WHAT IS HAPPENING IN IRAN
This is not an easy period for the Islamic Republic; even though Syria has been more of a burden than an advantage for years now (being very dependent on Iranian aid), the fall of the Assad regime has certainly created problems, and the Israeli invasion of southern Syria constitutes a threat to Hezbollah (the closest ally in the region), just as – paradoxically – the (temporary) end of the conflicts in Lebanon and Gaza, with the consequent suspension of attacks on Israel by Iraq and Yemen, relaunches Tel Aviv's drive to strike Tehran.
But the real problematic elements of this phase are in fact found in Tehran, as well as in Washington.
Trump's re-election as president of the United States, in fact, opens a period of uncertainty, since – as always, one might say – the position of the new president is rather ambiguous. According to his statements, Trump reiterates the US’s absolute opposition to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons (a claim that has no basis in international law), even if he claims to prefer the negotiation route to the military one, to achieve this result. The problem is that Trump himself, during his first term, withdrew the United States from the JCPOA, the treaty with which Tehran committed not to develop military nuclear power. It follows that the intention of the new American administration is to wave the threat of a preventive attack, to obtain a new, even more stringent treaty. The intent is to reach a broader agreement, which includes limitations not only on the development of nuclear weapons, but also on the development and possession of hypersonic missile systems [1]. Which, however, is clearly unacceptable for Tehran.
Of course, Washington knows perfectly well that, at the moment, Iran does not have nuclear weapons, and does not intend to build them; just as Tel Aviv knows perfectly well too. But if for Israel it is important to prevent them from being carried out, since this would mean losing its nuclear deterrence, it is even more important to destroy Iranian military capacity tout court, because this constitutes the greatest threat to the Jewish state.
In turn, the states have no interest in unleashing a large-scale conflict in the Middle East, which in addition to putting their bases in the region at risk could inflame the world oil market [2], but they must seek a solution that allows them to avoid war while at the same time securing Israel, whose defense and survival is now totally dependent on US aid. It is therefore likely that Washington will try to act by tightening sanctions (economic leverage), rather than by endorsing an attack (military leverage) [3]. In this, they will not only have to keep the Israelis in check, but also obtain some result: either a new treaty, therefore, or an economic weakening of Iran that opens up the possibility of attempting new ‘colored revolutions’.
The problems, however, as was said, are also in Tehran. On the issue of nuclear weapons, in fact, a very strong debate is developing in the Islamic Republic, which is also the linchpin of a broader and deeper political dispute. On one side there is the authority of Khamenei, who at the time had issued a fatwa by virtue of which Iran must not develop nuclear weapons, and who however, more recently, has firmly denied any sense in opening negotiations with the USA, while on the other side there is the group linked to President Pezeshkian, who instead is very open to opening negotiations with the West. Almost immediately after Khamenei's statement, in fact, Foreign Minister Araqchi instead relaunched the negotiation hypothesis, subordinating it however to a preventive revocation of sanctions.
This is obviously a game of roles, in which, especially Pezeshkian and his, are trying to circumvent Khamenei's vetoes; from the point of view of the moderates who govern in Tehran, the fatwa that prohibits nuclear weapons is the card to play in negotiations with the West, in order to obtain the end of sanctions. The position of Khamenei, who is in fact the highest authority in the country, is that the experience of previous negotiations (JCPOA) demonstrates the uselessness of negotiating with Washington. Especially since Trump is once again in the White House, who unilaterally nullified the previous treaty. Government circles object that "the leader has prohibited negotiations with the Americans and the development of nuclear weapons, although these are the only ways in which the regime can survive. He is leading the country to collapse". Here too, of course, there is considerable forcing, functional to the ongoing political clash (which, of course, is not only on the nuclear issue, but has a much broader scope: the moderates are clearly aiming to reduce the power of the Supreme Leader, especially in view of the appointment of his successor). The underlying issue is that Pezeshkian believes a form of appeasement with the West is possible, which would allow the resumption of trade without calling into question the existence of the Islamic Republic, while Khamenei is instead very clear that for the West, it is precisely to overthrow it that is the objective.
Needless to say, this political confrontation at the highest levels of the Iranian state does nothing but weaken him. Unfortunately (strictly personal opinion), Pezeshkian is a politically weak and mediocre character, absolutely inadequate for the historical phase in which Iran (and, obviously, the entire Middle East) finds itself; and this regardless of his being a moderate. Unlike his predecessor Raisi, he does not have the leadership chops needed to lead a nation under siege for 40 years, and constantly threatened by military attack.
The issue of developing nuclear weapons, however, remains at the forefront. The powerful group headed by the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) continues to ask Khamenei to revoke the fatwa, and to give the go-ahead for development for military use. Khamenei's advisor, Kamal Kharrazi, said months ago that "if the Islamic Republic is facing an existential threat, we will have to review the military doctrine".
It is clear, however, that everything is playing on a razor's edge. If the fatwa were revoked, this would greatly strengthen Israel's ability to convince Trump of the need for a preemptive strike; it would therefore be a matter of calibrating the timeline very carefully, for example by developing the weapon and only then announcing the revocation of the fatwa and the first nuclear test, in such a way as to make it clear that an Israeli-American attack would have an immediate and adequate response. As Khamenei said, “If they threaten us, we will respond in kind. If they compromise our security, we will compromise their security.”
Notes
1 – According to the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, President Trump sent a direct message to Iran in recent days. In the message, President Trump offered to sign a new deal with Iran in exchange for the complete dismantling of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In accordance with the directives of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, the message was ignored and not even given the dignity of a response.
2 – Tehran has the military capacity to close one of the world’s busiest oil transit routes, IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri said. He also rejected US threats to cut off Iran’s oil exports, saying the country has already responded to hostile actions, including seizing US-linked oil tankers in response to Iranian ship seizures.
3 – Of course, there are those – even in the States – who would prefer military action against Tehran. Despite Iran’s strong denials, the assassination theory periodically resurfaces. Trump has been informed that Iran’s intentions to assassinate him are “much more serious” than previously thought. According to Axios, Iran has even equipped sleeper cells in the US with surface-to-air missiles to shoot down the president’s plane. Needless to say, if Iran wanted to kill him, in revenge for Soleimani, it would have had every opportunity to do so when he was not president, and it certainly would have no interest in doing so now, which would be tantamount to being heavily attacked without a doubt.