Stop Strangeloves

As has been said several times on these pages, a serious problem for the collective West, and in particular for that part of it that gathers in the shadow of NATO, is that sort of autism that distinguishes it - where this term is intended to allude to the barrier of incommunicability that is constantly erected between the (diplomatic and strategic) thinking of the leadership and the actual reality. And there is one aspect in particular that is significantly problematic, and which is independent of any evaluation of merit, and that is the inability to understand the reasons of the enemy. Unfortunately, the action of propaganda, which from the beginning has focused on the dehumanization of the enemy, has created a sort of boomerang effect, whereby the Western political elites themselves have become victims, losing sight of a fundamental aspect.

This is even a classic mental mechanism, in its predictability: since one must deny in nuce that the enemy may have reasons, one ends up misrecognizing them, and consequently not understanding the how and why of his present and future actions.
Specifically, refusing to consider the Russian approach to the conflict that pits it against the West translates into the inability to correctly evaluate and predict what the next moves could be. It is no coincidence, in fact, that these assessments constantly oscillate between opposite extremes, which see Russia now as a barbaric horde eager to attack us, now as a country on the brink of collapse.
Reality, however, tells us that Moscow's choices respond to a very clear and precise logic, which in turn can be clearly traced back to what the Russians consider to be their own strategic interests.

In particular, the entire history of the Ukrainian conflict, starting from 2014, tells us some extremely significant and obvious things. Over these years, Moscow has been very reluctant to venture into a conflict that it imagined to be much more challenging - especially from a geopolitical point of view - than those previously experienced against the Islamist insurrection in Chechnya and with Georgia. But, at the same time, when you felt that the perceived threat level was about to exceed a dangerous threshold, you did not hesitate to intervene militarily.
And this tells us two very important things. First of all, that the fundamental question is not what NATO thinks and/or wants, but how its moves are perceived in Moscow. And the second is that when perception exceeds an alarm threshold, Moscow is ready to attack first.

Now, if we consider from this perspective all the bellicose agitation that is going through Europe, and which is not only made up of chatter but also of concrete facts, we must realize that - from the Russian point of view - it is not possible to avoid taking it seriously. And that, consequently, it is highly probable that if this aggressive mood does not subside, if on the contrary it is increasingly translated into targeted actions, a point will be reached in which the perception of the threat will be such as to suggest that the clash is inevitable. And therefore, logically, Russia will be led to strike before NATO's capabilities reach a critical threshold, enough to worry it. In short, if Moscow were to convince itself that European countries are really preparing for a war, it will not wait until they are actually ready for it, and will attack.

At this point, it is also necessary to underline the importance of perception in the Western field, and particularly in the European one. Since the end of the Second World War, the West has been involved in numerous wars, practically all of them - with the exception of Korea - absolutely asymmetrical, conducted by projecting its armed forces thousands of kilometers away, and above all always being the attacking subject . The launch of the Russian Military Special Operation in February 2022 therefore produced a shock, because for the first time in almost eighty years an exactly reversed situation occurred: the war returns to Europe, it is a symmetrical war, and we are not the ones attacking but we are attacked. This, I repeat, is in Western European perception. To that first shock was then added another, when the European leaders realized that the United States, after having triggered and fueled the conflict, are about to get out of it, shifting the burden onto the allies of the old continent. And what's more, they certainly wouldn't spend too much to defend them, in case the conflict spreads. At that point, what I call the Hannibal syndrome [1] kicked in, throwing them into panic and plunging them into a mad arms race [2].

The possibility of a major conventional war on European territory, therefore, is neither a science fiction nor remote hypothesis, and yet it is probable that many actors on stage do not really want it. We are in fact on an inclined plane, which in turn becomes increasingly inclined the further we go. And it is precisely the unawareness with which the European elites act that is the greatest reason for concern today.
Given therefore that, regardless of the actual intentions and full awareness, the scenario that is unfolding at least concretely contemplates this possibility, it can be a useful exercise to try to think about how this conflict would develop, on what are the problems that the NATO, and therefore what outcomes are foreseeable.

From the NATO-EU point of view, the problems to be faced, in the perspective of a conflict with Russia, are numerous, of various nature, and some are simply insurmountable.
To begin with, however much coordination efforts may be made, we are talking about 27/32 different countries, with different armed forces, different strategic interests, different political, economic and industrial strength. This fragmentation is not something that can be resolved in the short term, much less imperious, and in the absence of strong leadership (the one that Macron would like to obtain for France, but which neither he nor his country are able to exercise) every An attempt at homogenization can only go through a process of mediation - which is slow and unstable by nature.

The transition to a war economy, beyond the easy enthusiasm with which European leaders fill their mouths about it, is something extremely complex, which requires a long time and considerable investments. Furthermore, developing an industrial system capable of supporting the war needs of a symmetrical and very high consumption conflict requires both a large amount of energy availability and an infrastructural adaptation (communication networks and transport systems, first and foremost). All things that European countries have little access to. And to which it is not easy, nor quick, to find a solution.
Another fundamental aspect, which is too often forgotten, is that war has a lot to do with geography.

Russia, unlike Europe - and it has demonstrated this several times in history - possesses something extremely relevant, strategic depth. That is, it can retreat, cede territory to the advancing enemy, without ever risking finding itself without further space towards which to retreat, at the same time consuming the opposing forces and constantly lengthening its logistical and supply lines. Otherwise, for Europeans any retreat from the front means the probable collapse of one or more countries.
Furthermore, Europe actually has only one large natural barrier to the east, namely the Carpathian chain, which however protects western Romania and Hungary, but which can be circumvented both to the north (along the Lviv-Warsaw- Berlin), and to the south (along the Chisinau-Bucharest-Sofia axis).

But obviously the biggest problems are those relating to the military instrument.
European armies are small, poorly armed, practically devoid of combat experience. This is the consequence of a double stratification, determined starting from the end of the Cold War, that is, on the one hand the orientation towards short, asymmetrical, or long but counter-guerrilla wars, and always projected thousands of kilometers away, and on the other the delegation to the U.S. military regarding ultimate and next-level protection.
The support to Kiev during the last two years has also revealed further problems, structurally present in European armies. First of all, the shortage of ammunition, which the Ukrainian conflict has shown to be a central factor - and which obviously has directly to do not only with stocks, but with industrial production. And secondarily, but not so much, that Western weapon systems - especially in the MBT and armored tanks sector - are largely overrated, and when tested by fire they reveal themselves to be heavy, delicate and of little effectiveness in combat.

The fact that Western armies have focused heavily on a (presumed) technological superiority has shown all the limits of such an approach, since most of the weapon systems used are extremely expensive, produced in limited quantities and with medium lead times. -long, rapidly subject to wear and requiring continuous specialized maintenance. And what's more, not even capable of ensuring a decisive advantage on the field.
Furthermore, the sophistication of armaments reflects negatively on another of the problematic aspects that European armed forces have to deal with. The need to field a higher number of military personnel, in fact, is not only a problem of modifying recruitment systems, but also and above all of training. The use of technologically sophisticated tools presupposes not only a longer time to learn their use, but also a sufficient quantity of competent instructors and places for training. Which, obviously, is not simply a question - for example - of driving a chariot, or of using a gun.

The most complex part is combat management, therefore the ability to use weapon systems in a condition of multilevel coordination, between different units and with different roles, etc. All things extremely difficult to simulate, and to which even periodic NATO maneuvers can only respond to a limited extent; both because they are obviously essentially parades, which take place in a context completely devoid of the elements of unpredictability and real danger that every battle brings with it, and because they still concern a limited number of personnel.
Therefore, an increase in European military personnel, in the short to medium term, would not have a significant impact on combat capabilities. Obviously without considering the psychological factor, which in a high intensity attrition war reaches considerable levels of stress, especially for conscripts who are culturally unprepared for the prospect of war.

According to some estimates, to face Russia, NATO should deploy at least 300,000 men on the eastern borders. Of these, at least a third are assumed to be American soldiers - but this will greatly depend on the outcome of the next US presidential election, and what follows from it. In any case, it is a very long front, which goes from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, although presumably the bulk of it would be concentrated in Poland. Virtually none of these men would have combat experience in a fire-intensive, symmetrical war; only a few tens of thousands could boast combat experience against guerrilla bands.
Against them, Russia would presumably deploy no less than 2 million men, of which practically half were trained on the Ukrainian field.

Furthermore, the disparity in combat capabilities (as the Ukrainian conflict clearly demonstrates) is immediately reflected in the quantity of losses and the difficulty of replacing them. European armies would soon find themselves fielding mainly cannon fodder.
Furthermore, NATO armies are structured according to fast and highly mobile conflicts, while it is reasonable to think that this possible conflict would have the same characteristics as the one being fought in Ukraine, only on a much larger scale. And this, inevitably, would increase the difficulties for forces structured on a model radically different from the one they will have to face.

The NATO armed forces probably only have an advantage when it comes to aviation, being able to have a higher number of aircraft, especially fourth and fifth generation ones. Obviously the point is whether or not this superiority is sufficient to ensure, if not exactly dominance of the air, at least an effective attack capability. The Russian armed forces certainly have excellent anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems, but it is likely that these would not make the difference, but rather the sector in which Russian dominance is quite clear, namely missiles and bombs. planing.
In fact, NATO aviation, much more than overcoming Russian defenses, should be concerned with being able to take off. Since Western superiority is well known, it is reasonable to think that the Russians would first launch a barrage of hypersonic missiles on the main NATO air bases, which would reach the target in just a few minutes [3].

The missile sector is certainly one of those on which Moscow could most easily leverage, to ensure a strategic advantage. In addition to being usable to cripple Western aviation, in fact, it could also be used to precisely strike other targets - communication routes, factories and weapons depots, command centers..
Furthermore, Russia can now boast solid experience in the use of drones of all types, both for observation and attack, as well as in the development of contrast systems for this type of weapon system - from electronic jamming to anti-drone -drone, to the recently established small mobile units for interception and killing.

Based on assessments by various military experts, the NATO armed forces would presumably (and based exclusively on fire capacity) have a possibility of resistance of approximately two/three months. It is reasonable to think instead of a longer period, say at least six months, before being able to stabilize the source. But, obviously, at that point the battle line would be well within the European countries, with all that this entails both on a military, moral and psychological level. In all likelihood, the Baltic countries would be occupied, as would Moldova, parts of Romania and Poland – including Warsaw. The level of devastation in the rear would be impressive, and the survival of the populations would be very much at risk.

Although a European conflict ending with a new defeat for NATO would sound like a red alarm bell, for the United States, it is still very unlikely that they will decide to take the field themselves. Unlike the previous two world wars, in fact, first of all the enemy now has a powerful nuclear arsenal, with which it could easily cause terrible damage to the USA itself, and secondly in this case it would no longer be a war aimed at imperial expansion, but of a piece of the broader conflict that Washington finds itself fighting to defend it.
As already said in the past, America without Europe is just a big island, but in the geostrategic context we are thinking about it is also an expendable pawn.

For the same reasons, it is practically impossible for France or Great Britain (the only European NATO countries to possess them) to use nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. In that case, in fact, it would not even be a question of Mutual Assured Destruction, but of the total destruction of Europe.
A conventional conflict of this scale, however, would represent a serious threat to a series of absolutely strategic bases for the United States, whose relevance goes far beyond the European theater. In particular, that of Ramstein in Germany, and those of Sigonella and Niscemi (MUOS). It is reasonable to think, therefore, from the moment a Ukrainian-type situation looms (significant territorial losses, difficulties in resistance, fragility of the internal political balance...) that Washington would maneuver to freeze the situation before it seriously puts the most important issues at risk. important members of its global military network.

Obviously, even regardless of the human and material losses, the serious risk of a possible conflict of this kind would be not only the humiliation of Europe, but its fall into an even more accentuated condition of dependence-subjection. It would mean destroying for decades any possibility of recovery, moral and political first and foremost, but not only.
For this reason, it is important to fully understand how a third major war on European soil would have terrible consequences for generations, and it is therefore necessary to do everything possible to avoid it. Stop the Strangeloves playing with fire, before the game gets out of hand and it's not too late.

Notes

1 – During the Second Punic War, Hannibal's Carthaginian armies, having crossed the Alps, penetrated the Italian peninsula, bringing war and destruction there for sixteen years. This was perceived by Rome as the greatest threat ever to occur, and the result was a desire for annihilation towards the rival power (Carthage was then razed to the ground) and a profound rethinking of the Roman army.

2 – As already examined more fully (see “Disprove the prophecy”, Substack), the swelling of European warmongering, even if it most likely does not correspond to a real desire to wage war on Russia, but rather to show itself ready to dissuade Moscow, it actually risks having the opposite effect, that is, appearing as a threat from the Russian point of view, and consequently being taken seriously.

3 – Hypersonic missiles are practically uninterceptable. They travel at a speed of about 9 times that of sound, that is, more than 10,000 kilometers per hour. The possible interception maneuver involves the radar detecting the missile and transmitting its coordinates to the anti-aircraft system (Patriot), then it takes five to seven minutes for the Patriot system to become operational. A Zircon missile travels approximately 1,000 km in that period of time. One of the main requirements for interception is the presence of a continuous radar field, which allows the target to be detected from the beginning to the end of the flight. But an always-on radar means making it an identified and localized target, which can be attacked with drones or glide bombs.