ON THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE
According to the Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Kiev has only two options to prevent a Russian breakthrough. The first is a significant operational withdrawal, which, however, requires first a political decision—unlikely to be expected from Zelensky—and, above all, significant organizational and logistical capacity. And, of course, a fortified line to defend itself, significantly set back from the current battle line. The second, even more radical, is a complete redeployment beyond the Dnieper, on the right bank of the river, thus creating a sort of de facto border between what remains of Ukraine and the territories under Russian control. This, of course, is a Western perspective, albeit a "rationalizing" one.
It should first be noted that this second option must clearly not be understood in a literal sense, but rather limited to the Donbass area; In practice, Ukrainian forces would have to retreat westward, remaining on the other side of the river in the stretch that essentially runs from Dnipro to Zaporizhia. This is the arm of the river that slopes almost vertically from north to south, while above Dnipro it bends sharply northwest, reaching as far as Kiev, while beyond Zaporizhia it turns southwest, reaching Kherson. To give an idea, between the Dnipro-Zaporizhia stretch and the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk defensive line, which is now close to the contact line, there are approximately 180 km. A retreat of this magnitude, even in better conditions than the Ukrainian armed forces currently find themselves in, would mean risking a massacre.
In both cases, the political decision that would necessarily have to be taken seems extremely unlikely, as Western sponsors need to see Ukrainian resistance to maintain the flow of aid.
From a strategic perspective, it is clear that redeployment to the Dnieper—regardless of the risks associated with the maneuver—would offer some undeniable advantages. First, obviously, it would take advantage of the natural barrier provided by the river, and also shorten the front line (and logistical constraints). It would also offer the opportunity to exert greater pressure on Moscow to halt its advance, having achieved the essentially complete liberation of the oblasts claimed as part of the Russian Federation. Nonetheless, the political and operational risks are so high that this option can be considered extremely unlikely.
The option of a limited operational withdrawal, while inconsistent with the policy adopted by Zelensky and Syrsky, appears more plausible, and is supported by the fact that the AFU appears to be preparing a line of entrenchments approximately 20 km west of the battle line. If Pokrovsk were to fall in the coming weeks, and the heavily fortified area centered around the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk were to be outflanked, a retreat would be inevitable—although we can assume the AFU would fight inch by inch, significantly increasing its losses.
Whatever Kiev's final decision, the overall picture will evolve largely independently of what happens on the western borders of Donbas.
To the northeast, Ukrainian forces continue to exert pressure in an attempt to penetrate the Russian oblasts of Kursk and Belgorod, despite the previous offensive having ultimately failed, but at a high price. For their part, Russian forces continue to press on the Sumy oblast, as part of Putin's declared strategic plan to establish a buffer zone between the territories incorporated into the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Meanwhile, to the south, no significant movements have been reported, and at least for the moment, there appears to be no pressure to retake Kherson.
Looking at the operational picture, the most significant element that emerges is the parallel decline in Ukrainian anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense capabilities and Russia's growing offensive capacity. The former is obviously driven by the depletion of ammunition and the progressive destruction of interception systems (radar and launchers), to which neither the now depleted arsenals nor Western industrial capacity are able to adequately respond. The second is a direct consequence of the constant growth in the Russian defense industry's production capacity: missiles (ballistic and hypersonic), fighter-bombers, and especially drones, are being churned out at an ever-increasing rate, so much so that today every nighttime attack on Ukraine sees at least 500-600 drones, plus a dozen missiles. This, combined with the overwhelming power of Russian artillery, makes the Ukrainian army's task extremely onerous. Despite Western propaganda continuing to peddle numbers regarding casualties on both sides, it's clear that the manpower consumption is too high for Kiev, which already suffers from a shortage of weapons systems (in addition to the aforementioned deficits in air defense, tanks and armored personnel carriers are also beginning to run low—although the predominantly defensive deployment partially reduces their need).
Amid all this, the question of Odessa remains open. The city, which is nevertheless subjected to heavy bombing of its port, industrial, and military infrastructure, and where local sabotage groups are clearly active, is unclear whether it is part of Russian plans. Officially, it is never mentioned, but it is clear that the possibility must at least be on the table. The city's strategic importance is simply enormous. Not only because it would cut off Ukraine from the Black Sea, thus protecting Crimea, and bring Russian forces closer to Transnistria—another potential crisis point. Even more importantly, it would strengthen Moscow's presence in the Black Sea, which NATO—despite its defeat in Ukraine—has not given up considering in its plans to encircle Russia. This is all the more important given the Atlantic Alliance's commitment to making Romania a significant military hub, and its maneuvers further east, where pressure on Armenia and Azerbaijan's rapprochement (via Turkey) with the Western Atlantic threaten to push NATO to the shores of the Caspian Sea, further extending its military rimland (and the agreement that appears to be on the verge of being finalized between Yerevan and Baku regarding the Zangezur corridor is a step in this direction), to the detriment of both Moscow and Tehran.
Because one thing is quite clear: although defeat in Ukraine is now taken for granted, and attempts are simply being made to delay it and reduce its impact, the West has by no means abandoned its aggressive policy toward the Russian Federation, and it is not limited to NATO-European rearmament policies.
It is safe to assume that they are aware of this, both in Moscow and in Beijing and Tehran. What's unclear is whether, and to what extent, they are prepared to exploit the military advantage they currently enjoy, not so much to strike their adversary directly, but at least to decisively repel its most dangerous initiatives.
From this perspective, the fate of Odessa could be a good litmus test.