PLAN A, PLAN B
The Trump presidency – what it represents and expresses – is still in its early stages, however dazzling, so it is not easy to fully understand how it will develop, in which direction (and above all how) it will try to take America – and the world. Some elements are starting to become clear, however, and they are based on what could have been, even easily, foreseen, already from the way in which the electoral campaign was conducted.
The first of these elements is that much of the new administration's action is aimed at the interior of the United States; making America great again, in the vision of that piece of US power that brought Trump to the White House, means first of all radically dismantling that web of apparatuses and institutions set up during the decades of neocon-dem domination. A task to which Trump’s team is dedicating itself with vigor – and, it would seem, with a certain astonishment on the part of its victims – but which, beyond the media effects, requires time to produce concrete effects. Obviously the destructive part is easier, which in any case will soon be opposed by the resistance of the same apparatuses [1], currently still dazed, but sooner or later the question of how / with what to replace them will have to be addressed. And this will be longer and more complex.
The other element, strongly characterized by the personality of the new president, is the same hasty, rough – and ultimately aggressive – approach applied on the international level. In a certain sense, symbolically summarized in the decision to rename the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America, that is, a unilateral decision, substantially limited in its concrete effects but highly visible, and which above all relaunches a muscular image of the United States, which has decided to put diplomatic formalities aside and to reaffirm its hegemonic power from the very tone.
Obviously, here, as they say, the donkey falls, because if it is a question of making America great again, it means that it is not only its perceived image that is no longer great, and therefore this kind of make-up is not only not enough, but risks having a boomerang effect. Because it is the entire global reality that has changed, not just the USA, and refusing to see reality is the first step to compromise any attempt to change it.
Aside from these first superficial elements, however, we can also begin to get a more comprehensive idea of the US strategic plan, or at least its short-medium term prospects.
In this context, it can be said that the objective is to transform the collective West into a sort of American fortress, in which the peripheries of the empire – Europe, Latin America, Australia, Japan and South Korea – will play the role of a protective moat; no longer, therefore, vassal countries still endowed with a certain autonomy, but territories closely integrated into the political-military defense device of the continental fortress, and subjected to the direct command of the emperor. This fortification maneuver will proceed in two directions: on the one hand, the heart of the empire - represented by the North American continent - will drain towards itself as many resources as possible (economic and intellectual) from the vassal countries, and on the other it will try to raise a wall between the imperial territories and the rest of the world, where hic sunt leones. The basic idea is to isolate the West as clearly as possible, leaving out all the others, in order to exploit its (presumed) technological, military and economic superiority, to prevent other powers from overcoming the gap that separates them from the United States.
The era of globalization is dead and buried. The United States has realized that the creation of a global market - which has favored Western deindustrialization, and American in particular - has given large and small competitors the opportunity to grow, to the point of threatening Washington's supremacy, and therefore it is necessary to radically reverse the trend: bring back production capacity to America, maintain technological (and therefore military) dominance, drastically reduce East-West trade - marginalizing the most dangerous countries and co-opting the potentially useful ones.
From this perspective, the hostility towards the BRICS (destined to worsen) does not arise so much from the idea that it is the embryo of an anti-Western bloc, but from the need to divide its members, bringing some into its own sphere of influence (India, Brazil), and pushing the others to the margins.
Trump's strategy (of his power bloc) is also a strategy that can be defined as beyond liberalism, which intends to overcome the phase of neoliberalism (supremacy of economic oligarchies over political ones), to arrive at a new phase in which the former occupy the space of the latter [2]. It is no coincidence that both Trump and his quarterback-alterego Musk are precisely two economic oligarchs.
In conclusion, the United States is moving in the direction of a sharp change in international relations, but also in internal social relations. The goal is to create a militarized Western bloc (in the political sense before the literal one), under strict US command, which, sheltered by a new iron curtain, recovers its potential and restores its supremacy, waiting for this process to mature and put America back in a position to deliver the final blow to its major competitor, China, thus putting all the others back in line.
It is, as is well understood, a very ambitious plan, and not at all obvious, which in any case requires a period of necessary calm - at least two or three decades - which is the reason (one of the reasons ...) why Trump is trying to disengage from the Ukrainian conflict, even gaining twice from it [3], and to calm the stormy Middle East.
Apart from the aforementioned internal unknowns, this strategic plan seems not to take into account some decidedly significant factors. First of all, the technological supremacy that the United States presumes to have is in reality much more limited, and less real, than they believe. From AI to the most advanced weapons systems, China and Russia are ahead in many sectors, and even Iran and North Korea are decidedly competitive. After all, China is able to invest in research and development as much as, if not more than, the USA, and in these nations the number of graduates in scientific and technological subjects is decidedly higher than the Western average. Paradoxically, the sanctions policy adopted for some time against countries considered hostile, even in terms of technological development, has proven to be counterproductive; these countries have in fact sought autarchic solutions, which excluded the use of Western hardware/software components, developing equivalent products, sometimes even better, and often cheaper. The case of the Chinese AI DeepSeek, or of the Russian and Iranian hypersonic missiles, is emblematic.
Even on the military level, Western superiority has yet to be recovered. The European armies, with perhaps the sole exception of the Polish one, are in a state of impoverishment, suffer from a profound lack of preparation for contemporary warfare [4], and above all pay the price of an obsolete doctrinal approach, conceived in other eras, for other scenarios, and above all for other adversaries. Russian and Iranian missile dominance (NATO has no hypersonic missiles...) is complete. On the conventional level, the production of armor and artillery in Russia and China largely surpasses that of all NATO countries, the vehicles are more robust and flexible, and cost much less than those in the West. In the field of electronic warfare, Russia is decidedly ahead of everyone. In the field of unmanned aircraft, Russia and Iran are at the forefront.
Traditionally, it is believed that Western superiority lies above all in the air force and navy. But the performance of the Russian 5th generation fighter-bomber, the Su-57, is considered astonishing, and once it enters mass production it could overturn the balance of power in the air. As for the navy, the Chinese navy alone now has a greater number of vessels, much of which are more modern, than the US navy. The Chinese, Russian and Iranian fleets – which often conduct joint exercises – are probably already able to compete with Western ones.
And, of course, the Russian nuclear arsenal is the largest in the world.
In short, it seems far from easy to implement a plan that, in a relatively short time, manages to complete all the objectives set, namely: reconstruction of the American production potential, adaptation of military force, strengthening technological supremacy, defense of the power of the dollar as an international currency of exchange. Even if they were all achieved, it must still be kept in mind that even the opposing countries will continue with their technological and military development, and therefore it is not certain that they will be sufficient to fill the gap. It follows that even an optimistic perspective may not be sufficient for the final challenge, and it will be necessary to divide the enemy front.
This is what we could call plan A. In order for this to determine conditions that allow us to face and win against the number one adversary, namely China, it is however essential – precisely – to ensure that Beijing arrives alone at the decisive moment.
In this regard, Washington expects to be able to detach Russia from its Chinese ally [5], and probably eliminate Iran in good time [6].
The path that leads to the realization of plan A, as has been said, requires a period of respite, at least in terms of kinetic conflicts. Therefore, the need to put an end to the two main ones – in which the US is heavily involved – or at least to get out of them, becomes a primary objective. Both, however, present quite a few difficulties in resolution. As far as Ukraine is concerned, these difficulties can essentially be summed up in Russia’s absolute unwillingness to compromise solutions at the lowest level, and in the need – no less relevant – to avoid a manifest defeat of NATO and the United States (the substantial one is inevitable). As far as Palestine is concerned, on the other hand, it is a question of the impossibility of abandoning Israel, and the impossibility of achieving a lasting peace without putting an end to the existence of a Zionist state in the Holy Land.
Despite Trump’s great unscrupulousness, and despite the strong will to carry out this decisive change of direction from the strategy pursued so far by Washington, it appears evident that the margins of success, especially in the first international steps, are extremely problematic and limited.
Since these difficulties obviously did not emerge out of nowhere on the day of Trump's inauguration, but were well known even before, it is reasonable to assume that in the think tanks linked to the Trumpian power bloc they were examined in time, and that solutions were therefore imagined to address them. What we could therefore define as plan B, and which aims at the same objectives but in less ambitious times and ways.
This second version of the strategic plan hinges on two guiding ideas: in the short term, trying to develop bilateral relations with Russia, on the basis of a sort of partnership for global security, and in the medium term arriving at the definition of a Yalta 2.0, which involves - to varying degrees - also China, and aims to establish new rules of coexistence erga omnes. From the US point of view, such an approach would always respond to the objective of restoring its ability to exercise hegemony, but acknowledging that this requires a longer phase.
This type of approach would very likely initially meet with favor from Moscow, which would have every interest in resolving (at least temporarily) the areas and sectors of crisis that directly concern it: Ukraine, obviously, but also NATO (USA) presence in Europe, the Baltic Sea, the Arctic Ocean and, to a lesser extent, the Middle East. For Washington, this second hypothesis would have the (potential) advantage of offering the leeway for an attempt to insinuate a wedge between Russia and China, even if this possibility would still be limited by other factors.
First of all, because the Russian leadership has well metabolized the Western unreliability and duplicity, but also because in this framework Europe would be marginalized and politically downsized, and in any case clearly separated from Russia; therefore, the Russian political-economic center of gravity would remain oriented to the east, towards Asia – and therefore China.
Judging by the tone with which the Trump administration is addressing its first approach with Moscow, it would seem that it is still undecided between the carrot-and-stick approach and a softer one, peppered with flattery and offers. In short, halfway between plan A and plan B... And for the moment it seems to be reciprocated in the same way by the Russian leadership. It remains to be seen whether and to what extent this initial idyll will be followed up when the real negotiations begin. In whose path weigh two obstacles as big as boulders: Russia's clear refusal to allow any freezing of the conflict, and Moscow's precise desire to accept confrontation only within the context of a broader mutual security agreement. The distance between the parties, in short, is significant, and it will not be easy to bridge it - if that is even possible. The enthusiasm (or dismay) with which this first, very small step is being greeted - Trump's phone call with Putin - seems truly excessive, almost as if the resumption of a dialogue automatically entails a rapid resolution of the problems. Something from which we are still a long way off.
Moreover, it is obvious that this path, in addition to being bumpy, is also necessarily long. And in the time needed to develop it, many things can still happen. It is not possible to predict if and how Europe will react (apart from the initial frustration). Nor is it possible to predict the reactions in Ukraine – which, like Europe, is clearly being sidelined. It is necessary to understand how China will position itself with respect to this – which in the meantime has proposed a trilateral US-Russia-China summit to find an agreement in Ukraine without the participation of Kiev, with Beijing ready to act as guarantor of any agreements reached.
But above all, it is unpredictable what will happen on the ground, where Russian forces continue to grind down Ukrainian ones, from which, however, it cannot be ruled out that desperate moves will be attempted. If the respective starting points are already quite far apart, it is clear that significant changes along the battle line could significantly affect the location of the arrival point.
One thing is quite clear, however. Whatever the outcome, the opening of a negotiating phase between Washington and Moscow is a watershed. There will be a before and an after. And the White House’s choice could depend on how it ends: plan A or plan B.
Notes
1 – The systemic aspect of the clash underway in the States should not be forgotten or underestimated. In fact, it is not a simple polarization of right vs. left (assuming that these terms have any meaning with respect to the American political framework); the process triggered by the Trumpian power group is broader and deeper than a simple realignment of federal policy, with the consequent elimination/modification of institutional tools, but implies both a real transfer of power (from public to private), and a drastic reduction in spending. And this means that it will not only be the elites tied to the Democrats at various levels who will be overwhelmed, but that the shock wave will descend further down, also hitting the lower and middle-class classes. In perspective, in short, the recovery of the American system will not simply open an ideological fracture (rep vs dem), but will have social repercussions. And it is not at all certain that the overlap between these two fault lines will not lead to a level of conflict so high as to exceed the safety threshold: a democratic system, even with strong oligarchic connotations like the American one, risks collapsing if the common assumptions between the parties are lacking.
2 – From a certain point of view, we are facing the dawn of a new political and social model, which represents the effective realization of certain utopias of liberal capitalism. In this regard, see “The new capitalist utopia”, Enrico Tomaselli, Meer
3 – After having profited from the termination of the Russia-Europe energy link, which led vassal countries to buy much more expensive American LNG and to lose competitiveness, after having pumped up the US military industry (a traditional driving force for the economic recovery of the States), now it demands that the Ukrainians compensate Washington, delivering 500 billion worth of rare earths and similar to American capital.
4 – NATO armies fought their last war in Afghanistan (losing it), where however it was something very different from the Ukrainian conflict, more of a counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla action, not even an asymmetric conflict. They have not had any knowledge of symmetric conflicts since the 1950s, since the Korean War. After all, just looking at the war in Ukraine, one sees how all the offensives of the Kiev army, planned by the NATO commands based on their own combat doctrines, have ended in disastrous failures. Even the training provided by NATO personnel is, according to the Ukrainian military who received it, absolutely inadequate; more often than not, the students had more experience than the instructors.
5 – Despite everything, the US continues to consider Russia as a minor adversary, believing that the difference in GDP is more significant than everything else. In this sense, they remain substantially convinced of what they thought during the Biden administration, only prolonging the calculations a little over time. If previously in Washington they counted that the sanctions and the cost of the war would bring Moscow to its knees within a couple of years, now they believe that by 2030 the regime could even collapse… In any case, they think they can exert a mix of pressure and seduction, enough to push it to break the alliance with China.
6 – Basically, the issue of the Iranian nuclear program is all there. It is also, of course, related to Israel's security and deterrence, but above all Washington does not want to find itself in a situation similar to the Korean one, with a hostile country with nuclear weapons and with which it must therefore come to terms. Therefore, it is very likely that sooner or later the United States will consider the possibility of hitting Tehran, considered (without nuclear weapons) the weak link in the chain (China, Russia, North Korea, Iran).