new problems for the Syrian forces (and for the Hezbollah units present in the country).

Obviously, here the risk would derive first of all from having to invade another sovereign country (which would only increase the difficulties of Western supporters), and then obviously from the fact that the opening of a fourth front - although Syria is certainly the soft underbelly of the Axis of Resistance - would only increase the difficulties (and losses) for the IDF.

Moreover, the presence of both Russian and US forces on Syrian territory would make the operation extremely risky, really on a razor's edge, and could result in a dramatic widening of the conflict (Iraqi Islamic Resistance, first of all, but perhaps also Iran itself, which cannot allow the Syrian ring to blow).

The only way to obtain a result, avoiding the risk of a general explosion, would be to achieve a rapid victory over Hezbollah, thanks to the flanking maneuver. But whether this is actually possible is doubtful, and is equivalent to betting everything on a lottery.

Inevitably, we always come back to the same point. The lack of a strategic plan by the Israeli leadership is dragging the country, chamber after chamber, into a tragic trap; and even if here it is Israel that carries out the slaughter along the way, in the end it is the tuna that risks being trapped and succumbing. And unfortunately, once it has taken the plunge, it is impossible for the pelagic predator to turn back and go back. As difficult – and painful – as it is for Israel, there is actually no other choice than to return to politics, to negotiation. But in the awareness that, as the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament Nabih Berri says, “what the enemy cannot obtain with force will not be obtained with politics”. It remains to be seen whether Netanyahu has the strength and clarity to understand and accept it.

Notes

1 – Once the season of wars with the Arab countries was over, Israel has always had to deal with the armed formations of the Resistance, which obviously were absolutely not able to compete on the instrumental level (quantity and quality of the weapons systems used). Nonetheless, Tsahal continued to rely on the same model (vertical hierarchical structure and technological supremacy), while for its part the Resistance learned to adapt its operational methods in such a way as to elude, or at least circumvent, its own handicaps. The Palestinian attack of October 7, in fact, well beyond sterile (and a little silly) speculations on whether or not it was known in advance, has nevertheless shown how Israeli intelligence – despite being well informed about the formations of the Resistance (how many men, existence of the tunnel network, type of weapons available…) – totally underestimated their operational capacity. Moreover, it let the Resistance reach this capacity, underestimating it on the one hand, and overestimating its own on the other. In practice, the Israeli military apparatus, as a whole, has not been able to prevent the Palestinian fighting formations from reaching an offensive capacity, and a military resilience, of which October 7 is only the most visible part. Much more significant, in fact, is that a year after the start of the fighting, and despite the immense devastation inflicted on the population and the territory, the Resistance has shown itself capable of giving the IDF no respite on the ground. And this already represents a strategic defeat for the Israeli military security system.

2 – Everyone will remember when, months ago, Netanyahu and the IDF leaders claimed to have destroyed 22 of the 24 Resistance brigades, and that it was absolutely necessary to enter Rafah because that was where the last two brigades still operational were located… And in fact, from last spring to today the clashes have continued everywhere, and in these weeks a very tough battle is being fought in the Jabalia camp, in the center of Gaza City, at the opposite point to Rafah.

3 – Even a pro-Israeli newspaper like the New York Times recognizes this, which in an article (“Hamas’s Guerrilla Tactics in North Gaza Make It Hard to Defeat”, Patrick Kingsley and Aaron Boxerman, New York Times) states that Hamas is “still a potent guerrilla force with enough fighters and ammunition to trap the Israeli army in a slow, attritional and still unwinnable war”. The article also mentions the fact that, as for the tunnel network, “much of it (…) remains intact despite Israel’s efforts to destroy it, according to military analysts and Israeli soldiers”. The article also gives credence to the data provided by the IDF, according to which “Hamas has lost more than 17,000 fighters since the start of the war”; considering that the number of confirmed deaths to date is just over 42,000, and that about 65% of these are women and children, there remain about 14,700 adult men. Even if they were all combatants – which is obviously impossible, since it would mean that not a single male civilian was killed – a couple of thousand would be missing. The most reliable figure, based on reliable data (total population, number of victims, number of combatants before October 7), is reasonable to estimate at 3/5,000 combatants killed, that is 10/15% of the operational force.

4 – Quoted in “Hamas’s Guerrilla Tactics in North Gaza Make It Hard to Defeat”, Patrick Kingsley and Aaron Boxerman, ibidem

5 – It was during one of these battles that the Al Qassam Brigades killed Colonel Ehsan Daksa, during an ambush in which his armored column fell. On that occasion two Merkava tanks and other armored vehicles were destroyed, while the actual number of dead and wounded remained hidden by the iron military censorship.

6 – See “Hamas’s Guerrilla Tactics in North Gaza Make It Hard to Defeat”, Patrick Kingsley and Aaron Boxerman, ibidem

7 – The PNA was established, following the Oslo Accords, in 1994. It exercises administrative power over the occupied territories of the West Bank, and is essentially made up of the Al Fatah party. It depends almost entirely on foreign funding, and is closely linked to the USA and – therefore – to Israel, which however maintains military control over the territories, and exercises it at will. Starting especially from the second Intifada (2000), and even more significantly after the Al Aqsa Flood operation, a part of Al Fatah, especially the youth, began to actively participate in the struggle, including armed, against the occupation, giving life to the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. This opened a contradiction within Al Fatah, since the Brigades have not severed ties with the political movement. This contradiction has become more acute following the national unity agreements, signed in Beijing on July 23, 2024, with which fourteen Palestinian groups agreed to revitalize the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) by welcoming all organizations fighting against the occupation. On that occasion, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi welcomed in particular the high Hamas official Abu Marzuq and the Al Fatah envoy Mahmoud Aloul. According to the head of Chinese diplomacy, the agreement provided for "the formation of an interim government of national reconciliation after the war". The current situation sees, in fact, a formal agreement in this sense, but strong disagreements remain between Hamas and Al Fatah, both because the latter is against armed struggle, and because the US sponsors of the PNA refuse the presence of Hamas (and other organizations) in any hypothesis of a Palestinian government. To put it simply, one could say that the most colluded (and corrupt) part of Al Fatah is the one that forms the backbone of the PA, the most combative part is headed by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and a third faction – more moderate and possibilist – is headed by the Fatah party rather than the PA.

8 – The blue line is a border line established by the UN in 2000, following the Israeli withdrawal from part of the occupied Lebanese territories (it still maintains control of the area of ​​the so-called Sheeba farms). Israel and Lebanon have never fully and definitively agreed on a mutually and internationally recognized border line (moreover, Israel is the only country in the world that does not have defined borders, since doing so would prevent any expansion…), and so it was the United Nations that established one.

9 – For example, Hezbollah not only does not have an air fleet (with the exception of some reconnaissance drones), but it does not even have an anti-aircraft defense system capable of countering the Israeli air force. Just as it does not have armored forces, it would therefore have difficulty carrying out a classic offensive maneuver, at brigade level.

10 – The Lebanese political system is based on a complex and delicate mechanism of power distribution on a confessional basis (Shiites, Sunnis, Christians, Druze…), inherited from colonialism (divide and conquer…), but which obviously no longer corresponds not only to the demographic reality, but also to the political one. As a result, the election of the new president, which requires an agreement between different forces, has been blocked for some time. The USA, France and Israel would like to elect a president capable of reducing the political role of Hezbollah – which goes well beyond the Shiite community, by the way.

11 – The IDF announced that 594 soldiers have been wounded on the northern front since the start of the ground invasion in southern Lebanon, confirming the general reliability of the data provided by Hezbollah.

12 – “Enemy Army: We have reached the peak and then the decline”, Ali Haidar, Al Akhbar

13 – Among others, we recall the drone strike against the Golani Brigade base in Binyamina, south of Haifa (5 dead and over 30 wounded), that of the headquarters of Military Intelligence Unit 8200, in the capital, and that against Netanyahu’s house, in Caesarea.

14 – “Will Israel’s Deadliest Month This Year Shift Public Opinion on the War in Lebanon?”, Amos Harel, Haaretz