Pantano
While the weather slows down the fighting, in the Ukrainian (and NATOstan's) rear, another battle is beginning to take shape, that for the Ukrainian leadership that will have to - according to Western wishes - lead the country towards a conclusion, albeit a temporary one, to the conflict. A battle, this one, which is already seeing the first heads drop, and which promises to be no less bitter than those fought on the front line.
Winter has arrived early in Ukraine. Rain and snow already make unpaved roads impassable, and the mobility of armoured vehicles is reduced to a minimum. A storm of unprecedented power has swept across the Black Sea, destroying power grids almost everywhere. 2000 Ukrainian villages are without electricity, the Crimea is without running water, because the pumping plants are not supplied. In some places on the coast, the sea has receded by as much as 100 metres.
Of course, all this is immediately reflected on the line of battle, severely curbing air and artillery activity, which in the immediate future is an advantage for the Ukrainians: the weather conditions, in fact, further slow down the Russian advance around Avdeevka, as well as the counter-offensive on the Dniepr, in the Kherson sector.
The situation on the ground is currently, metaphorically and practically, frozen.
The arrival of General Winter, however, can at best ease the Ukrainian forces in the transition from an offensive to a defensive posture. But it is not enough for anything more, and as we saw last winter, it will not stop the Russian army.
The inevitable slowdown in land operations, however, becomes fertile ground for other levels of the conflict to manifest themselves more incisively. In fact, it is clear that NATO has now entered Minsk mode, i.e. it is looking for a temporary way out of the conflict; some form of agreement that would allow, precisely, to freeze the conflict, just enough to put a semblance of an efficient Ukrainian army back on its feet, and above all to put the Alliance's European countries in a position to face a direct clash with Moscow. It is clear that NATO is moving towards this prospect, a war with Russia within (relatively) a few years. As the president of the Czech Republic, Pavel, who is, moreover, a former NATO general, has clearly stated.
Both the efforts (and investments) to adapt and standardise European road infrastructures (both road and rail), in order to make them suitable for the movement of troops and vehicles with NATO standards, and the recent proposal for a military Schengen [1], to facilitate rapid and free cross-border movement for NATO armies, go in this direction.
A prospect that, however, necessarily requires, above all, that European armies - and their industrial capabilities - be brought up to the level necessary to fight a war of attrition with a major military power like Russia. And to do this, it basically takes time. A time of active non-belligerence, which therefore requires the (temporary) closure of the Ukrainian conflict. An outcome, this, that requires the alignment of three elements: the conversion of the propaganda narrative, Ukrainian readiness, and above all, Russian readiness.
Obviously, the first two are not only those on which NATO's full influence can be exerted, but also those necessary (though not sufficient) to initiate dialogue with Moscow.
But if reorienting the propaganda narrative (which is already being done) is easy, convincing the Ukrainians to take more gentle advice seems to be much less so. Zelensky, in fact, seems to be determined to continue the war at any cost, not least because he perceives that his fate is ineluctably linked to its continuation, and therefore the longer the conflict lasts, the longer his power lasts.
It follows that for NATO - or rather, for those in it who decide, i.e. Washington - the problem is to manage a transition in the country's government; ideally, a democratic transition would have been preferable, but it is clear that Zelensky has no intention of holding presidential elections next year. It will therefore be necessary, in all likelihood, to achieve the desired change in a somewhat more informal manner...
At the moment, the main problem seems to be finding a replacement who is reliable (for the US) but also credible (for the Ukrainians), i.e. one who is capable of maintaining his grip on the country, leading it out of the war, without any jolts or twists.
This last point, in particular, is not exactly a given. Even if, in fact, the Ukrainian population is exhausted (and decimated), and would generally welcome an end to hostilities, it should not be forgotten that a significant part of the armed forces is made up of openly pro-Nazi units, whose reaction could be entirely unpredictable (or predictable, depending on how one looks at it). Let us not forget that European history recounts two resounding cases in which a peace seen as a betrayal of the sacrifices of war produced in defeated Germany first the Freikorps and then Nazism, and in victorious Italy Fascism. It is therefore not a danger to be underestimated, also in view of the fact that these banderist units are very well armed and trained.
In short, a candidate is needed who has the authority to keep the most restless sectors of Ukrainian society in check during a necessarily stormy phase.
As things stand, there seem to be two possible alternatives to Zelensky, his former advisor Arestovich, and the head of the armed forces Zaluzhny. The former is certainly in line with the prospect of compromise for peace, but he is also a not particularly clear-cut character, and in any case well-known but not popular. The commander-in-chief, on the other hand, is held in high esteem, both among the military and the population, but although he is often at odds with the president, he does not seem very convinced of the pacifist option; it goes without saying that, by virtue of his current role, he cannot be too outspoken in this regard, but some of his stances seem to suggest that the dissent is more about the best strategy to oppose Russia, and not about whether or not to continue fighting. And of course, the fact that he is the army commander would make it more difficult to disguise the substance of how the change at the top would take place, i.e. a coup.
Of course, Zelensky is well aware of all this, and moves to prevent the moves of those who would dethrone him. Internationally, it is clear that the only iron ally he can count on is Great Britain (which, unlike the US, is for continuing the war to the last Ukrainian), while internally a real fratricidal war has begun, pitting Zelensky's power group against Zaluzhny's (almost exclusively military) one.
Moreover, the Ukrainian president well understands that this is not just a battle over the choice between war and peace, nor is it merely a question of power; in fact, there is much more to it than that. As Politico [2] recently wrote of him, 'as long as Zelensky is alive, he will continue to move Europe in the direction he wants'. Which, if not exactly as a threat, certainly sounds like a dark prediction. He is therefore using his power to weaken his opponents.
What is happening in Ukraine is in fact a real settling of scores, a kind of protracted Night of the Long Knives [3]. According to former deputy of the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament) Oleg Tsarev [4], there are two structures capable of carrying out a coup without the need to deploy tanks in the streets: the Special Division Alfa and the Special Operations Forces.
The deputy commander of Alfa, General Major Shaytanov, was charged with treason. Viktor Khorenko, Head of Special Forces, was removed. The commander of the military health departments, Tatyana Ostashchenko (a loyalist of Zaluzhny), was removed. Zelensky also dismissed and replaced four deputy commanders of the Ukrainian National Guard.
What's more, Zelensky recently launched a direct attack on Zaluzhny - albeit without naming him - in an interview with The Sun newspaper, stating that 'if a military man decides to engage in politics, and he has every right to do so, then let him, but then he cannot engage in war. If you're in a war, you're thinking of going into politics or standing for election tomorrow, then both in words and on the front line you will behave like a politician and not like a military man, which I think is a big mistake' [5].
The internal Ukrainian situation, therefore, is just as bogged down as the troops at the front. It is likely that, as conditions along the battle line worsen, and with the US presidential election campaign approaching, the pressure from Washington to reach a Minsk III will grow stronger, using the leverage of aid and military supplies - the scale and scope of which will be increasingly aimed at pushing Kiev towards an agreement.
Of course, in all this (as is now customary) NATO is reckoning without the innkeeper. In fact, it is hard to understand why Russia should accept a compromise today, from which it would gain nothing more than a Western acknowledgement of the reality on the ground (that is, something it has already obtained), not only renouncing the strategic objectives of the war - demilitarisation and neutrality of the Ukraine - but in the knowledge that, just as it was for the previous agreements signed in the Belarusian capital, these would be mere expedients, used by NATO to gain time and catch its breath.
Certainly in the presence of a formal Ukrainian willingness, and a substantial US one, Russia would be under pressure from many sides not to at least reject the possibility of an agreement prejudicially. It is clear that this war is uncomfortable, even for some important friends of Moscow - China among them. But it is also true that a downward compromise agreement, not only could provoke discontent in the country (victory betrayed again...), but would above all be a strategic error. In fact, it is absolutely clear that NATO is preparing for war, and that - barring any sensational events - in five to seven years' time it will feel ready to go on the offensive again; perhaps even from a Ukraine that has retreated up to its knees, reopening the conflict under the pretext of taking back lost territories.
Any agreement that does not provide for the certain achievement of objectives would therefore be a rash manoeuvre, to say the least. It is therefore probable that Moscow, while agreeing to sit down at a table, will not accept any ceasefire, and above all will not sign any treaty whose terms are guaranteed not by NATO's word, but by concrete results obtained on the battlefield.
Regardless of what happens in Kiev in the coming months, therefore, the prospect that is emerging in the medium term is that of a new war with Russia, but one in which Ukraine (or the Baltics, or whoever else is willing to play the role) will act as the trigger, but the next proxies will be the European NATO armies. While the empire manoeuvres by external lines, as befits a thalassocratic power, it is the colonial armies that will fight on the frontiers.
Notes
1 – See "NATO urges member states to build a military 'Schengen'", Euractiv.it
2 – See “The most powerful people for 2024”, Politico Europe
3 – See "The Night of the Long Knives", Rai Cultura
4 – See “On the dismissal of the head of Ukraine's special forces, General Major Viktor Khorenko”, Telegra.ph
5 – See “Zelensky warns Ukraine generals that getting involved in politics puts country’s unity at risk”, The Sun