WHAT'S HAPPENING IN SYRIA?
The situation in the Middle Eastern country continues to remain unstable, and the fierce clashes of recent days - in the Alawite-majority region of Latakia - are only the most obvious manifestation of this.
Let's try to make an overall picture of the Syrian scenario. Starting from an examination of the various political-military actors.
The regime in Damascus
The new regime led by Al Jolani (former ISIS cutthroats, then Al Qaeda, then in the new suit and tie dress code) is trying to obtain the lifting of sanctions, previously imposed mainly by the Europeans, and to obtain funds from the Sunni Arab countries, Qatar and Saudi Arabia first and foremost. To some extent, it is also trying to distance itself a little from Turkish control.
Its problems, however, remain the lack of economic resources, a country devastated by years and years of civil war, the lack of control over the entire territory, and the lack of a real army. The various democratic-jihadist formations (more than 100) united under the umbrella of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, in fact, are mostly militias without heavy armament, and the systematic preventive destruction of most of the weapons systems (land, air and naval) of the old Syrian army, by the Israeli air force, prevents the development of adequate military capabilities. Furthermore, although formally the various militias have united in a new army, in fact they still answer to the different commanders of each faction, which gives the central government very little control over them. Since a significant part of these armed formations is made up of Islamist fanatics, often not even Syrians or even just Arabs (Dagestanis, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Uighurs), frictions with non-Sunni populations (Alawite-Shiites, Christians, Druze) are almost continuous, and often result in armed clashes. Aware of its weakness – first of all military, but also economic and therefore political – the government of Damascus is in fact unable to oppose the most significant forces that refuse to submit, in particular the Kurds (in the oil-rich north-east), who enjoy US support, and the Druze (in the south) who seem to rely on the Israelis. It therefore turns, with ferocious repression, against the Alawite minority, much weaker militarily, and who is reproached for having been the reference group of the Assad regime. In fact, the main objective of the regime is to survive, despite its numerous weaknesses, at least until it is able to stabilize the situation.
Turkey
Of course, the main external actor is the powerful neighbor. Turkey has been the nurturer of anti-Assad groups for many years, welcoming them on its territory and supporting their action. Since the old regime fell, replaced by this ragtag army of its protégés, Ankara’s clear goal is to incorporate Syria into a large sphere of influence, which to some extent mirrors that of the old Ottoman Empire. For this, the Turks must stabilize the country, and keep it united – which, in turn, requires resolving the Kurdish question.
In this regard, Erdogan has clearly brought out the Öcalan card again. The former leader of the PKK, the Kurdish guerrilla party within Turkey (but in fact also the Syrian ones) has launched an appeal for the disarmament of the fighting formations, which at the moment seems to have found full support in the Turkish PKK, while the Syrian formations have taken a more nuanced position, open to the hypothesis but cautious in its application. Here too, the Turkish message is that of the various brotherly peoples within the Ottoman world. Peacemaking with the Syrian Kurds is obviously crucial, both because they are the strongest political-military formation within the territory, and because they control the oil area (and the related smuggling through Iraqi Kurdistan), and because they enjoy – still – US military support. Ankara is therefore exerting a double pressure on the SDF forces (the umbrella organization of the Kurds and their local allies): on the one hand, through the militias controlled by the Syrian National Army, which keep the areas under Kurdish control under military pressure, and on the other with the proposal of disarmament-integration into the Syrian political context. If this is, at least for the moment, the main Turkish problem inside Syria, the second is – as mentioned – preventing the balkanization of the country. This implies not only the resolution of the Kurdish question, but preventing new ones from arising – the Druze in the south, with the support of Israel, but also, potentially, the Alawites in the west.
The Kurds
For the Syrian Kurdish organizations, the international political framework – after the fall of Assad – is not the most favorable. The United States no longer has a particular active interest in maintaining a presence in Syria (and probably, in the context of the drastic reduction in military spending decided by the Trump administration, the Syrian bases will be among the first to be dismantled). The risk is therefore that of soon finding themselves completely exposed, without US support. Therefore, seeking a compromise solution, which allows them to preserve as much as possible of the autonomy that has been de facto achieved, seems an inevitable horizon. In this sense, Öcalan's proposal could be a good opportunity to open a negotiation, also considering the fact that – unlike the PKK in Turkey – they have a position of greater strength here (both militarily and, due to oil, economically). However, reaching an agreement will not be easy or quick, and the fragility of the new Syrian regime is certainly not helpful in this regard. Moreover, the very ease with which the jihadist militias of the HTS indulge in pogroms (for now against the Alawites) should not be very reassuring, in the perspective of a disarmament of the SDF. Moreover, the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade (also known as al-Amshat), a faction of the SNA supported by Turkey, which has long fought against the Kurds, is now busy massacring the Alawites…
Israel
Although he had no role in the fall of Assad, Netanyahu tends to attribute it to a decisive role of Israel, in the context of a vaunted redrawing of the Middle East, which occurred precisely by virtue of his decisive action. This is not the place to observe that, if such a redrawing has occurred, it certainly contemplates a significant downsizing of Israeli power as a regional power. But certainly the end of the old Syrian regime has created an opportunity, which Tel Aviv has quickly (and voraciously) pounced on. Taking advantage of the chaos following the transfer of power (and clearly also on the basis of tacit green light), the Israeli air force first dedicated itself to the systematic destruction of the vehicles and infrastructure of the old Syrian army, and then proceeded to the occupation of a slice of territory, almost to the gates of Damascus.
Although Israeli rhetoric paints the occupation as a defense measure against the radical Islamists in power, in reality they have never – in decades of terrorist activity in much of the world – hit Israel or its interests. And, specifically, Tel Aviv actually maintains good relations (although discreet) with Al Julani. The occupation of Syria, therefore, actually responds to two needs: a tactical one, almost exclusively political, and a strategic one. The first is to give a positive response to the growing Israeli crisis. Netanyahu's leadership has dragged Israel into a regional conflict (Gaza, West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen, Iran) that has not only failed to produce any useful military results, but has isolated the country internationally, and above all has revealed its absolute dependence on US support for defense, perhaps never so total, with all the consequences – including political – of the case. He therefore needs victories that he can sell to the public opinion of his country in the media. The second, obviously, responds in part to the expansionist vocation of the Zionist right, and above all to the need to weaken the Arab-Muslim front in every possible way, in the awareness that sooner or later the moment of final reckoning will come, and that this is the only way to postpone it.
Specifically, the idea of militarily occupying some strategic positions (starting from Mount Hermon) allows for operational control over both Damascus and southern Lebanon, while the plan to build a sort of protectorate, through the creation of a Druze state in southern Syria, would allow both the creation of a buffer between Syria and Israel, and the balkanization of the Syrian state.
The USA
The US presence in Syria, initially justified to fight the jihadists of ISIS and Al Qaeda (i.e. two creations of the CIA…), after they were defeated by the Iranians, the Russians and Hezbollah, continued – illegally – maintaining two areas under control: one in the south, near the crossroads between the Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi borders, and one in the north-east, in the oil region controlled by the Kurds. The US military presence is essential both for the defense of the Kurdish Rojava and for the control (and smuggling) of Syrian oil.
In the current context, however, the United States seems oriented towards a certain disengagement from Syria. First of all because, in the framework of the planned reduction of the Pentagon budget (of about 30% in four years) a significant part will be covered by the reduction of bases abroad. Furthermore, the Middle East is no longer as central to Washington as it was in the past. As for the Syrian theater in particular, it is clear that the end of the Assad regime first, and the predominant Turkish role (still a NATO ally), make a direct military presence much less necessary. The Israeli presence in the south, finally, ensures an indirect one, making Kurdish proxies superfluous. Therefore it is presumable that we are moving towards a significant reduction in US involvement.
Russia
Moscow’s main interest has always been to maintain the two bases in the coastal region, the naval one in Tartus, which ensures a foothold for its presence in the Mediterranean, and the air one in Latakia, an important stopover for supplying forces in Africa. And in fact, when Assad fell (who was given refuge in Russia), Kremlin diplomacy immediately began relations with the new regime, with the prospect of maintaining its presence in the western region, renegotiating the terms. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that Israel is pressuring Washington to ensure that the Russian presence in Syria is maintained. Although Russia is (moderately) pro-Palestinian, and strategically linked to Iran, Tel Aviv knows well that it is also a friend of Israel, and sees its presence in Syria as a rebalancing of forces with respect to the Turkish one – which is instead seen as potentially hostile. It should not be forgotten that for years the Israeli air force has struck Syrian territory at will, not only despite the presence of the Russian air force and anti-aircraft defense, but with the Russian approval, which has always given it the green light.
Russian interest, therefore, is mainly linked to its military bases, and therefore also to the defense of Syrian territorial integrity, regardless of who governs in Damascus.
Iran
For Tehran, Syria has in the past been an important link in the Iranian regional project, which however has cost heavily, both in human losses to defend its regime, and then in economic terms to keep it standing. The final outcome, despite all possible justifications, clearly represented not only a political defeat, but also a considerable disappointment. But, at the same time, the relief from a burden that is not insignificant. Moreover, Assad has always refused to allow Syria to play an active role in the Axis of Resistance, limiting himself instead to allowing Syrian territory to serve as a transit point to Lebanon.
Iran is now practically absent from Syria, and is the country towards which the hatred of the jihadist militias is most directed. Its main interest, obviously, is to maintain its integrity, especially because Israel has the opposite interest. In general, apart from the excellent relationship with the Russians, Iranian relations with other subjects present in Syria are generally hostile, or at least distrustful. This is true for the Al Julani regime, and obviously for the Israelis and Americans, but even with the Turks and the Kurds there is definitely no good feeling.
Hezbollah
The army of the Party of God played a fundamental role in the defeat of the Syrian rebellion and the jihadist militias, which has made it a sworn enemy of the latter, on a par with Iran – obviously also for religious reasons. For Hezbollah, Syria has long been a hinterland where it could operate freely, and having to abandon it was a problem. However, as was seen during the conflict with Israel, it has not affected its fighting capacity. Today it is no longer present on Syrian soil, and at the moment it is certainly absorbed by internal problems (the new Lebanese government, Western pressure, reconstruction, the restoration of the political-military structure damaged by the conflict, the expulsion of the Israelis from the last pieces of Lebanese territory...), and therefore little interested in new involvement in the neighboring country. Undoubtedly, however, the long years of permanence have also served to weave a series of ties, apart from those of the cross-border Shiite clans, which make Hezbollah the entity that probably has the greatest possibilities, in the future, to reactivate forms of resistance to the pro-Western jihadist regime.
The situation
At present, therefore, we have an intrinsically weak regime, which is currently supported by a fragile balance of power, which in turn essentially hinges on Turkey and its ambition to extend its influence as far as Damascus. The time since the fall of Assad is still too short for significant endogenous opposition phenomena to manifest themselves, but undoubtedly all the conditions exist. At the moment, therefore, the most urgent problems are the Kurdish question, and the Israeli occupation. As far as the Kurds are concerned, obviously the main points are the dissolution and/or integration into the army of the SDF fighting formations, and the return of central control over Syrian oil. In this, obviously, the main role will be played by the Turks, who have every interest in definitively resolving the issue, in pacifying Syria and maintaining its territorial unity.
It follows that, on the other hand, the Israelis will have every interest in ensuring that this does not happen. If the Kurds and Turks find a formula capable of leading to an effective and lasting solution, the possibility opens up for a strong increase in tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv, potentially to the point of (direct or indirect) military confrontation.
As for the more strictly internal situation, the points of friction are fundamentally confessional, and concern the Alawite coastal region, up to Homs, and to a lesser extent nationalist, relating to the region occupied by Israel.
In the first case, we are still in a clearly embryonic phase, and it is difficult to understand how much and how it can develop. The clashes are mainly linked to the violent repressive activity of the jihadist militias, who consider the Alawites apostates, and moreover as Assad's loyalists. At the moment, these can hardly go beyond a relative capacity for self-defense of the communities, and it is not even clear whether or not there is an intention to go beyond that. Which, to be effectively implemented, requires a safe rear area, which can only be offered by Lebanon; but which, for the reasons seen previously, is not necessarily practicable now. In this, much will depend on the Syrian government's ability to exercise control not only over the territory, but above all over its own militias. And since the government is largely in the hands of Turkey, much depends on how it intends to address the problem. Avoiding the rise of Alawite separatism should be in Ankara's interest, so presumably it will try to pacify the region, one way or another.
There have been signs of resistance to the Israeli occupation, but for the moment they are very feeble. Much will also depend on how the various Druze clans position themselves, not all of whom are firmly aligned with Israel. And obviously, as was said, on the developments in Turkish-Israeli relations.
Fundamentally, we are still fully in a transitional phase, in which nothing is really defined. Al Julani himself - in my opinion - is a transit figure, who will hardly be able to manage the next phase. At present, however, it is essentially the Turks and Israelis who are calling the shots, while the Americans, Russians and Iranians remain on the sidelines of the game. But how this will develop in the future will depend greatly on the overall picture of the Middle East, which is currently extremely fluid. Even when and how the conflict in Ukraine ends will influence the Middle Eastern context, especially with regard to the shift in the center of gravity of US interests. It is reasonable to assume that, in a relatively short period of time, Russia on the one hand, and especially Iran (and Hezbollah) on the other, will return to exercise their influence in Syria as well.
