ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Further confirmation of how this is one of the most complex situations to resolve, because it embodies all the damage caused by 19th-century European colonialism, compounded by the existence of Israel, we are once again witnessing a series of upheavals that, when combined, weave a highly intricate plot.

With the war with Iran put on hold, the US objective is now to end the war in Gaza. The US strategic plan remains the same, the Abraham Accords, but with some significant changes in the overall framework. As reported by Axios—a US publication with close ties to the intelligence community—during Netanyahu's long trip to Washington (this time, as we saw, without much public honor), the conditions for a ceasefire are reportedly being established. Specifically, there are reports of tense meetings between Ron Dermer, a close advisor to Netanyahu, Steve Witkoff, and an official from Qatar, a country that is mediating between the parties and has relayed the Palestinian resistance's demands. The crucial issue still to be resolved appears to be the extent of the Israeli withdrawal; Tel Aviv insists on maintaining control of the Morag corridor, which serves to separate a vast area in the southern Gaza Strip, destined—in the Israeli plan, outlined in the Smotrich Plan—to become a gigantic concentration camp. Both the resistance and the US administration, for obviously different reasons, are opposed to this. Naturally, since this is Israel (and in this respect the US is not much different), the reliability of any agreements signed is extremely tenuous, and they could be torn up as soon as they deem it useful or possible.

The US strategy aims to subdue Israel, strengthened by its intervention that saved it from a crushing defeat by Iran, since this step (the end of the kinetic conflict in Gaza) is the sine qua non for advancing the Abraham Accords, which remain the cornerstone of all US Middle Eastern policy. In return, Trump will likely offer recognition of further annexation of occupied territories in the West Bank.

Quite simply, Saudi Arabia (and the other Gulf Arab countries) want the region to be pacified so they can pursue their own development projects; and, at the same time, the US has a vital need for these countries, both as investors and as guarantors of the survival of the petrodollar (one of the main pillars of the US currency), while Israel is merely a bottomless pit swallowing up precious resources (economic and military). Furthermore, Riyadh is well aware that Tehran is an essential player (politically, economically, and militarily) in the region, and is now firmly tied to both Russia and China, both of which Saudi Arabia also enjoys a commercial interest. And while the agreements brokered by Beijing, which led to the reopening of relations between the two countries, represented a significant step forward, even more important was the Twelve-Day War (which clarified the true military balance of power between Iran, Israel, and the US), and in particular the attack on the US base at Al-Udeid in Qatar. Although the Gulf countries view Iran's influence over many Arab countries with displeasure, they are nevertheless well aware that it is better to find a peaceful modus vivendi with their neighbor.

But if US policy in the Middle East requires regional pacification, this means not only keeping the mad dog Israel at bay, but also dismantling (or at least rendering as harmless as possible) the Axis of Resistance. This is the reason for all this support for the new Syrian government, despite awareness of its lack of stability and its extreme closeness to Turkey (an unwelcome trait for both Washington and Tel Aviv). It is also the reason for the growing pressure on Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah, and the pressure on the Iraqi government to dismantle the Shiite popular militias.

This grand game obviously includes the agreement emerging between Syria and Israel, with the latter withdrawing from occupied territories in southern Syria in exchange for ceding the Golan Heights to Tel Aviv. Persistent rumors also suggest a secret clause in these agreements, according to which Syria would commit to attacking Lebanon if Israel did so.

But at the same time, it is clear that these efforts, at least in the short term, fuel tensions rather than easing them. Although Hezbollah is currently forced to contend with the offensive led by US envoy Tom Barrak, trying to avoid triggering an internal conflict within the country, and having to endure the ongoing Israeli occupation of swathes of territory (which it was supposed to have vacated following the ceasefire agreement), as well as the constant bombing by Tel Aviv's air force, it is clear that it will never accept disarmament, even at the cost of a new civil war. This, it doesn't take much to understand, would open a window of opportunity for Israel, which would undoubtedly launch a fourth invasion of the land of the cedars. The situation in Iraq is similar, but less tense, where the Popular Mobilization Forces are largely already integrated into the armed forces, making it much more complicated to demand their demobilization.

Last but not least, the Kurdish question continues to weigh heavily on the regional scene. Following the televised announcement of the dissolution of the PKK, made by Öcalan and other Kurdish leaders, a symbolic ceremony was held in Syrian Kurdistan to hand over their weapons by some guerrillas. But it was, indeed, a symbolic act. The Syrian Kurdish forces are not very willing to disarm, and in fact, talks in Damascus between the government and the SDF stalled precisely over the issue of regional autonomy and the question of maintaining Kurdish units in Rojava after their integration into the army. Moreover, there is an even deeper rift between Öcalan and the Syrian Kurdish leaders, who have long been sheltering under the protective wing of the United States (even maintaining contact with Israel), while the PKK leader maintains his strongly anti-imperialist and anti-US stance.

Last but not least, and as a result of the same situation, in Iraqi Kurdistan (an autonomous region created after the fall of Saddam, and also under US-Israeli control) clashes have occurred between government-run Peshmerga and some tribal leaders. The Kurdish world, in short, is also undergoing a realignment of its internal balance, and this fits into the broader shift in the geopolitical balance of the entire Middle East. The game is still wide open, and the Israeli-American axis does not necessarily have an advantage; indeed, it is forced to seek diplomatic mediation precisely because it has demonstrated its inability to sustain a military confrontation of attrition. The long wave of October 7th continues to manifest itself, and both Washington and Tel Aviv have little to celebrate.