Having fortunately escaped the attack on Butler, Trump is sailing towards a very probable victory in the presidential elections in November. And it is very likely that America too has escaped - at least for now - the outbreak of a civil war; if he died, the chances of a chain reaction starting were really strong.
Clearly, the attack itself was a game-changing event; at this point the game is essentially lost for the Democrats, and therefore it no longer makes sense to look for an alternative candidate to Biden. It would make no sense to burn a candidacy now that can be used in four years' time. But they will do well to quickly find a frontman (or a frontwoman...), and prepare him for the challenge: J.D. Vance is young and feisty (and his biography, 'Hillabilly Elegy', is a bestseller).
If Trump confirms the predictions, and is elected president for the second time, he will have a limited period of time before him to develop his policies; and even if Vance is – as some say – a clone of him, it is not a given that he will be elected in 2028.
In this time window it will be faced with numerous challenges, both internal and international, and the two aspects are intertwined.
To begin with, he will have to restore the country's economy - or rather, he will have to restore the country. Which has a public debt of 33,000-odd billion. It will probably have to come up against very strong institutional resistance from the Dems, at every level, and obviously have to deal with the deep state (which is totally bipartisan, therefore firmly present even among the Republican ranks). Although his election will probably be triumphal, and this will silence the dissent among the reps, differences will not take long to emerge.
And finally, he will have to prevent the country's extreme polarization from plunging into a violent crisis.
But naturally his biggest challenges are international ones: Ukraine, Palestine, China.
Regarding the conflict in Ukraine, the Trumpian position is known: put an end to it. But to think that the generic will of a new administration is enough to resolve the lump of issues related to the conflict is pure naivety.
To begin with, we must not forget that, although in a subordinate position, the war in question involves two other actors, in addition to the USA and Russia: Europe (EU) and Ukraine itself, the first of which is also linked to Washington from the Atlantic Alliance. Any US move, therefore, must at least take into account the possible reactions of these subjects too. But, of course, the priority issue is Russia.
Moscow certainly has an interest in putting an end to the war, both to stop the bleeding of human losses (which are now probably approaching one hundred thousand), and to ease the pressure on Russian society, and to reorganize/rearm the armed forces calmly and without more in progress, and – not least – because it is what the rest of the world would like to see happen.
But Russia is certainly not willing to throw away everything that it has cost to get to this point, therefore a compromise position can be reached, but still taking into account that there is a subject that wins - Russia - and one that loses – NATO. Basically, therefore, the question is mainly what this can offer, and what is indispensable for Moscow.
Let us immediately sweep away the ridiculous hypothesis, which has arisen several times, of the freezing of the conflict (on the Korean model), or of the concession of the occupied territories: Russia already firmly controls those territories, and in any case does not intend to consider the hypothesis of a return to Ukraine, and as for freezing the war, it is clear that - especially after the mockery of the Minsk agreements - any hypothesis that does not give guarantees on the definitive end of the war will not be taken into consideration.
That said, there isn't much left for Washington to offer. Theoretically, it could put on the table the lifting of the sanctions [1] and the restitution of the frozen funds (perhaps in a second phase), it would be politically very difficult to manage - and very indigestible for the Europeans... - as it would be like recognizing that the Russian OSM it was justified. Moreover, from the Russian point of view, these are important but ancillary issues.
The explicit renunciation - on both sides, Ukraine and NATO - of joining the Atlantic Alliance would, once again, be politically problematic, since it would sound like a defeat - even if everyone knows that in reality Kiev will never join NATO. And Moscow is also aware of this. A declaration of neutrality with associated substantial disarmament by Ukraine could already have greater relevance. And better yet, a refusal to deploy new weapons and new troops too close to the borders of the Russian Federation.
Obviously Moscow knows it cannot get 100%, but it cannot afford to get too little, from any point of view. And surely there are at least two non-negotiable conditions: any stipulation foreseen must be actually implemented, and there must be some sort of international guarantee.
The Russian leadership knows all too well that the United States is always ready to unilaterally withdraw from the agreements signed when it deems it appropriate.
Considering that a possible Trump presidency will take office on January 20th, and that such a complex negotiation can only take months, it is extremely unlikely that the war will end before a year.
If all goes well for the new administration, by the summer-autumn of 2025 we could reach the effective end of the conflict, with the demilitarization of Ukraine and the international guarantee - for example - of India and/or Brazil (Trump would never give this opportunities to China). But, since it is truly a matter of squaring the circle, it is much more likely that the Trumpian strategy will fall back on a plan B, which will develop along two tracks: drastic reduction of military aid to Kiev and rapid delegation of support to the Europeans, which will lead, in within a year or so, at the end of the conflict due to the simple extinction of the Ukrainian fighting capacity, and of the European capacity to support Kiev.
In both cases, the repercussions on Ukraine, on the EU - and on individual European countries - as well as on NATO itself, will be considerable. On the one hand, the reaction of the (heavily armed) Ukrainian nationalist forces is unpredictable; for another, it is clear that the political backlash on the European ruling classes would be very strong, causing a perhaps decisive landslide that would shake the European Union, and would probably insinuate internal fault lines within NATO - and this could also be a problem for Trump , which perhaps does not like the current structure of the Alliance very much (which it considers unbalanced in terms of costs), but which is necessary for the USA both to maintain its grip on Europe and to involve it in containment (today) and in the conflict ( perhaps, tomorrow) with China [2].
The second challenge is the Middle East. It should be taken into account here that, although the new administration would certainly be no less pro-Israeli than the current one, this conflict does not fall within the strategic interests of the United States. From Washington's point of view it represents a sort of unwanted deviation from its road map; not out of any sympathy towards the Palestinian cause, however declined, nor even out of a lack of aversion towards the Axis of Resistance (Iran in the lead), but rather because it forces us to stop dealing with it, because the international unpopularity of the United States, and above all because it inevitably destabilizes a region in which, on the contrary, the US plans precisely envisaged stabilization (Abraham Accords). As the Yemeni affair clearly shows, it is a strategic quadrant in which it is extremely easy for opponents of American hegemony to create enormous problems with very little effort.
Obviously, Netanyahu is convinced that he can get even stronger support from Trump, but this could probably turn out to be a bad bet. The vice-presidential candidate Vance, also a passionate pro-Zionist, highly supported by the US Jewish lobby, has in fact declared that Israel should quickly end the war in Gaza. It's a shame that this is not possible (the IDF recently spoke of a five-year perspective, to defeat Hamas...), and is in any case contrary to Netanyahu's personal and political interests.
Certainly, and for more than one reason, Trump's Middle Eastern policy will be characterized by strong support for Israel but, unlike during the current administration, also by strong pressure on the Tel Aviv government. Which, in some ways, could be summed up in a sort of short program: we will give you all the support you need, if necessary we will give you a limited direct hand, but you must close this matter quickly. Which, as already mentioned, is practically impossible, for various reasons.
Trump certainly does not want to be involved in a regional war with Iran, nor with Lebanon and/or Syria. This, however, does not mean that he could be available - for example - for targeted attacks on southern Lebanon or Syria. Naturally the problem, in this case, would be the exposure of American bases in the region to a possible, and proportionate, reaction. Not to mention the US ships in the Red Sea.
This is actually a fairly typical situation of dangerous equilibrium. Neither of the two adversaries (neither the USA nor the Axis of the Resistance) wants to come to direct confrontation, and both are aware of this. In a certain sense, it is as if two cars were proceeding at high speed towards each other: no one wants the crash, but both aim for the opponent to swerve first. A war of nerves, in short. And obviously, in these cases, the safest thing is not to turn on the car engine at all...
To get what he wants, Trump probably needs a change of government in Tel Aviv, and to get that he would have to offer Netanyahu a personal way out. But this may not be enough, and here too it is a question of squaring the circle: keeping Israel standing, without appearing defeated by the Palestinian Resistance, and at the same time preventing the regional balance from changing too radically. At this point, rather than trying to revitalize the Abraham Accords, it could probably be more functional to find another second leg for control of the region. Traditionally, in fact, the USA has tried to have two iron allies in the Middle East; initially it was Israel and Shah Reza Pahlevi's Iran, and after the Khomeini revolution this was replaced by Saudi Arabia. Now that this, under the leadership of Mohammad Bin Salman, is disengaging and moving towards multipolarity (BRICS+), it becomes even more necessary to have another partner - also to rebalance the importance of Israel.
This could be achieved by killing two birds with one stone, progressively stopping the conflict in Gaza, starting a powerful reconstruction financed by the Arab countries of the Gulf, and placing Egypt as guarantor of all (which would thus take the place of Arabia ). Even if Cairo currently has a somewhat ambiguous position (like Erdogan's Turkey and Russia itself), firmly pro-Israeli on the one hand, but also flirting with Russia (for example in Libya and Sudan), with a robust contribution of funding (Arab, USA, IMF) it could be possible to bring it back into the fold, and also make it a US praetorian, both towards the Middle East and towards sub-Saharan Africa.
Naturally, with this the circle would not become a square, but on the other hand - it should not be forgotten... - Trump's time perspective is only four years, as he cannot be re-elected a third time.
Finally, the third challenge is the Chinese one. Certainly, even in this case, there will be no acceleration towards the conflict with Beijing. Indeed, from the first statements, it would seem to proceed in an almost opposite direction. As reported by the Financial Times [3], in fact, Trump declared that Taiwan should pay the United States for its defense guarantees. This, upon closer inspection, is a bit of a leitmotif of his political thought - it is exactly what he essentially asks of the European countries of NATO - and which places the USA no longer in the position of global hegemon (I protect you because you are one of mine possession), as well as that of a sort of global security agency (pay for my protection).
A position, this, in line with a certain isolationist impulse that has always been present among republicans, and which in turn also finds its justification in the difficulty of the historical phase that American imperialism is going through, but which obviously will only fuel friction with historical allies.
The confrontation with China, therefore, will probably be less muscular, but no less determined. Which will certainly please Beijing, which has no interest in arriving at a military clash, not even with Taipei, but which on the other hand knows well that this appeasement will essentially be a cosmetic one, and that the clash is only postponed. In any case, to continue developing the construction of a cordon sanitaire around mainland China, bringing together Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia, fueling the narrative of the Chinese threat is essential.
However, Beijing's is the easier challenge, since in any case it is not destined to reach the breaking point during the tycoon's presidential mandate. And in fact, the very fact that the conflict is still in its cold phase - unlike the other two, which are very hot - is the main advantage for Trump, as it protects him from making blatantly wrong moves, while increasing his chances of appearing - on the short term, at least – as a peacemaker, a leader who faces problems decisively but not with a weapon in hand.
Upon closer inspection, therefore, the three great challenges that await Trump, if he obtains the presidency, present themselves with a different degree of complexity, but will be faced with a similar approach, fundamentally based on the principle of sharing the burdens with allies, but with the capitalization of honors.
Beyond what are - or will be - the orientations of a Trump administration, and what will be the balances that will be determined between it and the deep state (the one that plans imperial strategies with at least a twenty-year perspective, and which necessarily does not may suffer fundamental shocks with every move to the White House), the fundamental element of his presidency will be the brevity of his mandate. Four years is certainly enough for seek, and perhaps find, temporary solutions to the most urgent crises, but they certainly do not allow the entire complexity of the picture to be addressed strategically. Nor is it easily conceivable that, in this period of time, changes could be achieved that would influence - in one way or another - the decades to come.
From this point of view, Trump's second mandate could result in a parenthesis, a simple temporary deviation from the pre-established route. Maybe it's just a coincidence, but all those who now openly talk about war with Russia refer to 2029 as the starting date. Precisely the year, coincidentally, in which there will be someone else in the Oval Office anyway.
Notes
1 – According to Bloomberg, Trump would even intend to revoke, or at least ease the sanctions against Russia, as soon as he takes office. If this were the case, he evidently considers them ineffective as a negotiating tool, and he prefers to use them as a gesture of good will, aimed at facilitating the reopening of Washington-Moscow contacts, and not only on the Ukrainian issue. This gesture, however, will not fail to embarrass the Europeans.
2 – It must also be said that, in the hypothesis that a possible peace negotiation seems to be moving towards success, the chances increase that some sectors that do not see it favorably (UK, parts of the Ukrainian political-military establishment, some NATO countries eastern countries...), may at that point decide to make some counter-move, capable of blowing up the negotiating table, and perhaps even triggering an expansion-exacerbation of the conflict.
Equally, if Moscow does not see credible and interesting glimmers of negotiation, it could decide to impose an acceleration of the war, and aim for a total Ukrainian capitulation, imposed by military force on the battlefield.
3 – See “Donald Trump calls for Taiwan to 'pay' for its own defense”, Financial Times