Two wars
Perhaps for the first time since 1945, the so-called collective West finds itself facing two significant wars at the same time. This is already an exceptional situation in itself, but it is even more so as the Western world is going through a complicated phase to say the least, and in which its power (not only military) is certainly openly questioned and challenged, by multiple actors on the international scene. And although, especially in Anglo-American circles, a long familiarity with geopolitics and global strategies should help to read the phase correctly, this does not seem to be happening. Or at least, not entirely.
From the Western point of view, in fact, it seems that - simply - one war removes the other. Having effectively archived the one in Ukraine, essentially given up for lost and in any case now a source of more embarrassment and annoyance, the United States and NATO seem to have thrown themselves into the (renewed) Israeli-Palestinian war, with the same enthusiasm as in the first months in Ukraine.
Even if for the moment only the USA supports Israel economically, while the European countries limit themselves to total and unconditional political support [1], it is evident that the long wave of this war will end up once again affecting the latter . And once again where it hurts most, the sources of energy supply. In this, it is highlighted once again how the European ruling classes are not only completely subservient to the American empire, but also made up of leadership of absolute mediocrity - if not worse.
What transpires, however, is that the perception of these wars, in the West, is all in all superficial. There is obviously an old problem involved, which concerns all the wars following the Second World War. All the conflicts that have involved the countries of the collective West have in fact been asymmetrical (against decidedly less powerful enemies), of limited impact (relatively few casualties, economic balance generally always positive), however politically advantageous (even when concluded with a defeat, the legacy of chaos always benefits the hegemon), and above all they were all fought far from home.
There is, therefore, a different perception of war on the part of the Western world that has formed over the last eighty years. A perception that, fundamentally, is summed up in the idea that we can fight as many wars as we want in safe conditions. Security which, in fact, would come from an overwhelming technological and military superiority, such as to allow us to project our war force always and in any case into the home of the enemy in question, keeping away all the unpleasant consequences that always accompany a war.
This paradigm still maintains its validity, but is already starting to crack. The economic costs, especially for European countries, are becoming unsustainable, and it is clear that in order to keep up with the pace of their (inevitable) growth, the welfare model to which we are accustomed will be increasingly undermined [2]. The political costs grow in parallel, both in terms of further and growing loss of any space of autonomy (with respect to the Washingtonian empire), and in terms of loss of international credibility and reliability.
We still have – who knows for how long – the ability to move wars to other people's homes. But the front line is getting closer and closer.
A fundamental fact, which escapes Western leadership (and public opinion), or which is in any case interpreted in a mystifying way, is the profound connection between the wars on our borders. Meanwhile, and this is no small thing, for the first time we have two extremely harsh and extremely dangerous conflicts at the same time. Both take place near the limes of the empire, to the east and south, and both see us deeply aligned and involved; all that is missing is that last red line to cross, direct involvement.
In any case, it is not only because of proximity that these two wars are connected. In both cases, in fact, much more relevant is the profound nature of these that connects them. They are, in different ways, and with different contingent reasons, two moments of the challenge that the rest of the world launches to the empire, to its hegemony. What's more, they can in fact even be read as linked: without the conflict in Ukraine (without what made it possible, without its outcome), the current conflict in Palestine probably would not have been able to manifest itself, at least not in these terms.
The point is that both are like two distinct battles, but of the same Great Global War.
This war is fought, and will increasingly be fought, with ever new battles, according to a politically asymmetric pattern, in the sense that the objectives of the parties in conflict are different and not simply opposites. For the West it is about trying to maintain its hegemony, trying to wear down the enemy so that its growth (economic, military and political) is delayed as much as possible. For the rest of the world it is about freeing itself from this hegemony - not replacing it with another.
This asymmetry has an immediate consequence on the ways, and above all the times, with which the parties in conflict confront each other. For the hegemonic West, it is a race against time, which forces it to be increasingly aggressive and bellicose. For the multipolar world, time is the best ally, so it will engage in battle only when strictly necessary, and in any case never letting the enemy determine the rules. Each battle will be fought when and how it is deemed appropriate.
It is the empire that seeks conflict, but must fear it every time.
General Time is a bit like the contemporary version of what General Winter was in the Russian campaigns. All international actors, who find themselves - willingly or unwillingly - having to face the hegemonic aggressiveness of the West, are aware of it and rely on it. And from this they also consistently draw important strategic and tactical indications.
Although Russia had, for example, the military potential to subdue Ukraine in a short time, it preferred to adopt a different approach, based on attrition of the enemy, and which lasts over time. Thanks to this approach, the war in Ukraine is producing much more than the defeat of the Kiev regime, which however would have left - if it had been rapid - a trail of unresolved problems. By putting general time into action, however, Moscow is achieving many, much more important results.
First of all, it is demolishing the Ukrainian army. Although NATO has committed huge resources, at least since 2014, to strengthen it and bring it up to its standard levels, today the AFU is in very serious difficulty; just think that the average age of soldiers in service is 40 years, so much so that the age of enlistment is being lowered to 17 years, and the mobilization has reached women. Even net of the high level of reluctance, favored by enormous corruption, this means that generations of young males have been more than decimated [3].
The war of attrition has also led to the destruction of colossal military arsenals, not only in Ukraine but in the entire West. While the Russian war industry has made gigantic strides forward, multiplying production, and making use of combat experience to develop more advanced and more effective weapons systems [4]. And above all, in Ukraine Russia has shown that NATO's weapons and tactics are by no means invincible, but on the contrary that it is possible to challenge and defeat the hegemon precisely where it felt most secure, namely on the battlefield.
Obviously NATO believes it still has this superiority, as its air and naval forces are considered largely superior. But, as Military Watch Magazine reports, “NATO is significantly inferior to Russia in the quantity and quality of anti-aircraft missiles.”
In any case, the Ukrainian conflict has highlighted the fragility of the NATO war system, and therefore its challengeability.
All of this - the failed Ukrainian victory, the defeat of NATO's weapons, the great development of the Russian arms industry, not to mention the de facto creation of a solid anti-hegemonic front with Iran, North Korea and China - represent a major obstacle to to US strategic plans, for which they translate into the need to slow down their implementation, giving time to its enemies.
The strategic enemy of the USA, China, is in fact kept under pressure on the one hand (with sanctions, threats of tightening them for collaboration with Russia and Iran, military provocations around Taiwan and NATO's expansive push in the Indo -peaceful), and for another cajoled with détente declarations and proposals for peaceful coexistence. Washington knows that the competition with Beijing will hardly be won on an economic level, it must therefore try to slow down its development, and at the same time accelerate in view of the clash, until it believes it has sufficient margin to ensure a military victory. In this strategic framework, the Ukrainian war ended up becoming a setback rather than a step forward.
Similarly, the sudden flare-up of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict presents itself as a hindrance to US global strategies. For the USA, in fact, control of the Middle East is just as fundamental as that of Europe, these two being indispensable strategic assets, for obvious reasons. In particular, as regards the MO, Israel represents the key pillar on which the entire control strategy over the region is based; a strategy which in turn is fundamentally articulated in dividing the Arab front, tying it to Tel Aviv, and to do this requires that the main reason for tension - the Palestinian question, precisely - be constantly silenced. This delicate balance, already threatened by Chinese mediation which put an end to the hostility between Saudi Arabia and Iran [5], was blown up by the Palestinian initiative of 7 October.
In fact, with the launch of the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, the Palestinian resistance has not only broken these balances, but exactly as the Ukrainian conflict did before, it has shattered the myth of the invincibility of Tsahal and the Israeli services, showed challengeability.
Not only that, the Palestinian move has brought Palestine back to the center of the world debate and, paving the way for the foreseeable Israeli reaction, has forced the USA to hastily take the field to support its ally, and with this has itself deepened the gap of mistrust between the West and the rest of the world.
Although it was clear that the resistance fighting formations could not beat the IDF in attack, just as it was clear that Israel would react savagely, the storm works very well when seen in its strategic perspective, which once again focuses on the attrition of the enemy. As the Hezbollah leader said during his Martyrs' Day speech, “we are in a battle of steadfastness, patience and accumulation of results, a battle to collect points over time” [6].
The resistance forces, in Palestine and beyond, are in fact absolutely capable of standing up to the Israeli army, and therefore of keeping the United States pinned down in the Middle East, forced to support another war, at low intensity this time, which his ally is unable to win alone.
Even in Palestine, therefore, the general weather returns to thwart the designs of the American empire. Both Netanyahu and his defense minister, Gallant, speak openly of a war that will last months, if not longer, to defeat Hamas. But it can withstand a clash of this duration, having to face not only a very tough urban battle with the resistance forces in Gaza, but also the challenging confrontation with Hezbollah on the Lebanese border, the pinpricks arriving from Yemen and Syria, and the growing insurgency in the West Bank?
Although it has the power of the USA behind it, Israel faces enormous difficulties, which transcend the mere military aspect. Even leaving aside the conflict within the country, prior to 7 October but only slightly quelled by this, there is the question of responsibilities (political and military) in the debacle, there is the question of civil and military prisoners, there is the question - which is now emerging forcefully - of the numerous Israeli deaths due to fire from the army itself.
But, even stronger, there is the economic cost of the conflict.
Which is not simply the out-of-pocket cost of the military operation, especially if it were to drag on that long, but the overall impact on the Israeli economy. Which on the one hand sees the workforce of the recalled reservists being taken away, and on the other that of the thousands of Palestinians who have now been expelled to Gaza. There is a cessation of economic activities throughout the north, largely evacuated for security reasons, and equally along the borders with the Gaza Strip. People evacuated from both regions who, moreover, will sooner or later need public help. Not to mention the fact that more than a quarter of a million Israelis left the country following the 7/10 attack. All this, in a context of growing international isolation; and even if the governments of NATOstan do not waver in solidarity towards Tel Aviv, it is clear that the latter's behavior creates enormous embarrassment, which in the long run will end up opening up cracks.
The situation is such, therefore, that both Israel and the United States need to get out of this impasse quickly, but they both know that it will not be possible. And in Washington they are impatient, because they are aware of how this crisis is putting their entire network of Middle Eastern relations in serious difficulty. To the point that - by virtue of necessity - Biden is preparing to ask Xi Jinping to intercede with Tehran, so that he refrains from intervening.
Except that Iran is in no rush to do so; sits metaphorically on the bank of the Jordan and waits…
Notes
1 – In fact, the German government has recently massively increased authorizations for arms exports to Israel. Since November 2, the government has authorized exports worth around €303 million. In 2022 it was only around €32 million. (Source: Deutsche Welle Politics)
2 – As Josep Borrell, EU foreign policy chief, recently stated, “EU countries must be politically prepared to compensate for cuts in US aid to Ukraine”.
3 – “The losses of the Ukrainian armed forces are exorbitant”; so said the former chairman of the NATO Military Committee, and former inspector general of the Bundeswehr, General Harold Kujat on the HKCM YouTube channel.
4 – According to the German television network ZDF, “Russia is at the forefront of military innovation in Ukraine, while Western weapons lag behind.”
5 – Beijing's mediation, in addition to allowing it to appear authoritatively in the region, has produced a cascade of events unwelcome to the empire: the return of Syria to the Arab League, the start of a possible resolution of the problems between it and the Turkey, the end of the conflict between Ryhad and Sanaa.
6 – Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, November 11, 2023, Rumble