WAR AT THE DOORSTEP

An easy mistake to make, if one thinks about the current world situation, is to overestimate the importance of the choices that can be made by the various leaderships; or rather, one does not take sufficient account of how the accumulation of previous choices (and their consequences) ends up increasingly limiting the spectrum of possible options, and therefore – in fact – shifts the decision-making center of gravity from the will of the political elites to the objective interlocking of the elements in the field.

If we take for example the Ukrainian conflict, which is now approaching its third year, we should – with greater rationality – recognize that the chances of a non-military solution are now decidedly slim, and obviously tend to reduce very quickly. And this, in fact, no longer depends so much on the lack of will to reach a diplomatic settlement, but on the fact that the margins for a possible solution of this kind are effectively minimal.

There are, of course, opposing interests that are not easy to reconcile, or between which it is not easy even to find a mediation, whether we are referring to the Ukrainian interest in maintaining/recovering its territorial integrity, or whether we are referring to the US interest in destabilizing Russia – and of course, to the opposing Russian interests.

It has been said many times that war has its own logic, which leads things towards outcomes that are often very different from those desired, and above all unexpected. And this is also true, of course, in terms of political consequences. It is now clear that the calculations with which the two main players in the game – the United States and Russia – entered the conflict, not only turned out to be (to varying degrees) wrong, but precisely by virtue of their wrongness they determined a change in strategic objectives.

If the American-led West triggered the conflict in the belief that it could use it as a crowbar, and through it achieve a destabilization of Russia that in turn would lead to an overthrow of its political leadership, after more than two and a half years of war this objective barely holds up only in the most obtuse propaganda. In its place, more realistically, a hypothetical compromise solution emerges, which allows – at the very least – not to further compromise the credibility (and unity) of NATO.

In turn, if Moscow entered the conflict with the idea of ​​being able to quickly reach, under military pressure, a compromise solution, during the war it has matured the conviction that the West, as a whole, is totally unreliable, and therefore any solution must derive not from some agreement, but from an actual situation, to which the agreement, if anything, places a formal seal.

As things stand, the possibility (which has been hypothetically advanced for some time) of a negotiated solution to the conflict seems to be gaining ground in the West, based on the exchange of territories (which Russia already controls) and the entry of what would remain of Ukraine into the Atlantic Alliance. This solution, if it were feasible, would allow NATO to present it as a (half) victory, and in any case it would be considered temporary, that is, a sort of colossal Minsk III: an agreement to buy time, get Ukraine back on its feet and, if necessary, relaunch it against Moscow in an irredentist war. It is quite clear that we are still in the realm of fairy tales, but Western leaders seem stubbornly convinced that Russia is available for a compromise solution, since the wear and tear resulting from the war would be greater than it appears.

But if such a hypothesis could perhaps still be practicable in 2022, it certainly is no longer so today. First of all, one cannot ignore the fact that Moscow has resolved to take such a demanding step to avoid what it considered an existential threat, namely NATO's landing in Ukraine. To think that less than three years later it is instead willing to accept it is frankly incomprehensible. It is also useless to underline that these years of war have nevertheless had a cost for Russia, albeit infinitely less than that paid by Ukraine, and certainly less than that of Europe, and it would be unacceptable to have paid for nothing. The annexation of the territories of Novorussia, in fact, has never been the real objective (so much so that all attempts at compromise, up until the failed Istanbul agreements, envisaged the autonomy of Donbass, not entry into the Russian Federation).

Annexation which, on the one hand, provides a demographic breath of fresh air to a country suffering from a population shortage, on the other hand entails reconstruction costs that can only be partially offset, and in the medium-long term, by the mineral and industrial wealth of the region. Furthermore, Washington would offer a de facto, but not de jure, recognition of something that is already in place.

From the Russian point of view, what has become increasingly evident during the war is that the Western objective of destroying Russia has not disappeared at all, but rather can be temporarily suspended for tactical reasons, and – what is in some ways even more important – that Western leaderships are totally unreliable, capable of any duplicity and any lie.

It follows that, for these reasons alone, Moscow would never accept a negotiation on such a basis.

But, in fact, there are other reasons, much more compelling, and for both contenders, that make not this hypothesis of mediation impossible, but any other.

The United States, and its European vassals, have invested too much in this conflict (economically, militarily and politically), to accept being defeated; especially at a time when the perception of their weakness could have disastrous consequences. A domino effect in reverse, in which a generalized crisis of mistrust on the part of friendly countries, and an encouragement to distance themselves on the part of neutral countries, would risk compromising not only the imperial reputation, but also the actual possibilities of facing the next challenges in the pipeline - one above all, that with China.

In particular, it would put at risk of fraying both NATO and AUKUS, and more generally the entire network on which the power of the empire is based.

Inevitably, in fact, this would result in a further acceleration of the process of de-dollarization of the global economy, but also of the destructuring of US military power in the world: some countries that host US bases, in fact, would stop perceiving them as a guarantee of protection - or as a price to pay ... - and would push to dismantle them. Which is already happening. Furthermore, by a principle of communicating vessels, the strategic weakening resulting from a defeat in Ukraine would be equivalent to a strategic strengthening of Russia, whose authority and credibility - already significantly growing today - would have a notable boost. And this growth, in turn, would also be reflected in other countries that are enemies of the United States - Iran and China first and foremost; and this would further weaken the American capacity for control over the Middle East, for example. A Russian victory, finally, would make Moscow the first de facto military power, strengthening its position in particular within the strategic alliance with Beijing, with the latter taking on the role of economic power, while Russia would take on the role of sword of the Eurasian bloc.

Any solution that cannot be spent as a victory, or even just as a draw, would therefore be unacceptable for Washington, since it would undermine a crucial imperial credibility, at a stage in which it is already wavering, and in which America intends to face challenges of enormous magnitude, comparable – in terms of strategic geopolitical impact – to the Second World War.

The hypothesis of disengaging from the Ukrainian conflict is therefore not only extremely difficult (even in its Trumpian version, which is perhaps even more imaginative…), but also not entirely assumed as an authentic strategic perspective. In fact, the United States is still in surplace, undecided between continuing ad ibitum and abandoning Kiev before it is too late. With, in pole position, the middle hypothesis of passing the buck to the European vassals.

In turn, Russia has excellent reasons for not negotiating any agreement. First and foremost – and obviously – for the simplest: it is winning on the field. Because the idea of ​​Russian victory is not measured in terms of square kilometers conquered (or liberated), but in terms of destruction of Ukraine's military and industrial potential. Only this, in fact, could provide sufficient guarantees that the threat will not recur in a few years. Victory manu militari, which is not that far away, will allow Moscow to obtain a capitulation, and therefore to impose the conditions of surrender [1]. Not to discuss them with Washington. As a corollary, the continuation of the war also allows the wearing down of NATO's war potential, and this in turn is a strategic objective.

In terms of the medium-long term, in fact, the Russian leadership believes that open and direct conflict with NATO is inevitable. This belief – or rather, let's say better: this awareness – leads to two fundamental conclusions. The first, made even more evident recently (even if it is not clear whether and to what extent it has been received and understood) consists in the change of the Russian nuclear doctrine [2]. Which is not, as it tends to be represented, a sort of response to the threat of having the Ukrainian forces struck in depth, using NATO weapons (and related logistics...), but which obviously has a much greater scope. Moscow, in fact, while aware of having some indisputable advantages over the Atlantic Alliance (in the nuclear field, in the missile field, in industrial capacity, in electronic warfare, and obviously in combat experience), knows well that NATO in turn has some not indifferent assets: the air force, considerable strategic depth (Europe - Atlantic - United States), and above all an overwhelming capacity for mobilization.

To face an adversary of this kind, it becomes absolutely necessary for Moscow to be able to rebalance the scales, both in terms of deterrence, and even more so in terms of effective operational capacity. Since a clash of this magnitude would be indisputably existential, for the Russian Federation, the possibility of resorting to nuclear weapons – tactical or strategic, it matters little, the difference being in fact merely symbolic – necessarily becomes part of the military doctrine, and it becomes so in the terms recently exposed, which foresee their use even against countries that do not themselves possess nuclear weapons (almost all Europeans) if allied with a country that possesses them (…), and even in the absence of an actual threat from these to use them first.

The second conclusion is that the issue must be resolved within a certain period of time. Before NATO overcomes the current crisis (the alliance's armed forces are largely substandard, and the industrial production of support is still far from the levels necessary for a clash of this type). And as long as the Russian mobilization capacity remains at a sufficient level. The Russian population, in fact, like the European one, is currently in demographic decline, and this curve will at a certain point come to affect – in terms deemed significant – the operational capabilities. The times of the Second World War are far away, when the USSR (which was larger than Russia alone) could afford to lose over 22 million people and still win the war.

In the face of barely 150 million inhabitants, today Russia has in fact faced a European population of over 740 million, and an American one of over 330 million [3].

Moreover, the Europeans are sending extremely bellicose signals to Moscow, now even superior to those sent by Washington. There are now many European political and military figures who are indicating a deadline for the conflict, even very close (perhaps a little too close). The German Minister of Defense Boris Pistorius, for example, on the basis of what has already been declared by the Bundeswehr General Staff, believes that it is necessary to "be ready for war by 2029" [4], while the Chief of Staff of the British Army, Sir Raleigh Walker, has warned that the combination of threats could lead to a clash with the 'shock axis' (Russia, China, Iran and the DPRK) by 2027-28 [5]. Not to mention the fact that European countries are investing heavily both in a renewed large-scale industrial production of munitions and in a series of adaptations of logistical infrastructures to military needs. There is even a NATO plan (Oplan Deu) that provides for the deployment of 800,000 men and 200,000 vehicles and heavy equipment on the eastern front [6]; and which among other things urges for this purpose the start of programs to increase the production of tanks, the increase of ammunition stocks (currently they are planned for 2 days, but according to the NATO standard they should be 30) and the construction of prison camps!

In light of these elements, a reasonable time frame within which Russia must face the conflict and resolve it is predictably quite short: between five and seven years maximum. Which, moreover, almost coincides with Putin's presidential mandate.

To think that the Russian leadership will not go that far is pure naivety. And unfortunately, even if Western propaganda continues to paint the Russian leader as the ogre who wants to conquer the whole of Europe, in reality what they think in the chancelleries is that he will never dare to do so, and that in any case he would not have the strength [7]. That is, they continue to make the same mistakes they made up until the eve of February 24, 2022: overestimating themselves and underestimating the enemy. When instead not only does the Military Special Operation constitute proof that, when cornered, Russia acts, but Putin himself has clearly said that when you have the conviction that the clash is inevitable, then you have to strike first.

For this reason, therefore, Moscow could not accept anything less than victory on the field, in Ukraine. Because this is preparatory to the final clash with NATO, and it is in any case more advantageous to prolong the war - slowing down the recovery of the Atlantic Alliance - than a truce to catch your breath could be. Something that, moreover, he does not cease to repeat very clearly, but that Western leaders continue not to take into consideration, completely sucked in as they are by their own collective ego, by their own arrogance - and by the conviction of their own (now only supposed) superiority.

From a strategic point of view, these are the terms of the question. We are heading towards armed conflict with Russia, because we cannot abandon the Western drive to destroy it.

Whatever the tactical moves, diplomatic balancing acts, duplicities, circus tricks and so on, if this threat is not removed quickly and in an absolutely credible way, war will be inevitable.

As things stand, both in terms of international balances and time, perhaps the only possibility to avoid the conflagration is a significant desertion of European countries. Not necessarily by leaving NATO, which in this time frame seems unlikely if not impossible, but certainly by taking a clear, factual stance against the hypothesis of war. And factual means first of all renouncing the rearmament programs and military restructuring of European infrastructures, not mere peaceful declarations. And perhaps, for starters, with a significant reduction in military aid to Ukraine. It would probably be enough for this defection to occur in some of the more important countries – Germany and France, for example – which would have its weight on Poland’s possible adventurist impulses. However, the time available is short, and it is not certain that it will be enough.

Notes

1 – In a recent interview with Newsweek, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov reiterated Russia’s conditions for a peace deal (and opposition to any ceasefire): “full AFU withdrawal from the DPR [Donetsk People’s Republic], LPR [Luhansk People’s Republic], Zaporozhye, and Kherson oblasts; recognition of territorial realities as enshrined in the Russian Constitution; neutral, non-bloc, and non-nuclear status for Ukraine; its demilitarization and denazification; guaranteeing the rights, freedoms, and interests of Russian-speaking citizens; and lifting all sanctions against Russia.” A complete capitulation, indeed. See “Exclusive: Russia’s Lavrov Warns of ‘Dangerous Consequences’ for US in Ukraine,” Newsweek

2 – Lavrov, quoting Putin: “We will make appropriate decisions based on our understanding of the threats posed by the West. It is up to you to draw conclusions.” In ibidem

3 – It is also true that, currently, the European NATO countries have problems with the recruitment of new troops, and could encounter difficulties in mobilizing in the event of a conflict with Russia. At the moment, the forces are estimated to amount to 1.9 million men, a contingent that should be sufficient to counter the Russian armed forces, even if, in reality, the Europeans would have difficulty attracting the 300,000 additional soldiers foreseen in the new defense plans. But, obviously, these problems would only arise in the event of a (relatively) limited conflict; in the event of general mobilization, through conscription, the demographic gap would make its full weight felt. On the subject, cgr. “Europe boldly redefines security for a new age of threats”, Financial Times

4 – See “Regierung gibt neuen Plan für den Kriegsfall raus”, Bild

5 – See “UK must be ready for war in three years, head of British Army warns”, Deborah Haynes, Sky News

6 – See “So bereitet sich Deutschland auf Krieg vor”, Nikolaus Harbusch, Bild

7 – According to the Swedish Defense Minister, Pal Jonson, “The Kremlin and Putin himself realize that they will lose a military conflict with NATO.” See “Pål Jonson über Wehrpflicht und eine starke NATO”, Bild