THE IMPOTENCE OF US DIPLOMACY

I have repeatedly pointed out the contradictory nature of the international action of the United States, and in particular of its president, during these first months of the Trump administration. The distance, if not the outright contradiction, between the declarations of today and those of the day after, or between public declarations and concrete actions, is now so continuous that it can be defined as systemic. And if at first it could be attributed to a negotiating tactic, aimed at alternating pressure and persuasion, and in any case at 'disorienting' the other party, it is becoming increasingly evident that the outcome is rather that of exalting the unreliability of US negotiators. Moreover, what was presented as the central idea of ​​the US diplomatic strategy - that is, "peace through strength" - has from the beginning appeared to be a blunt weapon; this is in fact a credible line only and exclusively if there is an affective will and ability to exercise force, and not just to threaten it. And, of course, if you apply it to a counterpart that fears it. The sensational decision to close the campaign against Yemen, however 'dressed up' by a narrative that tries to pass it off as a victory, is exactly the tombstone on this strategic line. When the adversary is not willing to be intimidated, and the cost-benefit ratio is totally unfavorable, the entire system goes to hell.

So we see how, in the negotiations with Moscow, the parties are unable to address the issues with the same approach: while Russia has always made it clear that to end the conflict it is necessary to address its root causes, the United States remains focused on the desire to stop the kinetic conflict, and to do so quickly. This leads to a growing underlying frustration on the part of the United States, which however it attributes to the Russian counterpart, or to the Europeans or the Ukrainians, refusing to recognize that it is instead its own approach that is the primary cause of the problem. The result is the difficulty in making concrete progress, and the continuous oscillation between openings and relaunching threats.

The same situation can be observed with regard to the negotiations with Iran. After accepting the negotiating framework clearly posed by Tehran (limited to the issue of military nuclear power, and on the basis of international law), Washington seemed to be on a reasonable path of mediation, despite the evident Israeli irritation. But while mutual trust in the seriousness of the negotiations was growing, Witkoff once again relaunched the aggressive approach, threatening the military option if Iran refused "dialogue" - where this obviously means if it refused to adhere to US requests. Which Witkoff relaunched, not only asking for a series of renunciations also relating to civil nuclear power (which Iran has every right to maintain) but also once again ventilating a subsequent 'extension' to other issues, such as support for the Axis of Resistance, which Tehran has always refused to discuss. The result therefore seems to be exclusively to induce the counterparts to doubt the negotiating reliability of the Trump administration. Finally, even on the complex Israeli-Palestinian issue, the White House seems to rely more on improvisation and Trumpian quips than on a clear strategic line. Even if it is quite evident that the US interest is to stabilize the region, meeting the wishes of Saudi Arabia, and perhaps 'containing' Iranian influence - even at the cost of a divergence with the Israeli ally - the inability to set a credible course, and to have it accepted by the various regional actors (Tel Aviv first and foremost) makes it decidedly incapable of being realized. Even if a series of signals indicate the availability for a 'fracture' with Israel (or rather, with the Netanyahu government), the indecision on 'how' to obtain the desired results ends up thwarting every attempt. It seems clear that the objective is to relaunch the Abraham Accords, and that to achieve this it is necessary to overcome the resistance of Riyadh, which is asking as a precondition the concrete adoption of the 'two states' solution and the end of the conflict in Gaza and the West Bank. Two points on which Israeli opposition is total. And here Trump is thinking of playing his ace; according to credible rumors this morning, he would have the intention - on the occasion of his imminent trip to the Middle East, excluding Israel - to announce the recognition of the Palestinian state. In other words, he would like to use a merely symbolic declaration, as a valid substitute for an effective reality. Thinking that this would be enough to convince the Gulf countries to normalize relations with Tel Aviv. But instead we would be faced with yet another empty talk, without any ability to actually impact reality, and which will only produce an increase in distrust and friction (particularly with the Israeli government), without however changing the general picture.

From the US point of view, the only viable path is clearly to force the fall of the Netanyahu government, replacing it with a more malleable one, willing to put an end - at least temporarily - to the conflicts that the Jewish state is rekindling everywhere in the region. But it is very doubtful that Washington has the will and the ability to do so.

A first assessment of US diplomatic action, therefore, inevitably leads to the conclusion that there is a structural problem, a fundamental inability to manage, on this level, the contradiction between the desire to maintain a hegemonic role and the loss of the ability to exercise the necessary power. This 'diplomatic impotence' is perhaps the biggest problem that the Trump administration has to deal with, starting from the fact that the president's nature does nothing but exacerbate it.