The earthen vase
The decline of the American empire has, incredibly, taken Europe by surprise, even though it should know something about empires and their relative declines. Despite numerous warnings, in fact, neither the various national governments, nor even the European leaderships, have ever considered this eventuality, so that when it fully manifested itself it caught them absolutely unprepared. A bit like many Chance Gardeners, who find themselves catapulted into an unknown and disorienting world upon the death of their benefactor, European leaders find themselves facing a situation that, evidently, they had never considered: being deprived of the protection of the old Uncle Sam. And this, unfortunately, is not a brilliant comedy, but harsh reality.
The situation in which Europe finds itself today is, on the other hand, completely alien to the political and cultural horizons in which the European ruling classes - especially those of the last decades - were formed, and which represented the essential set of parameters that defined their world. For many years, starting from the end of the last world war, Europeans thought of themselves as part of a world (the West), in which hegemony was firmly in the hands of the United States, but in which they believed they played a role however significant; and in any case the dominant perception was that of a profitable exchange, substantial renunciation of sovereignty for the guarantee of protection capable of allowing peaceful and rich development. The awakening was shocking.
Especially in the last decades of the last century, and the dawn of this one, the subordinate horizon allowed the birth of the fallacious belief that Europe is a happy garden (paraphrasing Borrell's rather unfortunate statement), which was essentially based on three pillars: on the one hand, precisely, the guarantee offered by the protection of the American sword, on the other the continuous and low-cost energy supply guaranteed by Russia, and finally the possibilities deriving from the inclusion in a global market in which - although being fundamentally a continent poor in energy resources and raw materials - the quality level of the manufacturing industry allowed the accumulation of rich surpluses.
The defensive move by the US Lord Protector blew up the entire scheme.
If, as regards its international position, unitary Europe was based on the three aforementioned pillars, as regards its internal policy the balancing factors were - obviously - of a different nature. First of all, it should be remembered that US hegemonic control is exercised in different forms over European countries, which correspond to a different strategic evaluation. Naturally, the first level is precisely that of political hegemony: the various European states are linked to the USA by a series of relationships - de jure and de facto - which guarantee the recognition, by the former, of the subordinate role. At a second level (but certainly not least) there is the role of NATO, whose primary function is to ensure a level of strategic, logistical, doctrinal, industrial and command integration between the various European national armies and the US one, which ensures full control of the continent's military force. The third level (such only because it is predominantly occult) is that of clandestine control networks, from stay-behind to the CIA, whose purpose is to maneuver in the shadows when official pressure is not sufficient, and possibly act to stabilize or destabilize a country.
Aside from this horizontal stratification, there is also vertical diversification. For example, the fact that the countries with the highest concentration of US bases, among European ones, are Germany and Italy, is generally attributed to the fact that they are the two countries defeated in the last world conflict. Almost as if this made them potentially treacherous. Naturally the real reason has nothing to do with this, but responds to precise strategic needs. Germany is the major industrial power on the continent, and this capacity (with the resulting wealth) makes it the key country on the continent, the only one capable of assuming possible continental political leadership. Italy, in turn, represents a large aircraft carrier projected into the Mediterranean, fundamental for the control of the Middle East and North Africa.
In this framework, the balancing of European balances has historically been based on the Franco-German pact. Germany, a great industrial and economic power, but dependent on energy flows from abroad, and France, a medium industrial power but with a large nuclear energy component, and with a colonial legacy in Africa from which it still draws. And which, moreover, has no US military bases on its territory, has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and possesses the force de frappe. Despite being in the context of a competitive relationship, the pact between these two countries has de facto guided the European Union during the last decades.
But, once again, the US move has also upset these balances.
The conflict in Ukraine immediately highlighted Germany's level of subordination. Which certainly discounts on the one hand the weakness of Scholtz's leadership (both political and personal), and on the other the profound differences of the traffic light coalition on these issues. The speed and silence with which he swallowed the destruction of the North Stream was paradigmatic. And in fact, despite the apparent resistance, he always gave in across the board. When they decided in Washington that Kiev needed the Leopards, first Berlin said no, then it said yes but if we are not the first to send MBT tanks, and finally it gave in by sending them. The American Abrams, which Biden had to promise to unblock the German nein, in fact arrived later, and what's more they remained well hidden in the rear for months, by order of the Pentagon.
It is no coincidence that Germany is by far Ukraine's largest economic contributor, among Europeans (who, let us remember, as a whole have already given more than the United States).
If, therefore, Berlin immediately aligned itself with the American positions, following in its footsteps and directives, conversely Paris had initially taken a more autonomous position, almost claiming a possible (however illusory) role as a possible mediator. Which Macron (another politically weak and inadequate leader), despite his somewhat chaotic oscillations, does not seem to give up on.
The breaking point, in any case, came when it became clear that Ukraine had no chance of victory, and was indeed constantly at risk of collapse. In fact, in the face of this scenario, the American administration (also for electoral considerations, but not only) has adopted a strategic line of decoupling, which can essentially be summarized in the idea of leaving the burden of supporting and continuing war. Today by taking charge of the support in Kiev, tomorrow - if necessary - by intervening directly.
The sudden change in the political horizon has generated panic in Europe. The EU countries, in fact, not only have lavishly financed Ukraine in the last two years, but have also emptied their limited arsenals, and find themselves today - in the midst of a deindustrialization crisis, having lost the precious and cheap Russian gas - faced with the alternative between the pan and the embers. If, in fact, on the one hand the current power bloc in the White House (dem + neocon) aims at a soft delegation of the Ukrainian conflict to the Europeans of NATO, on the other Trump (probable winner of the next American presidential elections) has in mind a substantially similar design, but in much more hardcore terms (1). In essence, the American friend withdraws the protection of his sword, and does so in a moment of grave difficulty for the Europeans.
Inevitably, this detonates a crisis that has been growing under the radar for some time.
In this context, European ruling classes tend to respond in a way that reflects their state of mind, that is, by displaying confidence but allowing panic to shine through. In fact, everything is accelerating, taking on terrible prospects but which they don't know how to oppose.
As is obvious, the various European member countries of NATO have long since begun to discuss these prospects confidentially. And if until not long ago the discussions mainly focused on how / when / with what financing, realigning countries to the implicit needs deriving from prolonged support for Ukraine, and more broadly to those of a hypothetical defense from an equally hypothetical expansionism Russian, the new scenarios require something else. Events are precipitating, and the Overton window must be widened.
When Slovakian President Fico declared that some European countries were discussing sending troops to Ukraine, therefore, he simply laid his cards on the table. And it is important to keep in mind that, if this was discussed at a political level, this means that at a military level, integrated NATO commands had not only already been discussed, but operational decisions had been taken and the relevant plans prepared. The framework, therefore, is certainly one in which the NATO structures have already determined the need for this intervention, and have planned it, while on the political level - which would formally be the final decision - the discussion is still open, and the positions are diversified.
The case of senior German officers discussing attacking the Kersh Bridge with Taurus missiles - and especially the way it was dealt with in Germany - however, it clearly states that national political authorities have limited authority.
We can therefore say that the overall picture is already determined, not only by the decisions of the American hegemon, but also by the behaviors and positions assumed so far by the Europeans, which have ended up determining a path from which it is now extremely difficult to deviate. And it is in this context that Macron's improvident acceleration is inserted, which - despite the aforementioned inadequacy of the subject - nevertheless has its own logic.
The premise is that Europe is today more disunited than ever, even if it tries to appear very stable. And what was the pillar of the Union, that is, German economic and political power, is today itself weak and disunited. While Washington is pushing to increase Poland's political weight, focusing on its Russophobia.
Macron's move, therefore, surprised everyone a bit, not so much for the content - of which they were aware, and had been discussing it for some time - but rather for the acceleration that he imposed on the public debate. The fundamental point, beyond any electoral calculations, is that the famous Franco-German pact is crippled by Berlin's weakness, and is therefore no longer convenient. Breaking it, taking an interventionist position more advanced than any other, means somehow placing yourself in a position of possible leadership, in the perspective that the framework is predetermined, and therefore inevitable.
For France, moreover, a significant strategic problem arises. If in fact, as already mentioned, its energy power is largely ensured by nuclear power plants, the combined action of more advanced decolonization processes and Russian political-military penetration in Africa is not only depriving it of part of its profits and its control over the sub-Saharan belt, but has seriously affected its privileged supply of uranium (Niger). Things which, moreover, have increased Western dependence on... Russian supplies!
In Macron's Bonapartist choice, therefore, there is not only the ambition to ride the tiger to recover an (impossible) grandeur, but also the emergence of concrete factors of friction between France and the Russian Federation.
Unfortunately, for him and for all of us, neither France, nor Europe as a whole, is absolutely in a position to face such a prospect. Apart from a series of structural problems, on which the EU has only recently decided to intervene, and even regardless of the finding of the necessary resources, in a phase in which the European economy is in dire straits, there are still a series of strictly linked to military-industrial aspects.
As Gianandrea Gaiani, director of Defense Analysis, underlines, "the European Union no longer has anything to give to Ukraine capable of changing the outcome of the conflict, because we have enormous production problems" (2). And a CNN analysis explains that "Russia is capable of producing 3 million ammunition per year" while the USA and Europe, combined, could reach "a maximum of 1.2 million" (3).
But it is not simply a question of industrial capacity, which in any case is fundamental in a war of attrition such as the one that NATO is already fighting in Ukraine, but literally of combat capacity. Even sending troops, therefore, not only would not serve to change the trend of the conflict, but would have the only result of triggering a much greater escalation and exposing European countries to Russian attacks.
Gaiani also recalls: “I will cite three examples. In 2022, a report by the Defense Committee of the French Parliament estimated that the ammunition stocks would have allowed the Paris army to sustain three or four days of conflict in Ukraine. The other day Germany inaugurated a new munitions factory and made it known that 40 billion euros would be needed to restore stocks. Finally, the latest report from the UK House of Commons claims that the country could fight a conventional conflict for up to two months” (4).
A poor combat capability which, moreover, is not the exclusive prerogative of the European members of NATO. One of the assets on which the Alliance bases its idea of war superiority is, for example, aviation. But from a report by the Government Accountability Office (5), it appears that the effective combat capability of the US F-35s, the flagship aircraft of the US Air Force, is 15-30% of the entire fleet (6).
The situation in which European countries find themselves today is dramatically that of an earthenware vase among iron vases. On the one hand, the United States which, using the historical instruments of control over European politics, has trapped the allies of the old continent in a war totally contrary to its interests; and on the other Russia, with its war, industrial and energy potential, which now totally distrusts the European leadership and - feeling existentially threatened by the West - is ready to take up the challenge and face a war directly with NATO.
And it is precisely in the gap between this objective situation and the political line pursued by the European leaderships that all the inadequacy of the latter dramatically emerges, absolutely incapable not only of freeing themselves from the deadly embrace of the declining American empire, but also just of placing conduct capable of defending at least the vital interests of their countries.
Unfortunately, the catatonic state of a large part of European populations does not lead to hope for some form of resilience. The next European elections, for example, even though the Union parliament is a practically insignificant assembly, could be an opportunity to send a signal, perhaps inducing these leaders to be more cautious.
Unfortunately, however, there are no leaders on the horizon capable of catalyzing this possible resilience, and in any case not beyond a limited extent and within strictly national horizons. There is not even a hint of true European leadership. While what we desperately need is a leader capable of bringing the old continent out of the jaws of war. A European Putin, to put it bluntly.
Notes
1 - On the topic, see “We are the new proxies”, Substack
2 - “Gli analisti: le armi non ribaltano la guerra”, Il Fatto Quotidiano
3 - “Exclusive: Russia producing three times more artillery shells than US and Europe for Ukraine”, CNN
4 - “Gli analisti: le armi non ribaltano la guerra”, Il Fatto Quotidiano
5 - The report is available here for download
6 - See “70 Percent or More of F-35s May Not Be Combat Capable”, The Epoch Times