PUTIN THE AFRICAN

It is interesting to observe the developments following the sudden fall of the Assad regime, and the consequent rise of moderate jihadists, which seem to produce slightly different effects than those hoped for and imagined in Western chancelleries. Even today, the German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, who flew to Damascus together with her French colleague Jean-Noël Barrot, repeated the mantra that "Russia must be expelled from the bases of Hmeimim and Tartus", stubbornly demonstrating the political infantilism that characterizes European leaderships. The new Syrian regime, in fact, on the evident input of its main Turkish sponsor, has already made it clear that the strategic interests of Damascus exclude such an evolution of the situation.

Although immediately celebrated in the West as a hard blow for Moscow and Tehran, the fall of Assad is rather revealing itself as an event capable of shaking up the regional balance, but not necessarily in the sense desired by Washington and Brussels. On the one hand, in fact, the internal situation in Syria remains extremely unstable, with the Syrian National Army – strictly Turkish – clearly much more committed to addressing the Kurdish question than to a process of nation building, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham struggling between the extremist thrusts of its more radical fringes and the construction of international credibility, the United States (clearly unwilling to cede control of Syrian oil to Ankara) increasingly aligned with the SDF, while Israel continues to roam freely, occupying pieces of territory and bombing wherever it wants.

In this general framework, paradoxically the most stable position appears to be precisely the Russian one. Having essentially ensured the maintenance of its two main bases, Moscow is calmly proceeding to dismantle the various minor bases present in the country, finding itself in the position of being able to free itself from the burden of economic and military support for Syria (the same can be said for Tehran), and therefore having logistical and military resources to deploy elsewhere.

At this stage, therefore, the only ones having a dialogic and non-confrontational dialogue with Turkey are Russia and Iran who, within the so-called Astana format, are discussing the future of Syria, while the USA has assumed a position of clear contrast towards the Turks, supporting (at least for the moment...) the Kurdish forces. In the very first days of the new year, increasingly harsh clashes between the SDF and SNA have been reported in the vicinity of Manbij, where the Kurds have counterattacked, pushing back the pro-Turkish militias up to the villages of Al-Atshana and Al-Masataha; Meanwhile, as Ankara claims it is preparing to attack Ayn al-Arab (Kobane), the United States is responding by rushing in logistical reinforcements and appears intent on building its own base in the city.

The US strategy therefore seems to be focused on maintaining control of the oil areas (which they have been plundering for ten years now), and more generally on placing obstacles to the birth of a new Syria in possession of full territorial integrity. Regardless of who governs in Damascus, Washington – in this in full agreement with Tel Aviv – prefers to keep the country divided, and with its own military presence.

While the various forces engaged on the field therefore face each other, in order to define the future balance of power in the country, Moscow instead seems to have pragmatically seized the opportunity opened up by the regime change, to develop further strategic penetration in an area in which it is investing heavily.

The resources freed up in Syria, in fact, are being massively transferred to eastern Libya, with a continuous air bridge between the Hmeimim base and that of Al Khadim, near Tobruk. And Libya itself seems to be emerging as a new large logistical hub for the Russian military presence in Africa. The Russians are in fact building a large air base in southern Libya, at Ma’tan as Sarah, near the border with Chad, while General Haftar’s forces have taken control of the Tindi camp, located west of Ubari, also in southern Libya, which will provide a gateway for Russian forces to the African countries of the Sahel.

The position of eastern Libya is strategically central, with respect to the growing area of ​​Russian influence in North Africa. The sub-Saharan region, in fact, already sees a military presence in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, while Chad, Senegal and the Ivory Coast have also freed themselves from the presence of Paris’ troops. To the northwest, on the Mediterranean coast there is the important presence of Algeria, a nation historically friendly with Moscow, while the most interesting developments concern the east. The Russians (and the Iranians) are in fact supporting the Khartoum government in its fight against the rebels of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Moscow is trying to obtain authorization from the Sudanese government to build a naval base on the Red Sea, which would strengthen its strategic projection in an area of ​​great importance.

In addition to the excellent relations with South Africa, therefore, Russia is developing an African strategy [1] aimed not only at consolidating relations with countries rich in raw materials (uranium, gold, phosphates, manganese), but above all at creating a solid network of relations in a quadrant that allows for a significant presence both in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and has its own strategic depth.

All things considered, therefore, the fall of Assad was much less problematic for the Russians than the West would like to make it appear. Obviously, there remain logistical problems, but as long as Hmeimim and Tartus remain active, these are largely containable. The direct presence in the Middle East is thinning out – and Russia has always had a relative interest in the region – but this is largely compensated on the one hand by the excellent relations within OPEC with Saudi Arabia, and on the other by the presence of Iran, which has now become a strategic ally. We know that sophisticated electronic warfare systems (seen at work during the latest Israeli attack) have already been transferred to Tehran, as well as S-400 anti-aircraft systems. The delivery of the SU-35 fighter-bombers will be completed by next spring, while in a couple of weeks the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement will be signed in Moscow, along the lines of the Russian-Korean one.

This partnership, which does not prevent the persistence of different positions even on non-secondary issues (such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), represents an important asset for both; for Moscow, Iran guarantees an important allied presence in two crucial areas, such as the Middle East and Central Asia, while for Tehran the Russian umbrella becomes a central element of its defense capacity and (therefore) deterrence. The Syrian failure, therefore, has revealed itself for Moscow as much more of an opportunity than a defeat, allowing it to relaunch its strategic penetration in Africa, whose global relevance is probably still greatly underestimated in the West (except probably by the French...), but which instead could prove to be of enormous importance. Egypt, Ethiopia and Uganda, in addition to South Africa, are already BRICS+ member countries, but it is clear that the attraction of this grouping is destined to grow exponentially, and Africa – which the West has always considered a land of conquest and exploitation – has enormous potential for economic development, and is destined to assume an ever greater strategic importance. And Moscow seems to have understood this better than others.

Notes

1 – In addition to the countries mentioned, the African presence of Russian forces, and more generally of the political-diplomatic one, is very significant, and includes the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, the Comoros, Eritrea, Guinea, Cameroon (all mainly through the former Wagner group). Moscow is also the main supplier of weapons to the African continent. Examining 27 defense agreements between Russia and African countries (open source on Russian government databases), it turned out that 10 include “the exchange of classified information and communications between defense ministries” (Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Rwanda). According to Ivan U. Klyszcz (See “Quel rôle pour les services de renseignement russes en Afrique?”, Le Rubicon) researcher at the International Centre for Defense and Security (ICDS) in Tallinn, CAR and Madagascar are now “platforms for Russian intelligence in Africa”. When the UN General Assembly voted to condemn Russian aggression in Ukraine, half of the countries that did not support the text were African (17 abstentions out of 35, one vote against), while 8 states from the continent did not even take part in the vote. Le Monde Diplomatique argues that “Africa is both the region most reluctant to follow the condemnation movement and the most divided in its reaction to the conflict, with only about 50% of its capitals approving the texts submitted for their consideration” (See “La guerre en Ukraine vue d’Afrique”, Anne-Cécile Robert, Le Monde Diplomatique).