What does the Iranian 'move' mean?
Even if the picture of the conflict in the Middle East appears extremely articulated and complex, as well as a harbinger of dangerous escalations, it is impossible not to observe how the Axis of Resistance - and in particular Iran and Hezbollah - has so far shown a great ability to strategic and tactical management of the conflict, calibrating every move with great attention. Which is why the multiple Iranian attack the other day caused quite a stir, precisely because it seems to be a breakdown in that capacity for balance demonstrated so far. But is it really like that?
Let's first consider the main aspects of the attack. Those hit were hostile targets in Syria (ISIS) and Iraq (Mossad), two more than friendly countries, and Pakistan (Jaish Ul-Adl), a country with which Tehran has good relations - in recent days, an attack was even planned joint naval exercise.
Aside from the fact that Iraq, and especially Pakistan, protested significantly, which was almost obligatory from a political-diplomatic point of view, the fact remains that these attacks were carried out without there being any attempt to react ; in fact in no case was the anti-missile defense system activated. This means that, certainly as regards Syria (and therefore Russia) and Pakistan, the countries on whose territory the targets were located were forewarned. As regards Iraq, whose government had certainly been alerted, there is a further consideration to add: the ballistic missiles used flew over 1200 km, as they were deliberately launched from a distant position, in the south of 'Iran, whereas given that the target was in Iraqi Kurdistan it would have been much simpler to strike from its counterpart in Iran.
This choice had a double value, political and military, namely to demonstrate the Iranian ability to strike with great precision and at a great distance (a message aimed above all at Israel), but also that the US interception and anti-missile defense systems, widely present in both Iraq and Syria, they were caught by surprise/bypassed.
As regards the attack on the Mossad base in Erbil, it should be added that (despite the fact that the Iraqi Kurdistan region is a largely autonomous enclave, and strongly linked to both the USA and Israel) it is clear that it also showed the penetration capacity of Tehran's intelligence.
The issue of the attack on Pakistani Baluchistan, in light of Islamabad's strong reaction, appears more complex, but here too - in addition to the failure to activate the anti-missile defenses - the particular nature of the Pakistani state must be taken into account, within which they certainly act powers (internal and external) that are also very different and conflicting. The armed forces and the secret services (ISI) are very well connected with the United States, since the times of the anti-Soviet guerrilla war in Afghanistan, but also quite permeated by Islamic fundamentalist influence, while the government (also with an anti- Indian, historically pro-Russian) is keen to maintain a privileged relationship with Washington. It is hardly worth remembering how, precisely on US mandate, the inconvenient president Imran Khan was liquidated... It is very probable, therefore, that some of the internal forces did not like the Iranian move, and imposed an appropriate reaction. Today's news is that Pakistan has carried out a series of targeted attacks against "terrorist hideouts" in Iran; mirroring Tehran, Islamabad has declared that it respects Iran's sovereignty, and its action is exclusively anti-terrorist. And even in this case, Iranian defenses were not activated…
Returning therefore to the initial question, whether or not we are faced with a failure of Iranian moderation, adding to the picture the claim of the attack on two Israeli ships in the Indian Ocean, but also the absence of direct moves against the USA, I believe we can say that we are faced with something else.
Iran has great prospects ahead of it, deriving not only from the close relations with Russia and China, both leaders of the drive towards multipolarism, but also from the great advantages that its strategic geographical position offers in the perspective of the Eurasian corridors. It therefore has no interest in arriving at a conflict with the United States, and much prefers to exert - as it is effectively doing - strong pressure aimed at expelling its military bases from the region, without leading to open conflict. But, at the same time, and precisely in the perspective mentioned above, it feels both the need to affirm its role as a leading regional power and that the internal and international conditions have developed for this to happen.
In this sense, the Iranian move goes read as a signal to the other regional powers - Saudi Arabia and Turkey first and foremost - as well as to the historic enemy Israel, to begin to grapple with the idea that Iran (more than forty years after the Khomeinist revolution), not only is not liquidatable nor marginalised, but it is a geopolitical subject with which they have to deal, and with which it is better to seek peaceful coexistence rather than chasing the dream of overthrowing the government. We'll see who and how will receive the message.
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