Ukrainian war act two

Even if it was expected, and partly even announced, the opening of a second offensive front by the Russian armed forces represents the transition to a further phase of the conflict, which we can probably read as conclusive.
Contrary to what Western propaganda claims, Russia has never had territorial ambitions: it is the largest nation in the world, and if anything has a population deficit compared to its territory. He didn't even have them with respect to the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine, so much so that until the eve of the start of the Military Special Operation he proposed an agreement that would provide for a special autonomous status for those regions, but within the framework of the Ukrainian state. And also being a country rich in resources, it didn't even have a particular need to grab those of Donbass (from this point of view, the richest area of Ukraine). Perhaps the only aspect in which Russian-speaking areas are attractive is precisely that of their demographic contribution.
Obviously, once the war began, paid for with tens and tens of thousands of casualties, even the liberated territories became indispensable.

The strategic objective has always been to ensure a stable security situation on the European side, in the face of NATO's threatening expansionism. Therefore, even the proclaimed objectives with respect to Ukraine (demilitarization and denazification) had to and must be framed in this context.
Certainly, these almost 27 months of war have changed many things, if not in the objectives then certainly in the way in which they are intended to be achieved.
With respect to Ukraine, it is clear two objectives are as unavoidable now as they were on February 24, 2022. The destruction of Ukraine's war potential – and as a corollary the country's neutrality and non-membership of NATO – remains the first. The certainty of not having a government in Kiev controlled by Russophobic nationalists - of which the Nazi groups have always been the dark soul - remains the second.

What has certainly changed is the general picture. If two years ago Moscow had no objections to Kiev joining the European Union, which was still an excellent trading partner, it is clear that now this possibility (always assuming that the EU still wanted to take charge of a devastated country...) does not it no longer exists, as Europe has lost its third party status and has been fully involved in the conflict. Just as the relationship with NATO has necessarily changed; if before the OSM the aim was to reach a lasting and balanced agreement on mutual security in Europe, starting from an equal and friendly relationship, now things are radically different, there is no longer any confidence in the possibility of an agreement, yes takes it for granted that the prospect is that of a long season of conflict, and in any case from now on relations will be based on balances of power.

Therefore, if this is the general strategic framework in which the conflict now takes place, Moscow's position - and its moves on the field - are clearer.
The Kremlin probably plans to close the war militarily between the end of 2024 and the beginning of 2025 - although it is certainly prepared, in every respect, to continue to wage it at least until 2027-28.
In the same period of time the transition between the current American administration and the next will take place, which regardless of who the new president will be will certainly mark a definitive change of strategic pace for the United States. Which could create favorable conditions for the situation on the battlefield to be reflected on the negotiating level.
It is also in Moscow's interest to move towards a conclusion to the war, before some European countries actually allow themselves to be seduced by the idea of intervening personally in the conflict - and before they reach the minimum conditions to do so.
Last but not least, Putin has just been re-elected for what will be his last mandate, and he certainly wants to end it without an ongoing war, and above all by working on the creation of a strategic prospect of great growth for Russian society.

All this means that the task assigned to the Russian armed forces, for this new phase of the conflict [1], will be to accelerate the fall of the Kiev regime, aiming at the disarticulation of the AFU's combat capability, and the consequent capitulation.
The offensive opened in the Kharkiv region must therefore be read in this perspective. Even if we are still in the initial phase of the maneuver, and the ones operating in the field are mainly DRG units, which probe the enemy defenses and prepare the ground for the advance of the subsequent brigades, the aims of this second front are quite evident. First of all, it is a question of protecting the border region of Belgorod, which has long been the object of Ukrainian attacks, both in the form of bombings and incursions from part of small mobile units. The need to create a buffer zone (there are over 340 km of direct border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation) has been evident for some time, and if anything from this point of view the Russian initiative is late.

The capture of Kharkiv, the capital of the oblast of the same name and a Russian-speaking city, is certainly another tactical objective, but the strategic rationale is to make the most of the greatest difficulty of the Ukrainian armed forces, namely the shortage of military personnel (especially sufficiently trained ). With more than one sector of the front affected by the dynamic action of Russian forces, the scarcity of reserves (and the difficulty of moving them from one to another) is clear that it will significantly affect the Ukrainian resistance capacity at every single point of the battle line . This means that the chances of failure will multiply. Already the AFU leaders speak openly about the fortified city of Khasov Yar as if it were irrelevant (while in fact it is very important for the entire Donetsk sector), a sign that - as was already the case for Bakhmut and Avdeevka - they are preparing to abandon it.
And there are signs that the Russians are preparing to cross the Dnieper, probably in the Kherson sector, and probably during the summer, opening a new offensive front.

Given the now overwhelming fire superiority, the multiplication of offensive pressure points in turn multiplies the chances of significant failures. This could start a chain reaction, dealing a fatal blow to the morale of the (already tired and disheartened) Ukrainian troops, which in turn would affect the entire country.
From a strategic point of view, it is known that the Russian armed forces try to avoid, as far as possible, the frontal assault on cities - as this entails high costs in human losses and destruction - preferring where possible to circumvent them, surround them, and push the forces Ukrainians to withdraw. They are likely to do the same in Kharkiv, Sumy (if they decide to head in that direction too) and Kherson.
Unless it becomes necessary, it is likely that they will not invest in Odessa, as there are too many political and logistical complications for such an operation. Presumably, if Moscow deems it necessary to liberate the city [2], they will try as much as possible to achieve it without fighting, either through a collapse of Ukrainian defenses or even at the negotiating table.

What appears clear is that the next 4/5 months will be very important, and the Russian armed forces will be entrusted with the task of pushing the balance of power even further, in such a way as to determine the prospects for a negotiating table. Which in any case will not, realistically, see the light before the new year. The fundamental step, in this perspective, remains that of the American presidential elections. If a Democrat returns to the White House, it is likely that the disengagement from the Ukrainian front will be slower and softer, and that it will be accompanied by greater pressure on the Europeans to take responsibility for supporting Kiev to the bitter end. If, on the other hand, Trump wins, it is more likely that both things will happen more quickly and brutally.
But for now the word is still under discussion.

Notes

1 – From this point of view, it will be interesting to see, in the next few days, what presidential appointments will be in the new Russian government, in particular that of the Minister of Defense (and, consequently, of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces). The probable replacement of Shoigu (and Gerasimov) will be an important indicator, in countless respects, of the position that Moscow intends to take.

2 – Odessa is clearly a key city, in many respects. Not only because it remains the last significant Ukrainian access point to the sea, but because for NATO it means maintaining a port on the Black Sea, preventing Russia from making it - de facto - a Russian lake. The British in particular are sensitive to this aspect. The decision on what to do with Odessa, therefore, cannot ignore this aspect. On the other hand, liberating the Odessa oblast would be necessary if the problem of the Transnistrian exclave is to be resolved. The one in Kaliningrad already constitutes a strategic problem of no small importance for Moscow, and having another one almost in the heart of NATO would be no small thing. But it is still a complex issue, which must take into account countless factors, and only the Kremlin knows how they plan to address them.