Towards the urkatastrophe of the 21st century?

Aby Warburg, a German art critic, defined the First World War as urkatastrophe, the original catastrophe; and it is in fact that historical event that can be identified as the turning point of European decline, the end of a historical phase - centuries old - which had seen the European continent dominate, for better or for worse, practically the entire globe.
Upon closer inspection, what had been European civilization (the original West) had long since lost its driving force, had indeed ceased to be the bearer of a vision of the world, of a corpus of values, now replaced by a single one, money. But undoubtedly it was with the First World War that the decline in values and culture became a geopolitical decline. A process which, not surprisingly, was hastily concluded only a few years later, with the Second World War. To put an end to planetary domination, a conflict of equal scope was necessary.

But what occurred in the first half of the twentieth century was a catastrophe only for Europe, which would see itself replaced - in the role of global hegemon - by the young American power of the United States, which in effect represented a distillation of its worst aspects. What officially opens with the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, therefore, is a historical phase in which the place of the decadent European civilization is taken by a single empire, which makes the sword the instrument for grabbing gold, and has no another value system to propose outside of this one; the famous American way of life being nothing other than the road to success. This civilization has also come to an end, its historical phase is over, and we are returning to an era characterized by a plurality of geopolitical subjects who - we hope - will compete with each other in a peaceful way. Unfortunately, for the process to materialize, a further step is necessary.

An empire almost always collapses from within, but for this to happen it must be shaken from without. And this is what is happening to the USA. Despite the obvious differences, the situation in the United States is very similar to that of the USSR before the fall (1), and for not very dissimilar reasons. Faced with the increasingly widespread emergence of small and large powers willing to challenge the empire, Washington has no choice but to play (as always, after all) the card of military power; a power which, moreover, no longer has deterrent capacity, and which is even at a disadvantage compared to some competitors. It must therefore face a situation in which the capital necessary to maintain and develop military capabilities up to the challenges is dwindling (in 2023, the US deficit reached the monstrous figure of 34,001 trillion dollars), while at the same time the military capabilities- industrialists of their adversaries grow. So he finds himself faced with a challenge against time.

In strategic terms, this is the primary reason for the open conflict against Russia in Ukraine. A conflict which, from even a superficial observation, is evidently conceived and constructed so as to lead to a confrontation between NATO and Russia, not between Russia and the United States. Although, and it is almost certain, the American strategic leaders - political and military - have decidedly misjudged the reactivity and resistance capabilities of the Russian Federation, the real objective of the war lies to the west of the battle line.
Although maintaining pressure on Moscow for as long as possible is perfectly part of the empire's defensive strategy, the purpose of the conflict is essentially another. And it is not simply a question of downsizing the European commercial competitor, as has been thought and said. In the context of the current multipolar confrontation, what Washington wants is to plunder the European colony of every possible industrial and economic resource, and hurl what remains of it against Russia.

We are an expendable resource. Our function is no longer that of a rich market for the empire, but that of a military outpost. We are the askari destined to face the first impact with one of the adverse powers.
However, the center of gravity of the global conflict is elsewhere, in the Indo-Pacific. It is there that Washington thinks the crucial game will be played, the center of the chessboard where it will be decided whether the white king or the yellow king will fall. But this strategic plan would need more time, more security in the rear. And above all not to be disturbed by unexpected factors.
Whether it is Trump or Netanyahu, who introduce a spoke in the wheels of an already not particularly powerful cart.

But above all, the United States needs a profound reconversion of its military-industrial apparatus, which requires even before a new strategic vision - which, from this that can be seen, however, seems to still be absent. The American strategic doctrine, in fact, continues to think of an unrealistic horizon. Although, obviously, both the Ukrainian and Palestinian conflicts are being observed and studied, the conclusions that are being drawn appear to be limited to the tactical dimension. The idea that the American empire seems to be lulling into is that it is sufficient to ensure the non-victory of the enemy. Isn't Putin must win today's obsessive refrain?
In US thinking, given that Taiwan will be the cornerstone of the conflict, it will be sufficient to prevent the People's Republic of China from reuniting it with the motherland; and they believe this is an achievable objective, as the experience of current conflicts demonstrates how defense is much easier and more effective than attack.

Of course, this is abstractly always true, always has been. But a general criterion must always be contextualized. Speaking precisely about Taiwan and the problems that the Pentagon must solve, Kelly Grieco (senior member of the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center), interviewed by Asia Nikkei (2) said that "the United States and Japan do not need to win against China. They must be able to deny China a chance to win. China must win to achieve its goals." And according to Grieco, the war experience in Ukraine demonstrates that, thanks to satellite observation technologies and drones, "transparency of the battlefield" has been achieved (3), which therefore makes it impossible to concentrate forces for attack and surprise.

What is missing - sensationally - in this hypothesis is the comparison with the context, and with the rest of the experiential reality to which it refers.

First of all, in fact, the fact that, despite the aforementioned transparency of the battlefield, the Russian armed forces continue to advance and grind down the Ukrainian ones is completely omitted. Furthermore, as Grieco herself recalls, that conflict also marked "the return of the masses to the battlefield". And she adds “the war is bringing the advantage back to the masses, especially the low-cost masses” (4). And in the context of a comparison with China, it's not even worth pointing out who has them in enormous quantities...
But above all it is another factor that seems obliterated, namely that Beijing - if it were resolved by a military reunification - does not need to attack Taiwan, as it is more than sufficient to isolate it from the rest of the world, preventing any entry/exit of goods, both via sea and air. Which would force the United States to commit its fleet(s) thousands of kilometers from the homeland and close to mainland China.

This, moreover, is not the only pernicious omission. One of the assumptions on which US strategy has always been based is that any war must be fought elsewhere, that is, it must not directly engage North American territory, because this could have disastrous consequences. A corollary to it is the idea that a conflict involving the cities and infrastructures of the United States would be a nuclear conflict, and should therefore be avoided at all costs, unless there is a vital need for defense, or the possibility of a fairly safe first strike.
This is, moreover, a fairly widespread idea: a direct conflict between nuclear powers would automatically be characterized by the use of atomic weapons. Except that's not necessarily the case at all.

Given that a conflict between powers equipped with nuclear weapons (and carriers), in substantially balanced quantity and quality, would pose the question of Mutual Assured Destruction to both parties, this does not at all exclude that they could hit each other heavily with conventional weapons. Which means, among other things, that both Russia and China (and vice versa) could launch ballistic and/or hypersonic missiles with non-nuclear warheads towards targets on US territory. Even if, obviously, this would dangerously bring the conflict closer to a threshold beyond which, in fact, there is only the use of nuclear weapons, it is not possible to absolutely exclude that - under certain conditions - someone could make this choice.
In short, there is no guarantee that the USA is certainly safe from a conventional war.

What is perhaps even more relevant, from a strategic point of view, is that today the West is substantially isolated from the rest of the world. In the event of an open conflict, most third countries would almost certainly refuse to help him in any way. Whether it is supplying raw materials or allowing passage through their airspace, even those who are not openly aligned with Russia or China would simply stand by and watch, perhaps hoping to see the imperial giant fall.
The fact is that the situation is radically different from that of the last century, from every point of view. To put it in Putin's very happy phrase, “the vampire dance is about to end”.

Notes

1 – In this regard, see Emmanuel Todd, “La défait de l’occidant”, Gallimard
2 – “U.S. and allies not ready for radically new era of war, analysts say”, Asia Nikkei
3 – Ibidem
4 – Ibidem