ONE FRONT IS CLOSED, ANOTHER OPENS?

Only a few hours have passed since the ceasefire came into force in Lebanon (with Israel having already violated it two or three times), and suddenly another front has flared up again, in Syria, where the situation had been stable for at least four years. The coincidence has obviously led to the belief that it was an Israeli move, which had recently threatened Assad several times in relation to the Syrian role in the passage of Iranian aid to Hezbollah. From what it appears, however, the resumption of fighting seems to be more attributable to Ankara than to Tel Aviv.

Let's start by saying that the situation in Syria - for a change... - is made extremely complicated by the presence of countless actors, local and international, whose relationships are also subject to constantly changing dynamics.

Northern Syria - where the fighting has flared up again - sees the presence, especially in the west, of some radical Islamist groups, some of which are entirely made up of fighters from abroad (Uzbeks, Tajiks, even Uighurs from China) who, together with the Turkic-speaking militias, operate in the shadow of Turkey. And they are precisely the groups that gave rise to the current offensive in the direction of Aleppo. Towards the east, on the border with Iraq, there are Kurdish groups (this is the large region of Kurdistan, straddling Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran).

Southeastern Syria, on the other hand, sees the presence of Kurdish and Islamist fighting groups, united under the acronym of the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces), who operate under the protection of the USA, which has some illegal military bases here.

Israel has excellent relations with the Kurdish militias (the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan is a Mossad base), and with the groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

There are also Russian military forces (Moscow has its only naval base in the Mediterranean here, in Tartus), Iranian and Hezbollah.

Syria is, together with Yemen, one of the two state entities that are part of the Axis of Resistance - in addition to Iran, of course - and due to its strategic position it is a fundamental link; at the same time, following the devastating civil war (fomented and fueled by the USA, Saudi Arabia and Turkey), part of its territory is still outside of state control, armed militias variously supported by regional and extra-regional powers control large parts of it and - with US support - steal a large part of the oil production, smuggled to Iraq. All this makes Syria a fundamental but also the weakest link in the chain. It is no coincidence, in fact, that Syria's contribution to the conflict with Israel has been entirely passive, limiting itself to acting as a transit corridor for Iranian aid to Lebanese Hezbollah. Nevertheless, Syrian territory has been constantly bombed for years by Israel, which evidently has every interest in destabilizing the country, waiting for the right opportunity to overthrow Assad. In this general framework, already complex in itself, Russia and Turkey constitute elements of further confusion. Moscow, which at the time intervened in favor of Damascus mainly because it was concerned about its naval base, has then had the opportunity to develop a collaboration with Iran here too, which has now assumed a strategic dimension (the ratification of a treaty similar to the one just concluded between Russia and North Korea is awaited). At the same time, Russia has historically had good relations with Israel, and tends to try to position itself in a marginal position, with respect to the clash between the Axis of Resistance and the Zionist state. So much so that, for example, it has never intervened to counter Israeli air raids, also arousing some discontent in Syria (especially, in recent times, for the attacks in the Latakia area, where there is also a strong Russian presence). Although Moscow-Tel Aviv relations have cooled considerably in recent times, the Russian position remains substantially almost ambiguous, so much so that relations with local allies are deteriorating somewhat.

For its part, Turkey - as is characteristic of Erdogan - follows an extremely changeable policy, played on many tables at the same time. Historically, Ankara has been among the major sponsors of the Islamic State in Syria and, when this was substantially defeated by the Iranian IRGC and Hezbollah, it moved on to the creation of Turkic-speaking militias to use as proxies. Fundamentally, Turkish interest in Syria is linked to the fact that the Kurdish militias (very active in Turkey) have an operational hinterland here. At the same time, a game is being played here that also has to do with Turkish-Russian relations on the one hand and Turkish-American relations on the other. And, as always, Erdogan maneuvers using his median position to get the most out of one and then the other.

In more recent times, following the appeasement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which was followed by Syria's return to the Arab League, Ankara seemed to want to reach an agreement with Damascus, but evidently its demands seemed excessive to the Syrian counterpart, and contacts were effectively frozen. At the same time, there was a rapprochement with Washington, which dropped the halt to the sale of F-35 fighter-bombers (linked to the Turkish purchase of Russian S-400 anti-aircraft systems); feeling somehow covered, Erdogan then decided to use the terrorist groups under his control to put pressure on Damascus, forcing it to give in to his demands (Ankara, a bit like Israel with Lebanon, would like the creation of a buffer zone, de facto under its control, with the right to intervene when it deems it appropriate). This is the political-diplomatic background behind the offensive launched in the Aleppo area by the militias of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Jabhat al-Nusra and other Islamist groups operating under the Turkish umbrella. An offensive that took the forces of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) by surprise, which was evidently counting on the fact that a de facto truce had been in place in that sector since 2020 (at the time mediated by Russia and Turkey). Following the HTS offensive, a series of villages in the direction of Aleppo were conquered and, above all, the anti-Syrian forces reached the M5 highway, the main logistics line between Aleppo and the south (Homs, Damascus). In all of this, Turkey is intervening directly, with artillery fire in support of its militias. A convoy of militants crossed the territory controlled by the SNA (Syrian National Army, another pro-Turkish group) entering Syria from the Salameh border crossing. The convoy included tanks, armored vehicles and other military vehicles. In response, the Syrian army's heavy artillery directly hit the Turkish military post in the town of Kafr Lata, in the southern countryside of Idlib.

After the initial confusion, the Syrian and its allies reacted. The Damascus air force, together with the Russian one, began to strike the terrorist formations, killing at least a hundred fighters, including many leaders (Abu Hassan Al-Ma'arra, Abu Obeida, Abdo Salah Ayoub and Mahmoud Bardan, all of them from the HTS). Counterattacks conducted by Iranian special forces pushed HTS back from Anadan, west of Aleppo.

Syria is now sending reinforcements to the sector, while air strikes on pro-Turkish formations continue. Hezbollah units, stationed in the country, have also intervened.

For the moment, therefore, we are faced with a relatively limited offensive, likely to be contained within a few days and which will then, presumably by the end of the year, lead to a stabilization of the situation. The aim, as mentioned, is to exert military pressure on Damascus, to obtain greater compliance in the context of negotiations for the normalization of Syrian-Turkish relations. Even if this inevitably creates friction with both Russia and Iran (the Foreign Ministry of Tehran has sent a clear message: "we warn the Turks to refrain from intervening in Syrian internal affairs. Unlike the Russian presence in Syria and the presence of Iranian advisors, which is the result of an official invitation from the government, Turkey is present in Syria illegally and has nothing to do with any of its affairs").

At the same time, clashes are taking place in northern Syria between the pro-Turkish SNA and the Kurds of the SDF, demonstrating that the variety of actors (and the interests they represent) makes it extremely complicated to clearly define the sides on the field.

At the moment, however, it can be said that there is no Israeli hand in this resumption of fighting in the Arab country, even if the Israeli air force has not failed to strike once again in the provinces of Damascus and Homs. And it would certainly welcome a worsening of the situation.

We will see in the coming months how the situation evolves; certainly Syria is, of all the countries in the region, the one where a clash could most easily occur, both because of its strategic position, and because of the presence of numerous foreign and/or foreign-controlled armed forces, and because of the aforementioned weakness of the Syrian state.