THE URGENCY OF AN ANTI-HEGEMONIC AND PROACTIVE POLICY

2024 seems to be closing in a generally unfavorable condition for the forces and countries that oppose Western hegemonism, which in turn seems to be the prelude to a 2025 marked by a renewed global offensive by the hegemon. The collapse of Syria, the ostentatious self-assurance of Trump and Netanyahu, the difficult situation in Iran, the multiplication of situations in which the exercise of democracy is increasingly reduced to a mere either-or (Georgia, Romania, Moldova)... in short, everything seems to induce pessimism, at least for those who hope for a transition to a new world order based on multipolarity.

But even if many elements are indeed negative, it is essentially a perceptual distortion, largely induced by Western propaganda - in which we are fully immersed. Therefore, if we want to draw up a sort of balance sheet, and above all to look at the year to come, it is best to do so starting from the facts, rather than from sensations.

2025 will most likely see the end of the kinetic conflict in Ukraine – and this, in itself, is already a positive fact – and this will represent a pivotal passage, destined to weigh heavily on the following years, because whatever way it ends, it will not be able to change the substance of this event, that is, the political-military defeat of NATO, and therefore of Western hegemonism. The extent of this defeat, which is inevitable, is not yet fully apparent – ​​and enormous efforts will certainly be made to conceal it – but not only will it be evident once it has occurred, its effects will propagate like seismic waves, shaking the entire Western political architecture.

Despite what one might think, the conflict will hardly be resolved by virtue of the action taken by the new American administration, and this for two fundamental reasons: first, the absolute inability (and lack of will) on the part of the United States to recognize and understand Russia's reasons and interests, and then (perhaps even more significantly) because what is moving the power bloc coagulated around the figure of Trump is a renewed confidence in the hegemony of the United States and in their right-duty to exercise it globally. This approach undermines any possibility of a negotiation between equals, and even more so makes it impossible for the US to accept any outcome that could be perceived as a defeat. All this therefore makes it almost impossible to reach a mutually acceptable agreement; and if there is no room for possible mediation, both parties have no choice but to forcefully impose their own solution to the conflict. It is certain that Trump will try to exert the maximum possible pressure on Moscow, in an attempt to force it to accept a negotiation in which it renounces (at least in part) its legitimate expectations; as Lavrov says, “Western diplomacy is all about threats, sanctions, punishments and blackmail”.

Such an approach by Washington in turn will leave Russia no alternative but to resolve the conflict on the battlefield. For the Kremlin, in fact, there are at least two essential points, which Lavrov himself has outlined: refusal of a truce (a road that leads nowhere) but the search for a global and lasting solution, as well as the need for any agreements to resolve the conflict to include a mechanism that guarantees the impossibility of violating them. Above all, this second part, given the absolute unreliability of the West (which Moscow knows well), is extremely delicate and, at the same time, very difficult to effectively guarantee, which is why Russia will most likely prefer to secure it manu militari in the end. In other words, only the destruction of the armed forces, and of the capacity of Kiev’s war industry, will be able to provide reliable certainty about non-membership in NATO and non-rearmament of Ukraine.

Another significant aspect is that, under the impulse of various pressures, the European Union – as a political cage for the vassals of the old continent – ​​is destined, if not to implode in the short term, certainly to be increasingly divided, increasingly less authoritative, increasingly conflictual within itself – opposing the Brussels dome to various national states.

Basically, for European countries, the new year will bring first of all an intensification of the trade war with the other side of the Atlantic, with the manifest will of the Trump administration to proceed through brutal blackmail (increased duties, demand for greater purchases of LNG, increase of the NATO contribution to 5% of GDP…). It is very unlikely that there will be any opposition from the EU leaders, now entirely composed of mediocre lackeys completely at the service of American interests. At the same time, attempts will multiply – by the few governments still capable of defending national interests – to distance themselves from the policies of the European Union, and to independently find a way to reduce the damage caused by Euro-subject policies.

And all this will manifest itself in a context of great internal instability of the countries, members or not of the European Union. Just think of the political picture that is emerging in the two most important, Germany and France, which suggests a worsening of the internal imbalance in the EU, as well as the worsening of internal crises in other countries – Romania, Moldova, Great Britain itself.

To this will inevitably be added the crisis of NATO itself, on the one hand stressed by the pressure of the American administration, on the other put to the test in maintaining a growing economic commitment while the crisis following the break with Russia bites ever more; and, obviously, while the awareness is already emerging that the Europeans alone, despite the warmongering flaunted by the elites, are absolutely not able to face Russia [1], the latter's victory in Ukraine – however achieved – will inflict a powerful blow to the credibility of the Atlantic Alliance, will undermine its internal cohesion and, last but not least, will shake to the foundations the European leaderships that, instead, have totally focused on the defeat of Russia.

As for the Middle East, once the smokescreen of propaganda has been removed, it is not so difficult to correctly relocate the events. It is enough to take Netanyahu's statements following the fall of Assad and verify them one by one, to make it clear that the reality is profoundly different from how the media portrays it. The Israeli prime minister has in fact claimed that, under his leadership, Israel has defeated Hamas (the Palestinian Resistance), defeated Hezbollah, brought down the Syrian regime and destroyed its military apparatus, has seriously undermined Iran's air defense and missile production capacity, and that his next steps will be the definitive annihilation of the Ansarullah movement in Yemen and of the Iranian regime itself. We therefore see that, despite Netanyahu's self-congratulatory statements, the actual reality is that the Palestinian Resistance in Gaza is not defeated at all. Despite the indisputable disproportion of forces, and despite the terrible genocidal policy pursued by the criminal Israeli government, it not only continues to fight strenuously on its own territory (forcing Israel into the longest war in its history: already 15 months) but, also thanks to the internal contradictions that it has managed to open up within the enemy, it is still forcing Tel Aviv to reach an agreement for the exchange of prisoners, within which there is room for both an urgent intervention in favor of the civilian population of the Strip, and a (albeit partial) withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from Palestinian territory. And although, as is obvious, the various fighting formations have suffered significant losses [2], the IDF intelligence sources themselves recognize that they have been able to recruit at least 4,000 new fighters.

In parallel, on the other Palestinian front, that of the West Bank, the situation is becoming increasingly heated, signaled not only by the growth of fighting formations, and by the harshness of the resistance that the IDF encounters in its daily incursions, but by the fact that the Israeli government has been forced to push the colonial government of the PNA to assume an increasingly exposed position, not simply of flanking the actions of the Israeli army, but of open warfare against the Resistance. In order to reduce the risks for its soldiers, in fact, Israel has pushed the security forces of the Palestinian Authority to engage in direct clashes, to the point of supplying them with weapons that were previously prohibited.

As for Hezbollah, it is all too evident that the IDF has encountered enormous difficulties even in penetrating hundreds of meters into Lebanese territory, has paid a heavy price in men and equipment, and has seen a constant expansion and intensification of missile and drone attacks on Israeli territory. In fact, Israel has failed to achieve any of the objectives it set itself at the time of the ground invasion: it has not pushed Hezbollah beyond the Litani River, it has not been able to bring back the tens of thousands of settlers forced to evacuate from the north of occupied Palestine. Here too, in a certain sense, the pattern already seen in Gaza has been repeated: the absolute Israeli air superiority has translated into the massive bombing of the civilian population, used as a form of pressure where the confrontation between military forces has proven incapable of obtaining the desired results. The final outcome of the conflict (so far) has been the largely predictable one – and clearly foreseen on these pages – of a failure of the Israeli military offensive, followed by international mediation aimed at offering a way out of the impasse.

The current situation sees Israel violating the terms of the ceasefire agreement (already more than a hundred times in a few days), strong in the Western protection that covers every misdeed, but without any strategically favorable outcome being achieved from the conflict. Although certainly tried by the clash, Hezbollah emerges from the confrontation with its head held high, and can dedicate itself both to the reconstruction of its military apparatus, and to supporting the civilian populations hit by Israeli bombs.

On the question of the alleged blows inflicted on Iranian defenses, and missile production capabilities, apart from the boasting of Netanyahu and associates we have very little objective data. What can be said with certainty is that a missile production plant was partially hit. One, and in part. As for anti-aircraft defenses, the fact that the Israeli air force stayed away from Iranian territory, in carrying out its attacks, leads one to think that these are still very efficient. Moreover, it is known that these defenses also consist of modern Russian S-400 systems, and sophisticated electronic jamming equipment, also supplied by Moscow. In turn, Iran has demonstrated that it can strike deep into Israeli territory, even reaching sensitive targets.

In the best of cases, a balance of power has now been established between Israel and Iran, with mutual deterrence. So much so that Tel Aviv is desperately trying to drag the United States into a conflict with Tehran, aware that – as long as the conflict remains at the current levels – it has no chance of prevailing, and if it were to ever reach higher levels, the Iranian strategic advantage would prevail. In all this, keeping in mind that Operation True Promise 3 is still pending, which the Islamic Republic has promised, but which requires careful preparation before being completed, especially in view of a probable US involvement. In a few days, moreover, the Russia-Iran strategic partnership agreement will be signed [3], which in itself already implies a renewed and strengthened Russian interest in the defense of the country, but which – if the agreement contains a mutual defense clause, like the similar one between Moscow and Pyongyang – could mean a real Russian umbrella to protect Iran, more than sufficient to dissuade Washington and Tel Aviv from carrying out truly dangerous attacks.

Finally, coming to the post-Assad Syrian scenario, it can be said that this appears much less favorable and glorious, for the West in general and for Israel in particular. First of all, although the fall of Assad represents an indisputable success, which the West has pursued for at least 15 years, it cannot be underlined that this was determined completely independently of Israeli action – which if anything took advantage of the situation to carry out steps that it had not dared to take in different circumstances. In any case, not only is the situation far from stabilizing (the Western media do not say it, but many of the factions that make up the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham are actively dedicating themselves to the repression of religious minorities, causing harsh popular protests, while formations of the former Syrian army are engaging in guerrilla actions), but it is a harbinger of developments that are not necessarily favorable for the West. Regardless of how much and how they actually acted in determining the sudden fall of the Syrian regime, the various players in the field today find themselves aligned in a very different and, in many respects, conflictual way.

Turkey, with Qatari petrodollars behind it, is increasingly assuming the role of main sponsor of the new Syria, while on the one hand the United States seems to prefer to entrench itself in defense of the Kurds, in the east of the country. The distrust towards Erdogan, the desire to maintain direct control over Syrian oil and agricultural resources, and the desire to prevent the rebirth of a unitary Syria, even if more or less Ottoman, probably weigh heavily. On the other hand, Israel has seized the opportunity to move – as always – outside and against all international law (as befits the greatest rogue state in modern history), occupying a portion of Syrian territory, including some areas of significant strategic importance, with the clear intention of appropriating it, and proceeding with the systematic destruction of the entire Syrian military apparatus. Two operations made possible only by the total absence of any capacity to oppose them militarily.

Israel's position, moreover, much more than America's, is absolutely irreconcilable with Turkey's, especially with regard to the territorial integrity of Syria. And so, even if there is good blood between the two governments (or rather, good oil, which Ankara brings to Israel from Azerbaijan), tensions are destined to grow in the future. Erdogan, moreover, has made extensive use of anti-Israeli and Islamic rhetoric, as part of his soft-power strategy, but the contradiction with the concrete Turkish position is destined to explode sooner or later. And the Syrian question is an easy terrain on which such an explosion can be triggered.

Although, certainly, the fall of the Syrian regime represented a blow to the Axis of Resistance, this is greatly overestimated. First of all, because keeping the regime afloat had a considerable cost for Iran (but also for Iraq and Russia), which supplied oil in large quantities, wheat, medicines and other supplies that Damascus could not otherwise procure. All resources that can now be used differently. But also because Syria's role as a passage between Iran and Lebanon was much less significant than one might think; for a long time, in fact, Hezbollah has equipped itself to be able to provide for its own military needs. No more and no less than Yemen, which despite not having any land corridor connecting it to Iran has been and is capable of defending itself and attacking.

Finally, it should be noted that the reconstruction of the Syrian state, even under Turkish aegis, will not be able to do without resorting to a large extent to the civilian and military cadres of the old regime. There is already talk of reconstituting a national army of 300,000 men, of which 40,000 will be HTS fighters, and 50,000 from the SNA (of very strict Turkish observance). It follows that over 200,000 will have to be recruited elsewhere; if a comprehensive mediation between the Turks and the Kurdish-Americans does not succeed (which is not at all easy), leading to the integration of the Kurdish fighting forces, inevitably the bulk of the new Syrian army will be made up of ex-military personnel and ex-officers of the Syrian Arab Army. Finally, even taking into account the ambiguity (if not the duplicity) of Erdogan, who in many ways is even more unreliable than the Americans, the fact remains that the only context in which the future of Syria is concretely discussed - and it is done with the maintenance of territorial integrity as a basic principle - remains the so-called Astana format, which brings together Turkey, Russia and Iran.

From the Israeli point of view, therefore, while it is certainly true that the end of Assad can still be considered an advantage, it remains that Tel Aviv's latest moves have, and will increasingly have, implications that are not necessarily positive. Beyond the fact that, as has just been said, the evolution of the situation could lead to a crisis in Turkish-Israeli relations, it is undoubted that the annexationist claims on southern Syria will increase tensions with the international community and the isolation of Tel Aviv, and above all that the extensive occupation of Syrian territory implies a further space-time extension of the military commitment, already put to the test by the innumerable open and/or frozen conflicts.

If therefore this is the real picture of the global situation, at least summarily outlined and limited to the two hottest fronts, it follows that the situation of the clash between Western hegemonic forces and anti-hegemonic and multipolar forces is actually much less unfavorable than it may appear, and than it is self-interestedly represented.

However, this does not take away the fact that, despite its objective difficulties, the West is putting into play a multiplicity of initiatives that can be described as offensive, within the broader hybrid war it is waging. And that this poses a series of challenges, in particular to the countries that are on the front line, namely Russia and Iran.
For which, as one might say, the dilemma of how to manage the conflict arises.

It seems quite evident that, up to now, the Russian Federation has taken a position that could be defined as reactive, characterized by an approach that sees Moscow react to Western initiatives, more concerned with avoiding an escalation of the conflict than with maintaining its own initiative. In particular, it would be said that it is lacking precisely in terms of hybrid warfare, where it appears in this respect to be absolutely on the defensive. For example, with respect to a series of geopolitical situations (Georgia, Transnistria, Armenia, Serbia...) Russian action seems at the very least timid, and does not go much beyond declarations of principle. While perhaps elsewhere – think of the Sahel and North Africa, or the Caribbean area – we see the development of an effective geopolitical plan (perhaps not very fast, but still capable of bringing home results), in the Caucasus it still seems insufficient.

More generally, one could say that Moscow relies more on warnings, repeatedly launched to the West but with little result, and much less on concrete gestures, forgetting that Western elites only understand the language of force, and reason according to a strictly utilitarian scheme, comparing pros and cons. Which would make it much more effective to concretely raise the price of the cons, rather than threaten it.

From this point of view, despite an absolutely inferior capacity, from every point of view, it must be recognized that Iran has shown itself to be much more proactive and, in some ways, strategically far-sighted. The construction of the Axis of Resistance, for example, is much more than a mere anti-Israeli alliance, but represents a strategic plan that aims to blow up the classic colonial, ethnic and religious fault lines (Persians vs. Arabs, Sunnis vs. Shiites), in view of a war of liberation from Western imperialist hegemony, capable of crossing the entire Middle East, and which sees the defeat of the Zionist entity as only the first step.

Just as the will and ability to attack the enemy, and not simply react to its moves, has proven to be strategically fundamental. Although the price paid and to be paid is high – and it could not be otherwise – it is indisputable that the Iranian strategy has nailed Israel to a long-lasting conflict, which is severely stressing the very foundations of the Zionist project.

Without ever claiming to teach strategy from their couch to the leadership of countries that have a thousand-year history behind them, and that indisputably prove to be aware of it and up to it, we would nevertheless like to witness, in the year that is approaching, a renewed Russian, Iranian and Chinese protagonism. A greater capacity for 360° initiative, even with more unscrupulousness. A greater determination.

Some time ago, Putin said that, if you are convinced that a fight is inevitable, it is better to strike first. Perhaps it would be a good idea to extend the concept slightly. Many times, a punch thrown at the right time allows you to avoid a fight. While hesitation often makes it more likely.

Notes

1 – After months and months of the governments of the small Baltic republics being the standard-bearers of European rearmament and the main supporters of a bellicose approach towards Moscow, here comes the unexpected counter-order: the highest authorities of Finland, Latvia and Estonia have recognised that the European countries of NATO cannot effectively confront Russia without the support of the United States. In an interview with the Independent (See “Nato cannot defend Europe from Russia without the US, warn alliance’s frontline leaders”, Tom Watling, Millie Cooke, Independent) in which Latvian President Edgars Rinkevich, Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal participated, the three leaders expressed the opinion that NATO “is not ready” to fight Russia without the United States and called on the allies to significantly increase defence spending. In particular, the President of Finland observed that he could not imagine NATO without the USA.

2 – Obviously we do not have official data on the number of fallen Palestinian fighters, but it is possible to make a (very approximate) estimate starting from the known data. By unanimous assessment, the Resistance forces could count – on 7 October 2023 – on approximately 50/60,000 men, or approximately 2.5% of the total population (2,300,000). The number of deaths recorded in these months of war is just over 45,000, but certainly does not count the thousands of dead still buried under the rubble, and those simply considered missing. Bearing in mind that some of the figures released by some observers, which put the number at almost 200,000, but which in this also make an estimated projection of the deaths that will result (due to hunger, malnutrition, disease, lack of medical care, etc.), it can be reasonably assumed – with a good margin of abundance – that the current number of deaths can be estimated at 100,000. Strictly applying the same ratio as before (2.5%), it would follow that the fallen fighters are 2,500; although it is presumable that most of the victims are civilians, killed during the continuous bombing, we still want to overestimate the losses among the ranks of the fighters, and believe that they were double, or 5,000. We would still be in the order of a maximum of 10% of the fighting force, a significant loss but far from affecting the combat capacity. And moreover, as seen, already abundantly compensated by the arrival of new fighters. Just to give an example, in order to combat capacity with such a rate of losses, consider that the Ukrainian army probably had about 500,000 casualties, but compared to a total number of mobilized of about 2,500,000, maybe 3,000,000, or about 20%.

3 – The agreement on the comprehensive strategic partnership between Russia and Iran will be signed on January 17 in Moscow, during the visit of the President of the Islamic Republic Pezeshkian.