ORDERING CHAOS
There is a passage in the interview given by Lavrov to Tucker Carlson that struck me [1], and it is when he says that the United States creates chaos and then sees how to use it. Indeed, and especially since the fall of the USSR, US foreign policy seems absolutely aligned with this basic principle, creating chaos (in the most absolute indifference to what it then means for millions of people), and only subsequently asking the question of how to concretely take advantage of it. Naturally, one could open a broad reflection on this, on the profound reasons that determine it, but this is obviously not the appropriate place. Here it is simply worth keeping in mind this characteristic of American imperial policy, since there is often a tendency to attribute to it a strategic planning that simply does not exist, where – precisely – there is instead the belief that chaos is always and in any case a harbinger of opportunities, and that in general it always benefits the US more than its adversaries.
If we now look at what is happening in Syria, keeping this assumption in mind, we can try – in a purely theoretical and abstract way – to put the chaos in order, that is, to try to identify the meaning of the events.
The necessary premise (but which does not imply any conspiracy theory explanation) is that in the events of these days there is, in many respects, a margin of inexplicable – or rather, unexplained, unclarified.
Looking at the facts in chronological order, the first gap is: how was it possible that the intelligence of three countries (Russia, Iran and Syria) had no awareness of what was being prepared in the province of Idlib? Or even better, how was it possible that the signals that had certainly been detected were so underestimated? In this – and I stress once again, without any conspiracy theory suggestion – there is ultimately a certain similarity with October 7 and Operation Al Aqsa Flood. Probably a mix of underestimating the enemy and overestimating oneself.
The second gap, again at the intelligence level, is: how did Russian and Iranian military advisors, who have been present in Syria for a decade, not fully realize the crumbling of the Syrian army? A crumbling that in these days is emerging not only from the evident defensive incapacity, but also from a whole other series of factors, which have highlighted its pre-existence with respect to the jihadist offensive.
The third gap is, in fact, the incredible speed with which the Syrian Arab Army collapsed, in the face of what - in any case - remains the offensive of several tens of thousands of guerrillas, without air cover, armored forces and significant artillery support. A collapse that translated into a succession of retreats without essentially ever facing combat, and which led two divisions of cutthroats to conquer almost half the country in a few days.
Fourth, and perhaps most inexplicable gap, is: what has determined the evident inability to respond promptly to the situation, both on the part of the Syrian government and even more so on the part of Russia and Iran? And how is it possible that this numbness of strategic thinking is actually determining the emergence of some kind of rift between the allies? The gap between the importance of what is at stake and the slowness of the reaction is considerable, and still lacks a fully understandable explanation.
Although – as has been underlined several times – the Syrian situation is, not by chance, one of the most complex, both for the strategic role played by the country and for the variety of actors in the field, what is surprising is the surrender to chaos by subjects otherwise demonstrably capable of profound strategic thinking. Any wrong reaction, or even just ineffective, would have seemed more understandable than this disarray.
On closer inspection, however, it is not even certain that there is anyone who really has clear ideas; it almost seems that many are convinced that they are playing their own game, while in fact they are pawns themselves. Chaos for chaos' sake, precisely.
Certainly the Turks, who with their laissez faire have allowed the preparation and launch of the jihadist operation, thought and think of taking advantage of this situation, probably in the belief that it could serve to obtain what they were unable to obtain through the famous (or perhaps we should say infamous) Astana format. That is, a buffer zone along the Syrian-Turkish border, under the control of its own militias (the SNA). But Ankara's strategic objective is to deactivate the Kurdish threat, and for this to happen, the buffer zone is not enough, above all it is necessary to maintain Syrian territorial integrity – otherwise the creation of a Kurdish enclave will be inevitable.
At present, the largely predominant force is that of Abu Mohammad al-Julani’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which is certainly not under Turkish control like the Syrian National Army. Indeed, it is probably not under anyone’s control, not in the strict and automatic terms one imagines. It is certainly, however, much more influenced by the US, which is not exactly Erdogan’s best friend, and certainly has other interests. One of which is, in fact, to use not one but two levers: the HTS and the Kurdish SDF.
In any case, especially in the event that the prospect of a US withdrawal from Syrian territory materializes in the coming year, they will not leave without leaving their own proxy, their own pawn, on the field. And the Kurds are far more reliable, from this point of view. The breakdown of Syrian national integrity, from the point of view of American strategies, is certainly the most suitable solution, and therefore Turkey will come out of it much less of a winner than it believes or hopes.
In turn, the Kurds will probably draw some limited advantage from all this. The crumbling of the Syrian army, in fact, is leaving room for the SDF to expand its area of control. And - it should not be forgotten - the Kurds have resisted for years the pressure of ISIS, of the Turkic-speaking militias and of the Turkish army itself, so it is unlikely that they will now suffer some strategic defeat, by a few thousand jihadists. Who, moreover, seem more interested in keeping the pro-Turkish SNA at bay than the pro-US SDF.
The game of non-state actors is all here.
Israel is watching for the moment, but obviously the destabilization of Syria is an old dream, which at the very least leads to a serious difficulty in the transit of supplies from Iran to Lebanon. And so, even without direct intervention, it has everything to gain from the way things are going. Moreover, jihadism has never once in history threatened the Jewish state, so it is not sure what it has to worry about. In the worst case scenario, launching the Golani and Nahal brigades over the Golan Heights, to take another slice of Syria, would serve the triple purpose of moving the border a little further, satisfying the territorial greed of the various Smotrichs and Ben Gvirs, and above all claiming – finally! – at least one victory that is one.
The real question, then, is what game are the other actors playing, those – let’s say – on the other side? What the Syrian government’s idea is (what they think of the situation on the ground, and how they plan to get out of it) is perhaps easier to decode. Unless they are totally imbecilic en masse, it is all too obvious that this is the end of the era of the Assad dynasty, for which the best prospect is a golden exile in Moscow. Which is probably why the Syrians prefer to hitch a ride on the Russian bandwagon, rather than the Iranian one.
Damascus, which refuses the Iranian offer of two brigades (“ask us and we will send them”), and makes an unreasonable appeal to the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan and even Turkey to help repel the jihadist attack, paints the picture very clearly: Assad considers the game lost, and therefore is not interested in trying to save the situation, but only in saving himself.
The perception of this state of affairs obviously cannot fail to influence the Syrian army, which – in any case – cannot but bear much of the burden of withstanding the shock, especially as long as the allies are not able to support them on the field (if that). At this point, a military putsch would almost be desirable, to remove – at least substantially – the Assad clan, and take control of what remains of the country. Moscow, for its part, seems to be moving in turn in the belief that there is no more time to repair the situation, and that therefore it is better to focus on saving what can be saved (read the bases of Hmemimim and Tartus). On the one hand, in fact, it is clearly stated that they are busy with other matters, and that therefore they can lend a hand to a limited extent; on the other, they insist on seeking a solution within the Astana format, even if Turkey speaks openly of the opportunity for the HTS to reach Damascus. And in fact, essentially nothing came out of the trilateral meeting in Doha. It is not at all clear what they base their belief that they will be able to save (how? under what conditions?) their military bases on.
The most difficult position is obviously the Iranian one (and, consequently, the Lebanese one). On the one hand, Syria is strategically irreplaceable, in the architecture of the Axis of Resistance, and its loss risks triggering a domino effect (with Hezbollah in pole position to be the next target, and Iraq to follow). On the other hand, it finds itself with its hands tied by Syrian inertia, if not by its open distrust. And it risks not only seeing the blood tribute paid to keep Syria afloat (from Soleimani on down) wasted, but also finding itself crippled in its confrontation with Israel.
Extremely significant of this Iranian discomfort is the statement by Foreign Minister Araqchi: “Iran has not abandoned and will not abandon its allies in difficult times, just as we expect our friends and allies to remain at our side”. The message to Moscow is clear and unequivocal.
According to what was reported by Middle East Spectator, an important Iranian analyst (not cited) has advanced the hypothesis (in a post on X) that there would be a divergence of assessment between Moscow and Tehran, with the former seeing the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as “anti-American”, while the latter would give an opposite interpretation. Obviously this is only a hypothesis, and frankly it is difficult to understand on what basis the Russians would see the HTS as anti-American, but at least it gives a plausible explanation to an evident disagreement.
A disagreement which, moreover, is in reality much deeper, and older, in my opinion. The Russian and Iranian intervention in Syria, at the time of the civil war, was concordant – and certainly laid the foundations for the development of the subsequent strategic partnership – but differently motivated. Beyond a generic interest in countering the American action, in fact, for Moscow it was mainly a question of defending the Tartus base (the only Mediterranean landing place), while for Tehran it was a question of guaranteeing the continuity of transit to Lebanon. Behind this diversity, I believe, there has been a disagreement until now, and precisely on the issue of the confrontation between Israel and the Axis of Resistance.
Notoriously, the Kremlin has a much more nuanced position on this, which absolutely does not question the existence of Israel as a Jewish state (remaining faithful to the worn-out hypothesis of the two states), has condemned the Palestinian attack of October 7 [2] and, as far as the Palestinian world is concerned, maintains its dialogue with the Palestinian National Authority (despite it being notoriously a halfway house between an Israeli colonial government and an entity in full US control). From this point of view, therefore, the strategic alliance between Russia and Iran (which is also part of the more global perspective of the New Silk Road), would see the question of Palestine as a disturbing element; at least for Moscow. Thus, the evolution of the Syrian situation, which threatens the strategy of the Iranian Resistance, could also be seen – by a part of the Russian establishment – as an opportunity to detach Tehran from a regional dimension too closely tied to the Palestinian situation, to bring it back to a predominantly Eurasian dimension.
It should not be forgotten, nor underestimated, that the strategic partnership agreement, similar to that established between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of Korea, although announced for some time (its signature was expected at the BRICS+ summit in Kazan), continues not to see the light of day. A sign that, evidently, there are still some aspects that are unresolved. And it is not a risk to suppose that they are linked precisely to the intertwining of Middle Eastern issues. It is all too evident that a formal commitment to mutual defense, in the event of an attack on one of the two partners, could easily drag Russia into a direct conflict with Israel.
The Syrian dynamics, therefore, must be read by contextualizing them in a broader framework.
All of this, obviously, remains largely speculative for now, and in any case everything is still susceptible to changes, even radical ones, based on what happens on the ground. Which basically means whether Homs will fall like Aleppo and Hama, or whether Syrian forces (supported by the few Iranian and Lebanese forces already present in Syria) will succeed in imposing a halt to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s advance. As well as whether the imminent isolation of the coastal province of Latakia (where the Russian bases are) will be limited to nucleating a sort of large enclave under Moscow’s control, or whether – as has already happened – part of the militias gathered under the HTS umbrella will not instead decide to go and threaten it directly.
Not everything, at this point, but a lot is still possible.
Notes
1 – Lavrov, in my opinion, is a giant of modern diplomacy, but in this interview there are very few notable passages. Apart from the one cited, I would say the one in which he says that after the ‘message’ of the launch of the Oreshnik missile, apparently not received by the West, there could be others (presumably, other launches of the same missile). Significantly, but negatively, I found the attitude clearly evasive on the Syrian issue.
2 – This is something reiterated by Lavrov in the interview cited above.